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The issue of reducing reoffending has been an age-old challenge in criminological research 
and sentencing policy. Three-strikes sentencing purports to achieve this goal by imposing 
mandatory minimum sentences for repeat offenders. 
This thesis examines the efficacy of three-strikes sentencing methods at reducing violent 
reoffending. This thesis begins by examining the objectives behind the introduction of New 
Zealand’s three-strikes regime. It then goes on to analyse the application of the regime in 
practice as seen in case law. Expanding upon this analysis, this thesis goes on to discuss the 
impact of the regime on criminal lawyers, and defendants who are subject to the regime. 
Following from that, this thesis goes on to analyse the theoretical basis of the three-strikes 
regime, and whether New Zealand’s implementation and application of the regime is 
theoretically justified. Finally, this thesis discusses the potential repeal of New Zealand’s 
three-strikes regime, how a potential repeal may be implemented, and the practical 
implications of such a repeal.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Introduction to Three-Strikes Regimes 
Three-strikes laws enact enhanced penalties against offenders who have been previously 
convicted of certain crimes (usually serious violent offences), which might include restrictions 
on parole eligibility. Such laws are intended to reduce reoffending “by imprisoning the worst 
repeat violent and sexual offenders for longer periods”,1 and thereby “protect[ing] the public 
from the worst repeat offenders.”2 Three-strikes laws are distinguished from the common 
sentencing practice of consideration of prior offences because they impose mandatory 
minimum sentences rather than allowing for judicial discretion. 
1.1.2 New Zealand’s Three-Strikes Regime 
In May 2010, New Zealand implemented three-strikes legislation in the form of the Sentencing 
and Parole Reform Act 2010. The Act introduced a “three-strikes” regime into the Sentencing 
Act 2002, which imposes increasingly severe consequences for repeat violent offenders. The 
regime applies to offenders who commit ‘serious violent offences’ as defined in s 86A 
Sentencing Act 2002. A slightly different regime operates for those committing murder as their 
second or third offence. 
For a stage-1 offence — that is, the first time an offender commits a 'serious violent offence’ 
— s 86B Sentencing Act provides that offenders are sentenced normally, and are given a 
warning of the consequences of the regime. 
For a stage-2 non-murder offence — that is, the second time an offender commits a 'serious 
violent offence' — s 86C provides that offenders are to be sentenced normally, but must serve 
that sentence without parole. 
For a stage-3 non-murder offence, s 86D provides that offenders must be sentenced to the 
maximum sentence for the offence, and must serve that sentence without parole unless this 
would be ‘manifestly unjust’. 
For a stage-2 or stage-3 murder offence, s 86E provides that an offender must be sentenced to 
life imprisonment without parole unless this would be manifestly unjust. 
1.1.2.1 Manifest Injustice 
Sections 86D and 86E Sentencing Act are both subject to a 'manifest injustice' exception — 
that is, the Court may avoid making a non-parole order if it is satisfied that such an order would 
be manifestly unjust. In Chapter 3, this thesis will examine how the Courts have interpreted 
and applied this ‘manifest injustice’ exception. 
 
1 Law and Order Committee Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17-2) and Petition 2008/4 of Rosa Chow and 
7,076 others (26 March 2010) at 1. 
2 (18 February 2009) 652 NZPD 1420 at 1421. 
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1.2 Research questions 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
1. What were the objectives behind the introduction of the three-strikes regime? 
2. Has the three-strikes regime been effective in practice? 
3. Does sentencing theory suggest that a the three-strikes regime can be effective? 
4. What should the future of the three-strikes regime in New Zealand be? 
1.3 Importance of the research 
The issue of reducing reoffending has been an age-old challenge in criminological research and 
sentencing policy. A wide variety of sentencing methods have been attempted in pursuit of this 
goal, and this thesis hopes to contribute to the field by examining the efficacy of one such 
attempt. 
1.3.1 Repeal attempt 
This research is particularly relevant now due to the fact that in recent years, the New Zealand 
Government has signalled its interest in repealing our three-strikes regime. In May 2018, the 
Hon Andrew Little, who was at the time the Minister of Justice, announced plans to repeal 
three-strikes regime3 because it “had not reduced crime rates and failed to act as an effective 
deterrent”, and had not made a difference in the eight years since its enactment.4 However, this 
attempt at repeal was unsuccessful as Mr Little was forced to withdraw his proposal due to a 
lack of political support from their coalition partners in the New Zealand First Party.5  
Although Mr Little signalled his intention to re-introduce the issue of repealing the three-strikes 
regime together with the bulk of the criminal justice reforms taking place in 2019, this did not 
ultimately happen. 
In October 2020, following the 2020 New Zealand General Election, the Labour Party once 
again vowed to repeal the three-strikes regime, with caretaker Minister of Justice Andrew 
Little6 saying that:7 
 
3 Tova O’Brien “Exclusive: Govt to repeal three strikes law in two weeks” Newshub (30 May 2018) 
<https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2018/05/exclusive-govt-to-repeal-three-strikes-law-in-two-
weeks.html>. 
4 Maddison Northcott “Andrew Little says three strikes law will be repealed” (1 November 2017) Stuff 
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/98466153/andrew-little-says-three-strikes-law-will-be-repealed>. 
5 Andrew Little “Three Strikes repeal not going to Cabinet” The Beehive 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/three-strikes-repeal-not-going-cabinet>. 
6 Following the 2020 New Zealand General Election, the current Minister of Justice is the Honourable Kris Faafoi: 
“Ministers | Beehive.govt.nz” The Beehive <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ministers>. 





Labour has committed to repeal the three strikes law which is leading to absurd 
results and instead focus on building a criminal justice system that ensures less 
crime, less offending and fewer victims of crime who are better supported.8 
This attempt at repeal may be more successful than the 2018 attempt as the Labour Party’s 
commanding win in the 2020 General Election allowed it to govern without a coalition partner.9 
For this reason this research considers the practical consequences of repeal in the final chapter. 
1.4 Limitations 
Despite the use of three-strikes regimes in other jurisdictions, there is limited data available as 
to its success. Limited empirical studies have been performed, and any studies available are 
influenced by a large number of variables (such as the effect of other policies introduced 
concurrently) which will need to be isolated. Therefore, this thesis will primarily focus on the 
implementation and application of New Zealand’s three-strikes regime through examining 
primary materials including Parliamentary debates and submissions, case law, and a small 
empirical study. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Following on from this introduction, chapter 2 sets out 
the background and history of New Zealand’s three-strikes law, by examining the evolution of 
the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill as it moved through the legislative process. It will then 
examine Parliamentary debates on the Bill, and the arguments made in favour of and against 
the Bill. Finally, this chapter will analyse the public sentiment about the Bill by examining the 
submissions made on the Bill by members of the public. 
Chapter 3 goes on to analyse the application of the regime as found in case law. It will first 
examine the consistency of the three-strikes regime with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. Next, it will discuss the application of the manifest injustice exception in the leading case 
of R v Harrison; R v Turner,10 and how this was applied in subsequent decisions. Finally, this 
chapter will examine the application of the manifest injustice exception to s 86C (stage-2 non-
murder offences) in case law. 
Chapter 4 will expand upon the analysis in chapter 3, and discuss the impact of the regime on 
criminal lawyers, and defendants who are subject to the regime. This will involve a survey of 
criminal lawyers in New Zealand, and will provide further insight into the practical application 
of the three-strikes regime and its effect on criminal defendants. 
Next, chapter 5 will analyse the theoretical basis of the three-strikes regime. It will begin by 
establishing the theoretical grounds for punishment under which New Zealand’s three-strikes 
 
8 Minister Little may have been referring to decisions such as R v Campbell [2016] NZHC 2817; and R v Fitzgerald 
[2018] NZHC 1015 both of which resulted in sentences of 7 years imprisonment for relatively minor offending. 
9 New Zealand Electoral Commission “2020 General Election—Official Results And Statistics” (30 November 
2020) <https://electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2020/statistics/index.html>. 
10 R v Harrison; R v Turner [2016] 3 NZLR 602. 
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regime is justified. It will then consider the validity of these grounds, and whether New 
Zealand’s implementation and application of the three-strikes regime fits within these grounds. 
The last chapter, chapter 6 will discuss the potential repeal of New Zealand’s three-strikes 
regime. It will first analyse the arguments for and against repealing the regime. Then, it will 




Chapter 2. Development of a Three-Strikes Regime in New Zealand 
2.1 Introduction 
The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill was conceived and written in 2008 by then ACT Party 
MP David Garrett following a visit to California, one of the first states to introduce a three-
strikes regime. He was accompanied on this visit by members of the Sensible Sentencing 
Trust.11 
This chapter will first set out how the Bill was enacted, and briefly explain the Bill as it was 
enacted. Next, it will examine the changes made to the Bill as it moved through the legislative 
process, and discuss the effect of those changes. It will then examine Parliamentary debates on 
the Bill, and the arguments made in favour of and against the Bill. Finally, this chapter will 
examine the submissions made on the Bill by members of the public. Overall, the purpose of 
this chapter is to explain the background to the Bill. This will set the scene for Chapter 3 which 
discusses the application of the regime in case law. 
2.2 Introduction and Initial Changes to the Bill 
2.2.1 Overview of Legislative Process 
The Bill had its First Reading in Parliament on 18 February 2009.12 Following a call for 
submissions from 7 March 2009 to 24 April 2009,13 an interim report was released by the Select 
Committee on 17 February 2010, containing several proposed amendments to give effect to 
some of the changes suggested in the first round of submissions.14 At the same time, the lead 
advising agency was changed from the Ministry of Justice to the New Zealand Police, with the 
Department of Corrections assisting.15 
There was then a second call for submissions ending 5 March 2010. 16  The final Select 
Committee report was presented on 26 March 2010,17 together with a Bar-2 version of the Bill 
containing the same proposed amendments.18 The Bill was then read a second time on 4 May 
2010, where the amendments proposed by the Select Committee were agreed to by a party 
vote.19 
 
11 The Sensible Sentencing Trust is a political lobby group that claims to advocate on behalf of victims of violent 
crime. Its goals include increasing sentencing levels and abolishing parole and cumulative sentencing. 
12 (18 February 2009) 652 NZPD 1420. 
13 New Zealand House of Representatives “Have Your Say: Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill” The Press (New 
Zealand, 7 March 2009) J5. 
14 Law and Order Committee Interim report on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17-1) (17 February 2010); 
See also Chapter 2.4 below. 
15 Cabinet Minute of Decision “Changes to the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill” (17 December 2009) CAB 
Min (09) 45/11 at 3. 
16 Law and Order Committee, above n 1, at 11. 
17 Law and Order Committee, above n 1. 
18 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010, Legislative History; See also Chapter 2.2.2 below. 
19 (4 May 2010) 662 NZPD 10673. 
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The Bill was then debated by a Committee of the whole House on 18 May 2010,20 resulting in 
a Bar-3 version of the Bill containing several minor amendments, but no substantive changes.21 
Finally, the Bar-3 version of the Bill was read a third time on 25 May 2010 and enacted as the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010.22 The Act received the Royal Assent on 31 May 2010 
and commenced the following day.23 
2.2.2 The Bill as Introduced 
Under the Bill as it was introduced, the three-strikes regime was triggered by ‘qualifying 
sentences’. Offenders who committed any of the 37 listed ‘serious violent offences’,24 and 
received a sentence of 5 years or more imprisonment, would be considered to have received a 
‘qualifying sentence’, and would receive a ‘strike’.25 An offender on his first strike would be 
sentenced normally, and would receive a First Warning stating the consequences of receiving 
further ‘qualifying sentences’.  
An offender who commits a non-murder offence on his second strike would be sentenced 
normally, but would have to serve the sentence without parole. In addition, he would receive a 
Final Warning stating the consequences of receiving further ‘qualifying sentences’. 26 
An offender who commits a non-murder offence on his third strike must be sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and must serve a Minimum Period of Imprisonment of 25 years unless that 
would be manifestly unjust.27 
There was a slightly different regime for murder offences. An offender who commits murder 
on his second or third strike must be sentenced to life imprisonment, and must serve that 
sentence without parole unless that would be manifestly unjust. If life imprisonment without 
parole is found to be manifestly unjust, the court must impose a Minimum Period of 
Imprisonment of 25 years.28 
The relevant sections as introduced are quoted below: 
86B First warning on receiving first qualifying sentence for serious violent 
offence 
(1) This section applies to a qualifying sentence for a serious violent offence 
imposed on an offender who, at the time of committing that serious 
violent offence,— 
(a) did not have a record of a warning given under this section; and 
 
20 (18 May 2010) 663 NZPD 10901. 
21 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17–3). 
22 (25 May 2010) 663 NZPD 11226 at 11247. 
23 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act, s 2. 
24 See Appendix A. 
25 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–1), s 86A. 
26 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–1), s 86C. 
27 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–1), s 86D. 
28 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–1), s 86E. 
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(b) was 18 years of age or over. 
(2) When the court imposes the qualifying sentence, the court must— 
(a) advise the offender that the court is imposing a sentence to which 
this section applies and warn the offender of the consequences of 
receiving a further qualifying sentence for a further serious violent 
offence; and 
(b) record that a sentence to which this section applies has been 
imposed on the offender and that the offender has been warned in 
accordance with paragraph (a). 
(3) On the entry of a record under subsection (2)(b), the offender has a record 
of a first warning. 
86C Final warning on receiving second qualifying sentence for serious violent 
offence 
(1) This section applies to a qualifying sentence, other than a sentence of 
imprisonment for life for murder, for a serious violent offence imposed on 
an offender who, at the time of committing that offence, had a record of a 
first warning. 
(2) If the sentence imposed on the offender is a determinate sentence of 
imprisonment, the court must order that the offender serve the sentence 
without parole. 
(3) When the court imposes the qualifying sentence, the court must— 
(a) advise the offender that the court is imposing a sentence to which 
this section applies and warn the offender of the consequences of 
receiving a further qualifying sentence for a further serious violent 
offence; and 
(b) record that a sentence to which this section applies has been 
imposed on the offender and that the offender has been warned in 
accordance with paragraph (a). 
(4) On the entry of a record under subsection (3)(b), the offender has a record 
of a final warning. 
86D Imprisonment for life on third or subsequent qualifying sentence 
(1) This section applies if— 
(a) an offender who has a record of a final warning commits a serious 
violent offence; and 
(b) the court would, but for this section, impose a further qualifying 
sentence, other than a sentence of imprisonment for life for 
murder, for that offence. 
(2) If this section applies, the court must— 
(a) impose a sentence of imprisonment for life; and 
(b) order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment 
under that sentence. 
(3) The court must impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 25 years 
unless the court is satisfied that it would be manifestly unjust to do so. 
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(4) If the court imposes a minimum period of imprisonment that is less than 
25 years, the court must give written reasons for doing so. 
(5) If the court imposes a sentence of life imprisonment for an offence under 
this section, it must record, with reasons, the qualifying sentence the court 
would, but for this section , have imposed for that offence. 
86E Offenders with record of warning or final warning who are sentenced to 
imprisonment for life for murder 
(1) This section applies to a sentence of imprisonment for life for murder 
imposed on an offender who, at the time of committing that murder, had a 
record of a warning or a record of a final warning. 
(2) If this section applies to a sentence, the court must order that the offender 
serve the sentence of imprisonment for life without parole unless the court 
is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, it 
would be manifestly unjust to do so. 
(3) If the court does not make an order under subsection (2), the court must 
give written reasons for not doing so. 
(4) If the court does not make an order under subsection (2), the court must,— 
(a) if the offender did not, at the time of the commission of the 
murder, have a record of a final warning, order that the offender 
serve a minimum period of imprisonment in accordance with 
section 103 and, if applicable, section 104; and 
(b) in any other case, impose a minimum period of imprisonment of 
not less than 25 years unless the court is satisfied that it would be 
manifestly unjust to do so. 
(5) If, in any case to which subsection (4)(b) applies, the court imposes a 
minimum period of imprisonment of less than 25 years, the court must 
give written reasons for doing so. 
(6) If the court makes an order under subsection (4)(a) and the offender does 
not, at the time of sentencing, have a record of a final warning, the court 
must— 
(a) warn the offender of the consequences of receiving a further 
qualifying sentence for a further serious violent offence; and 
(b) record the sentence that has been imposed on the offender and that 
the offender has been warned in accordance with paragraph (a). 
(7) On the entry of a record under subsection (6)(b), the offender has a record 
of a final warning. 
2.2.3 Changes from Bar-1 to Bar-2 
There were a significant number of changes from the Bar-1 to the Bar-2 version of the Bill 
following the Select Committee process, including many changes in wording for the purpose 
of clarification. This chapter will focus on the substantive changes. 
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2.2.3.1 Removal of five-year requirement 
Section 86A originally defined a ‘qualifying sentence’ as “a determinate sentence of 
imprisonment of 5 years or more or an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment”.29 It was 
amended to remove this definition.30 Sections 86B to 86FA were also amended to remove 
references to a ‘qualifying sentence’. This simply left the definition as referring to the specified 
offences, and had the effect of making sentences under five years’ imprisonment count as strike 
offences, and therefore trigger the three-strikes regime, where they previously did not. With 
the removal of the five-year threshold, police discretion as to the charges laid would become 
critical. Therefore, all stage-3 charges would be referred to the Crown solicitor for peer 
review.31 
This amendment was made in response to the 70 submitters who suggested that the five-year 
requirement be removed. Parliament intended for this amendment to provide more “certainty 
for offenders and victims about the consequences of offending”,32 and to increase the deterrent 
or incapacitory impact of the Bill as “the wide scope of this option means that more people will 
be subject to the regime”.33 
2.2.3.2 Removal of qualifying offences 
Section 86A was also amended to remove the following offences from the list of “serious 
violent offence[s]” that would count as strike offences: 
• Section 130 Crimes Act (Incest) (max penalty = 10 years imprisonment); 
• Section 199 Crimes Act (Acid throwing) (max penalty = 14 years imprisonment). 
This may have been in response to submissions that argued that incest may be consensual, and 
where it was not, it could also be charged as sexual assault which was a qualifying offence.34 
Similarly, some submissions argued that acid throwing was a rare offence that did not 
necessarily cause injury. If injury was caused, it could also be charged as wounding with intent 
to cause grievous bodily harm, which was a qualifying offence.35 
2.2.3.3 Addition of qualifying offences 
Section 86A was amended to add the following offences to the list of “serious violent offence[s]” 
that would count as strike offences:36 
• Section 144A Crimes Act (sexual conduct with children and young people outside 
New Zealand); 
 
29 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–1), s 86A. 
30 Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (17–2), s 86A. 
31 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10678. 
32 Cabinet Paper “Changes to the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill” (16 December 2009) CAB 100/2008/1 at 8. 
33 At 6. 
34 Ron Peek “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009”. 
35 Peek, above n 34; Sensible Sentencing Trust (Napier) “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on 
the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (17 April 2009)” at 5. 
36 See also the new list of offences in Appendix B. 
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• Section 174 Crimes Act (counselling or attempting to procure murder); 
• Section 175 Crimes Act (conspiracy to murder); 
• Section 200(1) Crimes Act (poisoning with intent to cause grievous bodily harm); 
• Section 201 Crimes Act (infecting with disease). 
Although no explicit rationale was given for these changes, a Cabinet Paper stated that “[a]s a 
general rule, the list comprises of all major violent and sexual offences with a maximum penalty 
of seven years imprisonment or more.”37 
2.2.3.4 Requiring stage-3 offences be heard in High Court 
Section 86D(1) was amended to require that stage-3 non-murder offences be heard in the High 
Court. There was no explicit rule on this in the Bar-1 version of the Bill, which meant that 
qualifying offences that were category 3 offences38 could be heard in District Court even at 
stage-3. 
2.2.3.5 Changes to consequences for stage-3 non-murder convictions 
Section 86D(2) and (3) was amended to change the consequence for a stage-3 non-murder 
conviction from life imprisonment with a 25 year MPI (unless manifestly unjust) in the Bar-1 
version of the Bill, to the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the offence served without 
parole (unless manifestly unjust) in the Bar-2 version of the Bill. This may have been intended 
to address concerns that requiring life imprisonment for offences that otherwise carry 
maximum sentences as low as seven years may be contrary to s 9 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act (NZBORA) 1990. 
Section 86D(4) was amended to provide that a stage-3 manslaughter sentence would incur a 
minimum 20 year MPI, unless that would be manifestly unjust, in which case the court was 
required to impose a MPI of at least 10 years. Under the Bar-1 version of the Bill, the same 
offence would have incurred a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and a MPI of 25 years 
unless that would be manifestly unjust. This amendment was intended to account for the fact 
that under the new s 86D(3), a stage-3 manslaughter would incur a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole unless that would be manifestly unjust, and to recognise the fact 
that “[m]anslaughter covers a wide range of conduct… [and] [l]ife imprisonment is seldom, if 
ever, imposed for manslaughter”.39 
Section 86D(6) was added to provide that where an offender was sentenced under s 86D(2) and 
(3) to serve the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the offence without parole, any other 
sentence of imprisonment imposed at the same time must be served concurrently. This was 
 
37 Cabinet Paper, above n 32, at 1. 
38 Crimes Act 1961, s 172 (Murder); Section 173 (Attempted murder); Section 174 (Attempting to procure murder); 
Section 175 (Conspiracy to murder); Section 177 (Manslaughter). 
39 Cabinet Domestic Policy Committee “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill: Police Charging Practices and 
Additional Legal and Policy Issues” (22 February 2010) DOM (10)3 at [39]. 
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intended to account for the fact that “[i]f the court was required to impose cumulative sentences 
for each qualifying offence, this would result in extremely long sentences in some cases.”40 
2.2.3.6 Allow for preventive detention for stage-3 non-murder 
Section 86D(7) was added to allow courts to impose a sentence of preventive detention to an 
offender sentenced under ss 86D(2) and (3) to serve the maximum sentence of imprisonment 
for the offence without parole, and to clarify that the MPI for said preventive detention could 
not be less than the term of imprisonment under the regime (i.e. the maximum sentence for the 
offence), unless the term under the regime would be manifestly unjust. This change was 
intended to “align preventive detention with the general stage three policy”.41 
2.2.3.7 Changes to consequences for stage-2 and -3 murders 
Section 86E(4) was amended to change the consequences if a court found that life 
imprisonment without parole for a stage-2 or -3 murder would be manifestly unjust. This had 
the effect of increasing the MPI that a court had to impose from the MPI under ss 103-104 (a 
minimum of 10 years and 17 years respectively) in the Bar-1 version of the Bill, to a minimum 
of 20 years for a stage-3 murder (unless manifestly unjust), and the MPI under s 103 for a stage-
2 murder, or if manifest injustice was found for the 20 year MPI above in the Bar-2 version of 
the Bill. 
2.2.3.8 Clarify effect of appeals on strikes 
Section 86F was amended to make it compatible with the removal of the five-year requirement 
in s 86A. 
Sections 86FA-86G were added to clarify the effect of appeals on strike warnings and the 
associated strike sentences. 
2.2.4 Changes from Bar-2 to Bar-3 (Bill as enacted) 
There were no substantive changes from the Bar-2 to Bar-3 versions of the Bill, following the 
debate in the Committee of the House. Some minor changes resulted from the committee of 
the whole House debate.42 The bar-3 version of the Bill passed its third reading on 25 May 
2010. 
2.3 Debates in Parliament 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the process leading up to the passing of the Bill, this thesis will now examine 
the arguments raised both for and against the Bill. This paper will begin by examining the 
arguments made by Members of Parliament. This will give us insight into Parliament’s intent 
when passing the Bill.  
 
40 At [43]. 
41 At [37]. 
42 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20. 
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The Bill was supported by members of the National and ACT Parties, and opposed by members 
of the Labour, Green, Maori, Progressive, and United Future Parties. 
2.3.2 Arguments in favour of the three-strikes regime 
This section will describe the arguments in favour of the three-strikes regime in each of the 
three readings. It is interesting to note that some arguments are raised in multiple stages of the 
debate, while others are raised only once. 
2.3.2.1 First Reading 
2.3.2.1.1 Public confidence in the Criminal Justice System43 
Simon Power MP (National) and Dr Richard Worth MP (National) both noted that the Bill was 
intended to provide certainty to the public about when or whether offenders would be released 
on parole, and to restore the public’s faith in sentencing.44 Dr Worth further argued that public 
confidence in the Criminal Justice System had been damaged by reports of serious offending 
by people on parole, and of violent offenders being sentenced to home detention.45 
2.3.2.1.2 Protect victims from re-victimisation46 
Mr Power noted that the Bill was also intended to spare victims and their families from 
repeatedly having to attend parole hearings.47 
2.3.2.1.3 Public safety48 
The primary architect of the Bill as it was first introduced, David Garrett MP (ACT), said that 
at the time of introduction of the Bill, there were “77 murderers in jail who committed a murder 
at a time when they had three or more violent offences under their belt”, and that had the Bill 
been in force in the past, there would have been 77 fewer murder victims.49 Dr Worth similarly 
suggested that the rate of violent crime had risen by 46.6 per cent from 2000 to 2009, and that 
the Bill would respond to that increase by increasing the deterrent effect of prison sentences.50 
On a similar note, Sandra Goudie MP (National), who would later become Chairperson of the 
Select Committee on the Bill, and Chester Borrows MP (National) both stated that the Bill 
would ensure the safety of law-abiding New Zealanders.51 Ms Goudie added that members who 
opposed the Bill condoned criminal offending.52 
 
43 See also 2.3.2.4.7. 
44 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1421. 
45 At 1424. 
46 See also 2.3.2.2.2 and 2.3.2.3.3. 
47 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1421. 
48 See also 2.3.2.2.3, 2.3.2.3.5, and 2.3.2.4.4. 
49 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1428. 
50 At 1425. 
51 At 1428; At 1435. 
52 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1427. 
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2.3.2.1.4 Supported by evidence53 
Mr Garrett further noted that the Ministry of Justice Regulatory Impact Statement had found 
that a similar regime in California had a “statistically significant deterrent effect”.54 He also 
argued that a similar regime in Singapore had been effective.55 
2.3.2.1.5 Address social and economic inequality56 
Mr Garrett argued that although the regime would disproportionately affect Maori, Maori 
people were also more likely to be the victims of crime.57 
2.3.2.1.6 Other comments on purpose of the Bill 
Mr Garrett noted that the Bill was intended to remove the discretion of the sentencing judge.58 
Chester Borrows MP (National) considered that although the rehabilitation of prisoners was 
important, that was not the purpose of the Bill, and that other legislation would be introduced 
in the future to provide for rehabilitation.59  
2.3.2.1.7 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill in the First Reading were 
that the Bill would increase public confidence in the Criminal Justice System and that it would 
improve public safety. 
2.3.2.2 Second Reading 
2.3.2.2.1 Intended to target repeat violent offenders 
Judith Collins MP (National), who was at that time the Minister of Corrections, considered that 
the Bill's main purpose was:60 
to deny parole to repeat serious violent offenders and to offenders who are guilty of 
committing the worst murders, and to impose maximum terms of imprisonment on 
persistent repeat offenders who continue to commit serious and violent offences. 
Ms Collins and Rodney Hide MP (ACT) both considered that the Bill was intended to result in 
disproportionate sentences for repeat violent offenders.61 
2.3.2.2.2 Protect victims from re-victimisation62 
Ms Collins noted that the Bill would protect the victims of repeat offenders from the stress of 
attending regular parole hearings.63 
 
53 See also 2.3.2.2.5 and 2.3.2.3.1. 
54 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1429. 
55 At 1430. 
56 See also 2.3.2.2.6 and 2.3.2.3.6. 
57 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1429. 
58 At 1438. 
59 At 1435. 
60 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10673. 
61 At 10673; At 10683. 
62 See also 2.3.2.1.2 and 2.3.2.3.3. 
63 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10673. 
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2.3.2.2.3 Public safety64 
Ms Collins also referred to public submissions which reflected concerns about violent crime 
and public safety and argued that the Bill would improve public safety.65 
Jonathan Young MP (National) considered that crime is often an endemic, generational issue 
that would take time to address, but that the Bill was intended to protect the public, not to 
address the causes of offending.66 
2.3.2.2.4 Supported by evidence67 
Mr Hide argued that there was evidence showing that the proposed regime would deter 
reoffending.68 
2.3.2.2.5 Address economic and social inequality69 
Mr Hide considered that the Bill would help address economic and social disadvantage by 
reducing violent offending, which disproportionately affects the poorest communities.70 
2.3.2.2.6 Deterrent effect71 
Ms Goudie and Mr Hide argued that the Bill would have a deterrent effect by sending a message 
that violent offending would no longer be tolerated.72 
2.3.2.2.7 Tough on crime73 
Ms Collins argued that the Bill represented the Government toughening up on criminals and 
putting the “victim’s and the wider community’s interests ahead of the interests of our worst 
serious violent offenders.”74 
Ms Goudie suggested that members who opposed the Bill were soft on crime, and that the 
consequence of committing a crime was that the offenders give up their rights. Ms Goudie 
further considered that the Bill represented the National Party “taking the tough steps needed 
in order to tackle violent crime and make people feel safer in their homes and on the streets.”75 
2.3.2.2.8 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill in the Second Reading were 
that the Bill would improve public safety (which was also a key theme in the first reading), that 
 
64 See also 2.3.2.1.3, 2.3.2.3.5 and 2.3.2.4.4. 
65 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10674. 
66 At 10684. 
67 See also 2.3.2.3.1 and 2.3.2.1.4. 
68 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10684. 
69 See also 2.3.2.1.5 and 2.3.2.3.6. 
70 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10683. 
71 See also 2.3.2.3.4 and 2.3.2.4.5. 
72 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10678, 10684. 
73 See also 2.3.2.4.8. 
74 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10675. 
75 At 10678. 
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it was intended to target repeat offenders, and that it would demonstrate that the government 
was tough on crime. 
2.3.2.3 In Committee of whole House 
2.3.2.3.1 Supported by evidence76 
David Garrett MP (ACT) argued that academics such as Professor Warren Brookbanks had 
conceded that similar regimes had been effective in the United States.77 
2.3.2.3.2 Rehabilitation 
Mr Garrett argued that some offenders were beyond rehabilitation. He further argued that the 
Bill would aid in rehabilitating other repeat offenders who were not beyond rehabilitation 
because it would provide certainty of sentence length.78 
2.3.2.3.3 Protect victims from re-victimisation79 
Dr Cam Calder MP (National) repeated previous arguments that the Bill would protect victims 
and their families from the stress of attending regular parole hearings.80 
2.3.2.3.4 Deterrent effect81 
Judith Collins MP (National), Rodney Hide MP (ACT) and Mr Garrett all considered that the 
Bill would reduce reoffending by sending a message to offenders that repeat offending would 
not be tolerated,82 noting that a similar regime in California had shown a deterrent effect.83 
2.3.2.3.5 Public safety84 
Mr Garrett considered that the Bill was primarily about keeping the community safe by 
incapacitating repeat violent offenders, and that rehabilitation was not a priority.85 He further 
argued that “[s]ince the election four more people have died at the hands of persons who, had 
this law been in place at the time they committed their crimes, would have been in jail.”86 
2.3.2.3.6 Address economic and social inequality87 
Mr Garrett repeated previous arguments by himself and Mr Hide that the Bill was supported 
by poor communities because they were the ones most affected by crime.88 
 
76 See also 2.3.2.1.4 and 2.3.2.2.5. 
77 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10905. 
78 At 10915. 
79 See also 2.3.2.1.2 and 2.3.2.2.2. 
80 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10908. 
81 See also 2.3.2.4.5 and 2.3.2.2.7. 
82 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10936. 
83 At 10906. 
84 See also 2.3.2.1.3, 2.3.2.2.3, 2.3.2.3.5 and 2.3.2.4.4. 
85 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10916. 
86 At 10905; Note: At 10905 Note: The 2008 New Zealand General Elections were held on 8 November 2008. 
This reading occurred on 18 May 2010. Approximately 15 months had passed in this time. 
87 See also 2.3.2.1.5 and 2.3.2.2.6. 
88 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10906. 
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2.3.2.3.7 Intended to target repeat offenders89 
Mr Garrett stated that the Bill was intended to result in disproportionate sentences for repeat 
offenders.90 
2.3.2.3.8 Regime would not result in unjust outcomes91 
Mr Garrett argued that the Bill was designed to operate differently from the regime in 
California, and that the unjust outcomes seen under the Californian regime would not occur 
here.92 
2.3.2.3.9 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill in the Committee of whole 
House were that the Bill would improve public safety by deterring repeat offenders (also a key 
theme in the first and second readings), and that it would not result in unjust outcomes. 
2.3.2.4 Third Reading 
2.3.2.4.1 Intended to target repeat offenders93 
Judith Collins MP (National) reiterated that the regime was intended to result in 
disproportionate sentencing of repeat violent offenders.94  
2.3.2.4.2 Regime would not result in unjust outcomes95 
Ms Collins said that the Bill would not result in unjust outcomes because stage-3 charges would 
be reviewed by the Crown solicitor to ensure that the appropriate charges were laid.96 
2.3.2.4.3 Tough on crime97 
Sandra Goudie MP (National) stated that the Bill would get tough on crime and keep the public 
safe, and suggested that members who opposed the Bill were soft on crime.98 Jonathan Young 
MP (National) referred to submissions from the public, and argued that they overwhelmingly 
showed that New Zealanders wanted sentencing to be “tougher for the worst repeat violent 
offenders.”99 
2.3.2.4.4 Public safety100 
Ms Collins, Ms Goudie and David Garrett MP (ACT) considered that the Bill was intended to 
protect victims, and that it would reduce crime by incapacitation and deterrence.101 
 
89 See also 2.3.2.4.1. 
90 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10940. 
91 See also 2.3.2.4.2. 
92 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10906. 
93 See also 2.3.2.3.7. 
94 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11228. 
95 See also 2.3.2.3.8. 
96 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11228. 
97 See also 2.3.2.2.8. 
98 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11231. 
99 At 11239. 
100 See also 2.3.2.1.3, 2.3.2.2.3 and 2.3.2.3.5. 
101 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11237. 
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2.3.2.4.5 Deterrent effect102 
Mr Garrett further argued that the Bill would have a deterrent effect because criminals would 
weigh up the cause and effect of their offending.103 
2.3.2.4.6 Public support 
Johnathan Young MP (National) cited a 1999 referendum which found that 92% of voters 
supported longer prison sentences and stated that the Bill had widespread public support.104 
2.3.2.4.7 Public confidence in Criminal Justice System105 
Mr Young further stated that the Bill was not intended to rehabilitate offenders, but to send “a 
signal to the people of New Zealand that this Government, in association with the ACT Party, 
is serious in its concerns about violent offending.”106 
2.3.2.4.8 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill in the Third Reading were 
that the Bill reflected the public’s desire for laws to be tougher on crime and that it would 
therefore improve public confidence in the Criminal Justice System, and public safety, which 
has been present at every stage. 
2.3.2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill throughout 
the readings were that the Bill would improve public safety, protect victims from re-
victimisation, and increase public confidence in the criminal justice system. Other themes 
appeared in latter readings, such as that the Bill reflected the public’s desire for laws to be 
tougher on crime, and that the Bill was supported by evidence and would have a deterrent effect 
on offenders. Some other themes also arose in response to critiques of the regime, with 
proponents of the regime saying that it was intended to target repeat offenders and was designed 
in a manner that would not result in unjust outcomes. 
2.3.3 Arguments against the three-strikes regime 
This section will describe the arguments against the three-strikes regime in each of the three 
readings. It is interesting to note that some arguments are raised in multiple stages of the debate, 
while others are raised only once. 
2.3.3.1 First Reading 
2.3.3.1.1 Oversold to the public 
Clayton Cosgrove MP (Labour) and Jim Anderton MP (Progressive) both argued that 
proponents of the Bill had oversold its effectiveness by claiming that it would have an 
immediate impact. They further argued that because the Bill had no retrospective effect, it 
 
102 See also 2.3.2.2.7 and 2.3.2.3.4. 
103 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11237. 
104 At 11239. 
105 See also 2.3.2.1.1. 
106 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11239. 
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would not come into effect for 15 to 20 years because of the time required to accumulate strikes. 
This is premised on the assumption that offenders would not offend in prison. However this 
assumption has not always held true. Mr Cosgrove and Mr Anderton also argued that public 
confidence in the justice system would be damaged when it inevitably did not live up to those 
earlier promises.107 
2.3.3.1.2 Driven by popular appeal 
Mr Anderton further argued that the Bill was a cynical bid for popular appeal.108 Jacinda 
Ardern MP (Labour) similarly argued that the way to restore public confidence in the justice 
system was to end the political bidding war around law and order, and focus instead on 
addressing the root causes of offending.109 
2.3.3.1.3 International comparisons 
Ms Ardern and Tariana Turia MP (Maori) both argued that similar regimes in the USA have 
not been successful. Ms Ardern argued that eight of the 22 states that had implemented similar 
regimes were now trying to remove them,110 and Ms Turia noted that in California in particular, 
a similar regime had resulted in an unsustainable increase in the number of prison inmates, 
eventually resulting in the release of 57,000 inmates one week ago.111 Similarly, Mr Anderton 
argued that similar regimes in other countries had resulted in “huge anomalies and greater 
injustices.”112 
2.3.3.1.4 Effectiveness / Alternatives to incarceration 
Mr Anderton, Ms Turia, Ms Ardern, and Metiria Turei MP (Green) argued that there was little 
evidence that the Bill would have a deterrent effect,113 and that the Bill would not reduce 
violent crime because it did not address the root causes of crime, such as substance abuse and 
illiteracy.114  Ms Turia further argued that research indicated that the Bill would result in 
“increased homicide rates, significantly larger prison population, disproportionate effect on 
non-violent offenders, disproportionate effect on marginalised populations, and significant 
costs and negative impacts on offenders’ families”,115 and that alternatives to incarceration 
should be considered.116 Ms Ardern similarly referred to the finding in the Regulatory Impact 
Statement (RIS) prepared by the Ministry of Justice117 that “it is not possible to conclude with 
 
107 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1424. 
108 At 1425. 
109 At 1440. 
110 At 1439. 
111 At 1430. 
112 At 1427. 
113 At 1425; At 1431; At 1433; At 1439. 
114 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1427. 
115 At 1431. 
116 At 1432. 




any certainty to what extent any of the options will improve public safety”, and argued that the 
Bill was therefore a solely punitive measure.118 
2.3.3.1.5 Injustice 
Ms Turei and Ms Ardern argued that the regime would result in injustice. Ms Turei noted that 
the RIS found that the Bill would result in disproportionate outcomes that would reduce public 
confidence in the justice system. Ms Ardern similarly argued that the Bill would remove 
judicial discretion, which would result in unjust outcomes such as an offender who commits 
three burglaries being sentenced to more than 60 years in prison.119 
2.3.3.1.6 Disproportionate impact on Maori 
Ms Turia and Ms Turei both noted the finding in the RIS that the Bill would disproportionately 
impact Maori. Ms Turei further argued that systemic racism in the criminal justice system leads 
to Maori being stopped by Police more frequently, and being sentenced more harshly.120 
2.3.3.1.7 Unintended consequences 
Ms Turia and Ms Turei both argued that the Bill could lead to unintended consequences. Ms 
Turia argued that it could result in the under-reporting of family violence, and an unsustainable 
increase in the prison population,121 and Ms Turei argued that it could lead to a perverse 
incentive for offenders to commit more severe crimes in order to avoid detection.122 
2.3.3.1.8 Cost 
Ms Turei and Shane Jones MP (Labour) both argued that the Bill would lead to substantial 
financial costs and that it would not make the public safer.123 Ms Turei further argued that these 
costs would take away funding which could be used to fund rehabilitation and education 
programmes in prison, which would more effectively reduce reoffending.124 
2.3.3.1.9 Imprisonment rates 
Ms Ardern argued that although crime rates in New Zealand were dropping, sentencing levels 
were higher, leading to New Zealand having one of the highest imprisonment rates in the 
world.125 
2.3.3.1.10 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised against the proposed Bill in the First Reading were that 
the Bill would result in unjust outcomes, that it was oversold to the public and would therefore 
decrease public confidence in the Criminal Justice System, and that it would not effectively 
reduce reoffending. 
 
118 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, above n 12, at 1440. 
119 At 1439. 
120 At 1439. 
121 At 1432. 
122 At 1433. 
123 At 1437. 
124 At 1434. 
125 At 1440. 
20 
 
2.3.3.2 Second Reading 
2.3.3.2.1 Cost 
Lianne Dalziel MP (Labour) cited a 16 December 2009 Cabinet Paper from the Minister of 
Police, which found that the deterrent effect of the Bill was uncertain, and that the Bill would:126 
add substantial direct costs to the justice system without creating any significantly 
improved outcomes in terms of reducing the drivers of crimes, improving social 
outcomes or reducing reoffending and victimisation 
2.3.3.2.2 Effectiveness / Alternatives to incarceration 
David Clendon MP (Green), Hone Harawira MP (Maori), and Lynne Pillay MP (Labour), and 
Ms Dalziel argued that the Bill would not effectively reduce reoffending, and that the focus 
should instead be on alternatives to incarceration which would be more effective. 127  Mr 
Clendon cited research showing that a combination of shorter sentences and family-oriented 
prison policies was a major factor in breaking the intergenerational cycle of crime.128 Similarly, 
Mr Harawira cited a Cabinet paper entitled “Effective Interventions”, which found that prison 
was “not the most effective or efficient approach to reducing crime.”129 Additionally, Ms Pillay 
argued that the Bill would remove incentives for good behaviour and reform in prison.130 
2.3.3.2.3 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
Hone Harawira MP (Maori), Parekura Horomia MP (Labour) and Ms Dalziel noted that the 
Attorney-General’s report under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) 
had found that the Bill may be inconsistent with s 9 of the NZBORA, which provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.”131 
2.3.3.2.4 Disproportionate impact on Maori 
Mr Horomia and Ms Dalziel also repeated previous arguments that the Bill would 
disproportionately impact Maori because Maori were disproportionately represented in the 
criminal justice system.132 
2.3.3.2.5 Oversold to the public 
Mr Clendon also repeated previous arguments that the effect of the Bill had been oversold, and 
that public confidence in the criminal justice system would be damaged when it failed to live 
up to those promises.133 
 
126 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10675. 
127 At 10676. 
128 At 10682. 
129 At 10687. 
130 At 10688. 
131 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
132 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10680; At 10677. 
133 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10681. 
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2.3.3.2.6 Impact on victims 
Chris Hipkins MP (Labour), Mr Horomia, and Ms Pillay argued that the Bill would not help 
victims, but would rather prolong their hurt.134 Ms Pillay and Mr Hipkins further argued that 
the Bill would remove any incentive for accused persons to plead guilty, which would lead to 
victims being re-victimised in the trial.135 
2.3.3.2.7 Public safety 
Mr Clendon argued that the Bill took a punitive and reactive approach, and that it would not 
make the public safer. He further argued that many offenders imprisoned under the Bill would 
eventually have to be released, and that these offenders would be “so alienated and brutalised 
that they will be almost impossible to reintegrate.”136 
2.3.3.2.8 Judicial discretion 
Mr Hipkins argued that the Bill would give the Police far more discretion than the judiciary, 
and that this was inconsistent with an open transparent and fair judicial system.137 
2.3.3.2.9 Summary  
The key themes in arguments raised against the proposed Bill in the Second Reading were that 
it would incur significant costs that could be better applied to more effective interventions, that 
it was contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and that it would disproportionately 
impact Maori. 
2.3.3.3 In Committee of whole House 
2.3.3.3.1 Injustice 
Carmel Sepuloni MP (Labour) argued that the Bill could lead to unjust outcomes because some 
of the qualifying offences, such as manslaughter, encompassed a wide range of offending with 
varying levels of severity.138 
2.3.3.3.2 Effectiveness 
Chris Hipkins MP (Labour) and Keith Locke MP (Green) argued that there should be more 
focus on preventing crime.139 Mr Locke cited the success of the Norwegian prison system, and 
argued that the Bill would not reform repeat offenders, and would only increase the rate of 
reoffending. Instead, Mr Locke argued that there should be more focus on rehabilitation in 
prisons.140 
2.3.3.3.3 Unintended consequences 
Lianne Dalziel MP (Labour) and Mr Hipkins both argued that the Bill would place prison 
guards in more danger because it would lead to an increased prison population, and prisoners 
 
134 At 10680. 
135 At 10688; At 10691. 
136 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, above n 19, at 10681. 
137 At 10692. 
138 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – In Committee”, above n 20, at 10903. 
139 At 10905. 
140 At 10909. 
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under the regime would have no incentive to behave well.141 Ms Dalziel further referred to a 
similar regime in California, which resulted in an exponential increase in violence against 
prison guards.142 
2.3.3.3.4 Driven by popular appeal 
Clayton Cosgrove MP (Labour) repeated previous arguments that the Bill was more about 
political posturing and tugging at the heartstrings of victims, than about having its promised 
effect of reducing violent crime.143 
2.3.3.3.5 Not supported by evidence 
Ms Dalziel referred to a similar regime in California, and argued that although there was a 
decrease in the crime rate after the regime was introduced, the crime rate had been decreasing 
before the regime came into effect.144 
2.3.3.3.6 Imprisonment rates 
David Clendon MP (Green) argued that the prison system was already overcrowded, resulting 
in “double bunking in jails, and the making of containers into cells”, and that this Bill would 
further increase the prison population.145 
2.3.3.3.7 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised against the proposed Bill in the Committee of whole House 
were that similar regimes had not been successful overseas and that it was not supported by 
evidence. It was further argued that the regime could in fact lead to more violent offending due 
to unintended consequences.  
2.3.3.4 Third Reading 
2.3.3.4.1 Not supported by evidence 
Grant Robertson MP (Labour) and David Clendon MP (Green) both cited submissions from 
academics who considered that the Bill was unlikely to improve public safety. Mr Robertson 
cited submissions from the New Zealand prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society and 
criminologist John Pratt, who both considered that the Bill would not improve public safety.146 
Similarly, Mr Clendon cited submissions from Professor Warren Brookbanks and Dr Richard 
Ekins, who considered that the Bill was “unlikely to defer [sic] would-be offenders in general, 
or the offender with one or two strikes in particular.”147 
 
141 At 10905. 
142 At 10923. 
143 At 10907. 
144 At 10923. 
145 At 10941. 
146 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11230. 
147 At 11232. 
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2.3.3.4.2 Judicial discretion 
Mr Robertson cited a submission from the Police Association, which said that the bill would 
remove judicial discretion, which “provides a 'safety valve' for the myriad of possible 
circumstances surrounding any given case and is preferable to mandatory sentencing”.148 
2.3.3.4.3 Injustice 
Mr Clendon similarly cited Professor Warren Brookbanks and Dr Richard Ekins, who 
considered that the Bill would result in unjust outcomes.149 
2.3.3.4.4 Effectiveness / Alternatives to incarceration 
Hone Harawira MP (Maori) and Carmen Sepuloni MP (Labour) both argued that the Bill would 
not effectively improve public safety. Mr Harawira further argued that the Bill would create 
frustration, anger, and violence within the prison population, and that the children of offenders 
who have been jailed for life would grow up with a hatred for society, which would perpetuate 
the cycle of offending.150 Similarly, Ms Sepuloni argued that the Bill was motivated more by 
hatred for the offender, than by compassion for the victim151 and that more money should be 
spent on education, and less on prisons.152 
2.3.3.4.5 Public safety 
In response to arguments from proponents of the Bill that crime statistics had risen and that the 
Bill was required to keep the public safe, Chris Hipkins MP (Labour) argued that the recent (at 
the time) rise in crime statistics could be partially attributed to an increase in reporting of crimes 
that previously went unreported, such as domestic violence.153 
2.3.3.4.6 Listed offences 
Ruth Dyson MP (Labour) argued that Ministry of Health officials were not consulted about the 
Bill, and that their advice should have been sought about including as a qualifying offence s 
201 of the Crimes Act, which makes it an offence to wilfully infect another person with a 
disease. This, Ms Dyson argued, would stigmatise risk-taking behaviour and drive it 
underground.154 
2.3.3.4.7 Summary 
The key themes in arguments raised against the proposed Bill in the Third Reading were that 
the proposed regime was not supported by evidence and that it would not effectively reduce 
violent reoffending or improve public safety.  
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In conclusion, the key themes raised in arguments against the proposed Bill were that the Bill 
would not effectively reduce violent reoffending or improve public safety, and that it was 
motivated by public appeal. Opponents of the proposed Bill also argued that the regime was 
oversold to the public, and would in fact harm public confidence in the criminal justice system 
as it would inevitably fail to live up to its promises. Finally, opponents of the Bill also argued 
that the regime would lead to unjust outcomes and that it would incur substantial costs which 
could be better directed to more effective interventions. 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
The key themes in arguments raised in favour of the proposed Bill were that the Bill would 
make the public safer and improve public confidence in the Criminal Justice System by 
targeting repeat violent offenders. Proponents also argued that the Bill would not result in 
unjust outcomes, and that it would address social and economic inequality. 
The key themes in arguments raised against the proposed Bill were that the Bill would not 
effectively reduce violent reoffending or improve public safety, and that it was motivated by 
public appeal. Opponents of the proposed Bill also argued that the regime would lead to unjust 
outcomes and that it would incur substantial costs which could be better directed to more 
effective interventions. 
The Sentencing and Parole Reform Act was passed after the third reading on 25 May 2010, 
with a final vote of 63 Ayes and 58 Noes. The vote was along party lines, with members of the 
National and ACT Parties voting in favour of the Bill, and members of the Labour, Green, 
Maori, and United Future Parties voting against the Bill.155 
 
2.4 Submissions to Parliament 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The previous section considered arguments for and against the three-strikes regime during the 
Parliamentary debates. Next, this thesis will move on to the arguments made by members of 
the public in submissions to Parliament. This will give us insight into the level of public support 
for the Bill, and how the Bill in its final form was shaped by public opinion. 
On 7 March 2009, a call for submissions was published. It asked for comments on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill, which was described as a Bill to:156 
create a three stage regime of increasing consequences for the worst repeat violent 
offenders, specifically targeting offenders who show contempt for the court system 
 
155 At 11247. 
156 New Zealand House of Representatives, above n 13. 
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and the safety of others by continuing to offend despite long prison sentences and 
judicial warnings.   
The first round of submissions closed on 24 April 2009. Significant changes were then made 
to the Bill,157 and there was a second call for submissions following the release of an interim 
report on 17 February 2010. The closing date for this second round of submissions was 5 March 
2010, and this was only open to “those who have previously submitted on the aspects of the 
bill affected by the proposed changes.”158 
2.4.2 Methodology 
Following the close of submissions, these were published on the Parliament website.159 There 
were a total of 1111 submissions — 1075 from the first round,160 and 36 from the second 
round.161 
A summary of each round of submissions was created by the Law and Order Committee.162 In 
this paper, this research, together with selected individual submissions, was analysed to identify 
public opinion on the existing sentencing and parole regime, specifically identifying reasons 
for supporting or opposing the amendments proposed in the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill, 
and any further suggested amendments. 
2.4.3 Overview of results 
2.4.3.1 First round 
Of the 1065 submissions from the first round of submissions, there were 32 submissions 
opposing the proposed Bill, 723 submissions supporting the proposed Bill, and 306 
submissions supporting the proposed bill but suggesting changes.163 
2.4.3.2 Second round 
Of the 34 submissions from the second round of submissions, there were 13 submissions 
opposing the bar-2 version of the proposed Bill and 21 submissions supporting the bar-2 
version of the proposed Bill with changes.164 
2.4.3.3 Total 
In total, of the 1065 submitters, 32 opposed the proposed Bill, 4 were unclear, 723 supported 
the proposed Bill, and 307 supported the proposed Bill with amendments. 
 
157 More discussion above at “2.2.3 Changes from Bar 1 to Bar 2”. 
158 Law and Order Committee, above n 1, at 3. 
159 “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill—New Zealand Parliament” <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-
laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL9040_1/tab/submissionsandadvice>. 
160 Law and Order Committee, above n 14, at 2. 
161 Law and Order Committee Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill − Summary of submissions on proposed 
amendments to Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (March 2010) at 2. 
162 Law and Order Committee Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill − summary of submissions (6 May 2009); Law 
and Order Committee, above n 161. 
163 Law and Order Committee Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill − summary of submissions: themes (6 May 
2009). 
164 Law and Order Committee, above n 161. 
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2.4.4 Reasons for opposing 
32 submitters opposed the proposal. Thirteen of these submitters also made another submission 
on the bar-2 version of the Bill. The reasons given can be separated into the following themes. 
2.4.4.1 Regime not supported by evidence and/or will have no deterrent effect 
This was the most popular reason, with 20 submitters listing this. Four of these submitters also 
considered that three-strikes laws have been shown to be unsuccessful internationally. Three  
of these submitters considered that the Bill would not reduce violent offending. Most of these 
submitters cited various studies on the three-strikes regimes in the United States, which found 
that they did not reduce violent crime,165 and noted that many US States had begun to reverse 
“get tough” policies such as three-strikes laws. Some also noted that the proposed regime was 
premised on Rational Choice Theories of crime, and that research has shown that this theory 
does not hold true for violent and sexual crime.166 Other submitters considered that offenders 
may not understand the implications of the strikes.167 The Legislation Advisory Committee 
further noted that there was little evidence to suggest that offenders specialise in serious 
violence, and that therefore the proposed regime would not reliably predict future offending.168 
2.4.4.2 Breach of NZBORA and/or international conventions 
This was the next most popular reason, with 13 submitters in total listing this reason — 12 
submissions in the first round of submissions and five submissions (one of which was new)169 
in the second round. Submitters who listed this reason cited the Attorney-General’s report on 
the Bill under s 7 NZBORA,170 which considered that the proposed Bill would be a breach of 
s 9 NZBORA (Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment). Submitters also 
considered that the proposed Bill would be a breach of Articles 7 (prohibiting torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9(1) (right to liberty and security of person) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Many also noted that life 
imprisonment without parole may be a breach of Article 10(3) ICCPR, which provides that 
“[t]he penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall 
be their reformation and social rehabilitation”, as it removes the possibility for rehabilitation 
or reform. There were also concerns about the additional pressure that the regime would impose 
 
165 See e.g. New Zealand Law Society “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing 
and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (23 April 2009)” at [31]. 
166 See e.g. Rethinking Crime and Punishment “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (15 March 2010)” at [12]. 
167 Valerie Morse “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 
2009 (7 April 2009)” at 2. 
168 Legislation Advisory Committee “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009” at [6]. 
169 The “new” submissions came from people who had submitted in the first round, but had not raised this issue 
in particular in that first submission. 
170 Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 




on the Corrections budget, which may cause standards in New Zealand prisons to fall below 
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.171 
2.4.4.3 Removes judicial discretion 
This was the next most popular reason, with 13 submitters in total listing this — 8 submitters 
in the first round of submissions, and 5 submitters (all of which were new) in the second round 
of submissions. Most of these submitters considered that judicial discretion was an essential 
‘safety valve’ to account for the myriad of possible circumstances in each case, and that the 
removal of judicial discretion could result in anomalous and unjust outcomes.172 Some of the 
submissions on the bar-1 version of the Bill noted that judges would retain some discretion 
with the 5 year requirement. This was removed in the bar-2 version of the Bill. 
2.4.4.4 Focus instead on addressing causes of crime 
This was the next most popular reason, with 10 submitters listing this in the first round of 
submissions. These submitters shared the stated desire of the proponents of the Bill to improve 
public safety, but considered that the proposed Bill represented an “ambulance at the bottom 
of the cliff” approach,173 and that public safety would be more effectively improved by seeking 
to address the causes of criminal behaviour. Furthermore, some submitters considered that the 
Bill would result in increased costs, which would deprive other sectors of resources that would 
address the causes of crime.174 Many of these submissions also considered that there should be 
more focus instead on the rehabilitation and reform of prisoners. 
2.4.4.5 Others 
Nine submitters (eight from the first round, one new submitter from the second round) 
considered that the Bill would have a disproportionate impact on Maori. Eight submitters 
considered that the Bill would provide an incentive for offenders to murder their victims in 
order to avoid apprehension.  
The following reasons were listed by five submitters each: 
• The Bill would be costly; 
• The use of preventive detention could be expanded as an alternative to the proposed 
three-strikes regime; 
• The Bill would lead to disproportionate sentencing. 
The following reasons were listed by four submitters each: 
 
171 Human Rights Commission “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at [4.19]. 
172  See e.g. New Zealand Police Association “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009” at [5]. 
173 Dunedin Community Law Center “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009” at 1. 
174 Religious Society of Friends “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009 (20 April 2009)” at [10]. 
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• The Bill would remove motivation for prisoners subject to the regime to reform; 
• The Bill would make prisons more dangerous as it would remove incentives for good 
behaviour; 
• The listed offences in the Bill were too broad, which would increase the chances of 
injustice; 
• The public perception of crime did not reflect reality — one submitter noted that 
crime statistics had dropped while the reporting of “tragedy stories” had increased. 
The following reasons were listed by three submitters each: 
• Concerns with parole should be dealt with by examining the implementation of the 
parole system, rather than by abolishing it for certain offenders; 
• Public confidence in the justice system could be improved by different means; 
• There was no reliable evidence of public support for the Bill; 
• The Bill would lead to public distrust of the sentencing process; 
• The Bill may cause juries to be reluctant to convict if they knew a defendant was on 
his third strike; 
• The Bill would lead to arbitrary sentencing; 
• The Bill would contribute to New Zealand’s already rising prison population. 
The following reasons were listed by two submitters each: 
• Prisons made offenders worse; 
• The Bill could make victims, particularly of domestic violence, less likely to report 
offending; 
• There was an over-representation of prisoners with psychiatric/social issues; 
• The Bill would result in an increased number of elderly prisoners who remained 
incarcerated despite having aged out of the risk bracket; 
• Parole provided a structure for a prisoner’s transition back into society; 
There were 89 suggestions listed by one submitter. These will not be listed here, but can be 
found in Appendix C. 
2.4.5 Reasons for supporting 
1065 submitters supported the proposal. The reasons given can be separated into the following 
themes. 
2.4.5.1 Victim’s Rights 
This was the most popular reason, with 673 submitters listing this. Many submitters who listed 
this as a reason expressed dissatisfaction with the existing sentencing and parole regime and 
felt that New Zealand had become less safe. Some of these submitters also expressed the view 




2.4.5.2 Life should mean life 
This was the next most popular reason, with 383 submitters listing this. Submitters who listed 
this as a reason expressed the view that parole should not be available for sentences of life 
imprisonment. Many submitters who listed this as a reason also expressed the view that parole 
was granted too easily to dangerous criminals, and that public safety had suffered as a result. 
2.4.5.3 Supports a three-strike system 
This was the next most popular reason, with 336 submitters listing this. Submitters who listed 
this as a reason expressed support for a three-strike system, as opposed to a different number 
of strikes. Some of these submitters expressed a preference for a lower number of strikes, but 
would still support a three-strike system. There was significant overlap between submitters 
who listed this reason and those who listed ‘life should mean life’ (82.7%). There was also a 
56% overlap between submitters who listed this reason and those who listed ‘victim’s rights’. 
Many submitters who listed this reason expressed the view that offenders who have not 
reformed after two stints in prison were unlikely to ever reform and should therefore not be 
given any more chances. 
2.4.5.4 Supports abolishing parole for repeat offenders 
This was the next most popular reason, with 140 submitters listing this. There is some overlap 
between submitters who listed this reason, and those who listed ‘life should mean life’ (72%) 
and ‘supports a three-strike system’ (64%). Many of the submitters who listed this reason also 
expressed concern with the numerous reports of reoffending by parolees. 
2.4.5.5 Parole granted too easily 
This was the next most popular reason, with 101 submitters listing this. It is interesting to note 
that there is almost no overlap between submitters who listed this reason, and those who listed 
‘supports abolishing parole for repeat offenders’ (2 submitters). Many of the submitters who 
listed this reason expressed the view that parole seemed to be granted as a right, that parole 
conditions were not enforced well enough, and also expressed concern with the numerous 
reports of reoffending by parolees. 
2.4.5.6 Current Sentencing laws are too lenient 
This was the next most popular reason, with 99 submitters listing this. There was significant 
overlap between submitters who listed this reason, and those who listed ‘victim’s rights’ 
(87.9%). Many of the submitters who listed this reason expressed the view that judges were 
too lenient, leading to a rise in violent offending. On a similar note, many submitters also 
suggested removing the five-year requirement in the bar-1 version of the Bill, due to concerns 
that judges would impose sentences just under five years to avoid the effect of the three-strikes 
regime. 
2.4.5.7 Public safety 
This was the next most popular reason, with 21 submitters listing this. Many submitters who 
listed this reason expressed the view that there had been an increase in violent crime, causing 
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New Zealand to become less safe. Some expressed the view that murder had become an almost 
daily occurrence in New Zealand.175 They believed that the three-strikes regime would improve 
public safety either by deterrence or incapacitation. 
2.4.5.8 Others 
Nine submitters did not give a reason for supporting the regime. Seven submitters considered 
that the regime would prevent victims from being re-victimised at parole hearings.  
The following reasons were listed by six submitters each: 
• Bail was granted too easily; 
• New Zealand’s international image had deteriorated due to a perceived rise in violent 
crime. 
The following reasons were listed by five submitters each: 
• Legal aid was granted too easily and/or to too many defendants; 
• The regime would reduce reoffending via a deterrent effect. 
The following reasons were listed by four submitters each: 
• The regime would promote personal responsibility in offenders subject to the regime; 
• Although the regime would result in increased costs of imprisonment, these costs 
would be less than the cost of investigating and prosecuting the reoffending that 
would be prevented by the regime; 
• There was too much emphasis on the rights of criminals, and not enough on the rights 
of victims; 
• Prisons work better for reform than non-custodial sentences. 
The following reasons were listed by three submitters each: 
• Concerns about crime in New Zealand; 
• The regime would promote “truth in sentencing”; 
• Parole conditions were too lenient; 
• Parole for certain offences should be abolished; 
• The regime would improve public confidence in the justice system. 
The following reasons were listed by two submitters each: 
• It was wrong for the government to condone repeat attacks on citizens; 
• Prisons were too comfortable; 
• Trying to help offenders who did not want to reform was a waste of time; 
• The regime would result in less judicial discretion; 
 




• The ability of prisons to accommodate prisons was not relevant; 
• The regime would protect poor and/or minority communities, who were more likely 
to be the victims of violent crime; 
• The right of citizens to live in peace should be paramount. 
Another two submissions, both from the same person (one as a representative of the Sensible 
Sentencing Trust Christchurch, and one in his personal capacity), considered that BORA 
concerns were “rubbish” and that the prohibition against “cruel and degrading” punishment in 
s 9 NZBORA referred only to torture.176 
There were 28 suggestions listed by one submitter. These will not be listed here, but can be 
found in Appendix D. 
2.4.6 Amendments proposed 
Three hundred and six submitters supported the proposal with amendments. Twenty one of 
those submitters also made another submission on the bar-2 version of the Bill. 177  The 
amendments proposed can be separated into the following themes. 
2.4.6.1 Include drug offences 
One hundred and ninety two submitters thought that drug offences should be included in the 
list of strike offences — 188 in the first round of submissions, and four new submitters in the 
second round of submissions. Submitters who suggested this thought that the manufacture 
and/or supply of illegal drugs should be a strike offence. Many submitters were particularly 
focused on the manufacture and supply of ‘P’, or methamphetamine. The primary reason given 
was that the manufacture and/or supply of drugs creates a large number of victims who would 
then go on to commit serious offences to fund their addiction.178 
2.4.6.2 Retroactive effect 
One hundred and fifty nine submitters thought that the Bill should have retroactive effect — 
157 in the first round of submissions, and two new submitters in the second round of 
submissions. Submitters who suggested this thought that a history of qualifying offense before 
the enactment of the Bill should be considered a ‘strike’ for the purposes of the three-strike 
regime. The primary reason given for this was that without retroactive effect, the regime would 
take too long to come into effect.179 
 
176  Sensible Sentencing Trust (Christchurch) “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009” at 1; Harry Young “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee 
on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009” at 1. 
177 Law and Order Committee, above n 161. 
178 See e.g. Sensible Sentencing Trust (Napier) “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (2 March 2010)” at 1. 
179 See e.g. Sensible Sentencing Trust (National Office) “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on 
the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009” at 3. 
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2.4.6.3 Remove five-year requirement 
Seventy submitters thought that the five-year requirement should be removed. This was also 
one of the few suggestions that were implemented in the bar-2 and the final version of the Bill. 
Submitters who suggested this thought that the requirement in the bar-1 version of the Bill that 
an offender had to be sentenced to more than five years imprisonment for the offence to count 
as a strike offence should be removed. The primary reason given was that judges would try to 
avoid the effect of the three-strikes regime by imposing sentences below that threshold.180 
2.4.6.4 Abolish parole 
Sixty six submitters thought that parole should be abolished. Submitters who suggested this 
thought that parole should be abolished for all offenders. The primary reason given was that 
prisoners manipulate and trick the parole board into granting them parole.181 Another reason 
given was that this would promote “truth in sentencing”.182 Some submitters caveated this 
suggestion by saying that parole should not be abolished for first-time offenders.183 
2.4.6.5 More qualifying offences 
Sixty three submitters thought that there should be more qualifying offences — 55 in the first 
round of submissions, and eight new submitters in the second round of submissions. Many of 
the new submissions in the second round were prompted by the removal of acid throwing and 
incest from the list of qualifying offense in the bar-2 version of the bill. Many submitters who 
suggested this thought that all violent crime,184 or all offences with a maximum sentence above 
3–5 years,185 should count as a qualifying offence. Several also suggested that burglary,186 
vehicular manslaughter,187 and offences against Police officers188 should be included. 
2.4.6.6 Consecutive sentences 
Forty seven submitters thought that offenders sentenced under the regime should serve their 
sentences consecutively — 46 in the first round of submissions, and one new submitter in the 
second round of submissions. Submitters who suggested this thought that, contrary to s 86D(6), 
offenders who are sentenced for other offences in addition to a stage-3 offence should not serve 
 
180 See e.g. Peek, above n 34, at 2; Sensible Sentencing Trust (Christchurch), above n 176, at 1. 
181 Jenny Peterson “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill 2009” at 1. 
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Bill 2009” at 2. 
183 See e.g. Red Raincoat NZ Trust “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009” at 4. 
184 See e.g. Josephine Dando “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at 3. 
185 See e.g. Stephen Brewster “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at 1. 
186 See e.g. Rita Croskery “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at 2. 
187 See e.g. Judy Ashton “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at 3. 
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those sentences concurrently. Many of these submitters also suggested abolishing concurrent 
sentencing for all offenders.189 
2.4.6.7 Forced labour for prisoners 
Forty two submitters thought that prisoners should be forced to work during their incarceration. 
The primary reason given was that this would offset the increased costs of incarceration caused 
by the three-strikes regime.190 Some submitters suggested that all prisoners, not just those 
imprisoned under the three-strikes regime, should be forced to work to offset the costs of their 
incarceration.191 
2.4.6.8 Harsher prison conditions 
Forty submitters suggested that prison conditions should be made harsher. The primary reason 
given was that this would make imprisonment a stronger deterrent to offenders.192 
2.4.6.9 Death penalty 
Twenty nine submitters suggested that New Zealand should bring back capital punishment. 
Some reasons given included that: this would offset the increase in prison population;193 that 
this would have a strong deterrent effect;194 and that some offenders have proven themselves 
incapable of rehabilitation.195 
2.4.6.10 Should also apply to young offenders 
Twenty seven submitters thought that the regime should also apply to young offenders. 
Submitters who suggested this suggested a variety of ages from which the regime should apply, 
ranging from 14196 to 16 years.197 
2.4.6.11 Past convictions should be admissible 
Seventeen submitters suggested that a repeat offender’s past convictions should be admissible 
in court. It was not clear whether this suggestion was to apply to the trial stage or the sentencing 
stage. Reasons given included that this would “enable juries to know the true nature of the 
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accused.”198 Some submitters also suggested that previous violent history should be available 
to the parole board.199 
2.4.6.12 Only more serious offences to qualify for third strike 
Fourteen submitters suggested that there should be a smaller list of the most serious offences 
that would count as a third strike offence. Some submitters suggested that this list should be 
comprised of the offences listed as ss 86A(18) – 86A(29).200 
2.4.6.13 Fewer than three strikes 
Thirteen submitters thought that there should be fewer than three strikes. Submitters who 
suggested this thought that three strikes would give offenders too many chances to offend, and 
that the maximum penalty should apply after either one201 or two strikes.202 
2.4.6.14 Fewer qualifying offences 
Thirteen submitters thought that there should be fewer qualifying offences — 12 in the first 
round of submissions, and one new submitter in the second round of submissions. Submitters 
who suggested this thought that some of the listed offences should be removed, including 
attempted sexual offences, 203  offences where violence was merely threatened, 204  offences 
within the family,205 acid throwing and incest,206 and sexual offences.207 This was another 
suggestion that was implemented in the bar-2 and final versions of the Bill, with incest and 
acid throwing being removed from the listed offences. 
2.4.6.15 Life imprisonment for repeat serious offenders 
Eleven submitters suggested that all repeat serious offenders should be sentenced to life 
imprisonment. A common reason given was that this would act as a deterrent to offenders.208 
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204 See e.g. Rex Beer “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill 2009” at 2. 
205 Michael Crozier “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill 2009 (9 April 2009)”. 
206 See e.g. Peek, above n 34, at 3. 
207 See e.g. Stuart Clarke “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009” at 2. 
208 See e.g. Gerry Tao “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill 2009” at 2. 
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2.4.6.16 Deport non-New Zealander offenders 
Ten submitters thought that non-New Zealander offenders should be deported. Some 
submitters suggested that non-New Zealanders accused (not convicted) of serious crimes 
should be deported.209 Others suggested that offenders’ families should also be deported.210  
2.4.6.17 Others 
Nine submitters suggested that there should be financial compensation for victims.  
The following suggestions were listed by eight submitters each: 
• Repeat violent offenders should forfeit their rights under the BORA; 
• The parole system needed to be reformed; 
• Bail should be abolished, either for violent offences or for all offences. 
The following suggestions were listed by seven submitters each: 
• The manifest injustice exception should be removed; 
• Parole should only be available after a longer period of imprisonment. 
The following suggestions were listed by six submitters each: 
• Education and/or training programs should be available for young offenders; 
• Concerns about criminal liability for self-defence, and/or suggested that there should 
be no prosecution for self-defence. 
The following suggestions were listed by five submitters each: 
• Punishment and/or deterrence should be considered by the Parole Board; 
• Compulsory DNA testing for offenders. 
The following suggestions were listed by four submitters each: 
• Caning with a rattan cane should be available as a sentence; 
• New Zealand's law should be more like Singapore; 
• The manifest injustice exception should be applicable in more circumstances. 
The following suggestions were listed by three submitters each: 
• Parents of young offenders should stand trial alongside the offenders; 
• Offenders should be sentenced to life without parole for all third strikes; 
• Deterrence should be the main goal of the regime; 
• All third strike offenders should be sentenced to life imprisonment; 
 
209 See e.g. FA Kelner and ER Kelner “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and 
Parole Reform Bill 2009”. 
210 See e.g. WJ McLeod “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole 
Reform Bill 2009”. 
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• The purpose of the Bill should be amended to apply to all repeat offenders, not just 
those “guilty of the worst murders”. 
The following suggestions were listed by two submitters each: 
• Handcuffs should be used in court; 
• Boot camps; 
• Compulsory RJ meetings if victims want; 
• 25 years as a life sentence is sufficient;; 
• Breach of parole provisions should result in return to prison; 
• Use offenders to clear landmines; 
• Abolish non-custodial sentences; 
• Guilty until proven innocent; 
• Parents to be held accountable for young offenders; 
• Reduced sentences should not be allowed; 
• Legal aid eligibility for self-defence cases; 
• Accumulated sentence for offender where parties to the offence are not convicted; 
• Abolish insanity plea; 
• Five-year MPI for violent offenders; 
• No ACC for injured offenders; 
• Favours double bunking in prison; 
• Confiscate proceeds from drug offending; 
• Introduce degrees of murder; 
• Clarify “manifest injustice”; 
• Mentoring/training for poor parents and children; 
• Believes prisoners should not have time off for good behaviour; 
• No Maori only prisons; 
• 25-year MPI rather than 20; 
• Keep five-year requirement. 
There were 89 suggestions listed by one submitter. These will not be listed here, but can be 
found in Appendix E. 
2.4.6.18 Opposed but made suggestions 
In the second round of submissions, three submitters were opposed to the proposed Bill, but 
suggested amendments be made to the Bill should it be passed. All three of these submitters 
suggested that the manifest injustice exception should be applicable in more circumstances. 
Two submitters suggested that the five-year requirement which had been removed in the bar-2 
version of the Bill211 should be reintroduced.212 
The following suggestions were listed by one submitter each: 
 
211 See “2.2 Changes to the Bill” above. 
212 Graeme Edgeler “Submission to the Law and Order Select Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform 
Bill 2009 (15 March 2010)” at [4]–[5]; New Zealand Law Society “Submission to the Law and Order Select 
Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (8 March 2010)” at 1. 
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• Fewer qualifying offences;213 
• Add acid throwing to the list of offences;214 
• No automatic Life Without Parole for second strike murder;215 
• Only offending pursued in the indictable jurisdiction should fall within the three-
strikes regime;216 
• 14-year MPI instead of Life Without Parole for third strike manslaughter.217 
2.5 Summary 
Most submitters supported the Bill, with some suggesting changes. The three most popular 
changes suggested were that the regime should include drug offences, that it should have 
retroactive effect, and that the five-year requirement contained in the Bar-1 version of the Bill 
should be removed. This third suggestion was subsequently put into effect by Parliament. Only 
32 of the 1065 submitters were opposed to the Bill, with the most popular reason for opposing 




The key arguments in favour of the proposed Bill were that it would increase public confidence 
in the Criminal Justice System, protect victims from re-victimisation, deter repeat offenders, 
improve public safety, and demonstrate that the government was tough on crime. 
The key concerns raised about the Bill were that it was oversold to the public, that it was driven 
by popular appeal rather than evidence, that similar regimes in other countries did not work, 
that the cost of the regime should be applied instead to rehabilitation programmes, that it would 
lead to injustice, and that it would disproportionately impact Maori. 
2.6.2 Submissions 
The key themes in submissions in favour of the proposed Bill were that the Bill would advance 
victim’s rights, that New Zealand was too soft on crime, and that the New Zealand public had 
become less safe as a result. 
The key themes in submissions opposing the proposed Bill were that the Bill would breach the 
NZBORA and/or international conventions, that it would result in injustice, that it was not 
supported by evidence and would not reduce reoffending, and that the cost of the regime should 
be applied instead to programmes addressing the causes of offending. 
 
213 New Zealand Law Society, above n 212, at 1. 
214 At 2. 
215 Edgeler, above n 212, at [11]–[12]. 
216 At [6]–[10]. 
217 At [16]–[17]. 
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The key themes in submissions proposing amendments to the proposed Bill were that drug 
offences should be included, that the Bill should be applied retroactively, that the five-year 
requirement contained in the bar-1 version of the Bill should be removed, and that New Zealand 
should be tougher on crime. 
There was overwhelming public support for the proposed Bill, with many submitters proposing 
even harsher measures. Most submitters thought New Zealand was too soft on crime, and that 
there was too much focus on the rights of offenders, to the detriment of victim’s rights. 
2.6.3 Did Parliament address concerns raised in submission? 
Arguments in Parliament in favour of the Bill for the most part did recognise submissions from 
members of the public who supported the proposed Bill. For example, Parliament responded 
to public concern about public safety, victim’s rights, confidence in the Criminal Justice 
System, and the general notion that New Zealand should be tougher on crime.  
However, submissions from the public also reflected a concern with parole being granted too 
easily. This was not considered in Parliament as the proposed Bill only targeted repeat violent 
offenders and was not intended to be a wider reform of the parole system. 
On a similar note, neither of the two most frequently suggested amendments (inclusion of drug 
offences and retroactive application) were implemented.  
Arguments in Parliament against the Bill similarly reflected concerns raised by members of the 
public. For example, Members of Parliament who opposed the Bill raised concerns about the 
failure of similar regimes in other countries, the potential for unjust outcomes, and the potential 
for disproportionate impact on Maori. 
A key concern raised in submissions from the public was that the proposed Bill could be a 
breach of international conventions. This concern was not raised in debates in Parliament. 
However, several Members of Parliament who opposed the Bill did raise concerns that the 
regime would be contrary to the NZBORA. 
A key concern raised in Parliament was that the Bill was oversold to the public and would thus 
decrease public confidence in the Criminal Justice System. However, this did not feature 
prominently in submissions from the public, with only one submitter noting that the regime 
may decrease public confidence in the Criminal Justice System among Maori, and three 
submitters suggesting that the regime would add to public distrust of the sentencing process. 
Three other submitters also suggested that public confidence in the Criminal Justice System 
could be improved by other means. 
In summary, some, but not all of the more frequently mentioned arguments in submissions 
were raised by one or more MPs in Parliament, either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, it 
seems that the resulting Bill did take into account submissions from the public. However this 
seems to have been limited to submissions focusing on general criminal and sentencing law 
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principles, rather than specific amendments such as retroactive effect or the inclusion of drug 
offences. 
2.6.4 Enactment of the Bill 
The Bill passed its third reading on 25 May 2010 with a vote of 63 Ayes and 58 Noes and came 
into force on 1 June 2010.  




Chapter 3. The Three-Strikes Regime in the New Zealand Courts218 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the background to the legislation and the issues that arose 
during the debates and in submissions. This chapter will discuss the law’s application in the 
courts and issues that have arisen from this. It will first examine the consistency of the three-
strikes regime with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Next, it will discuss the application of 
the manifest injustice exception in Harrison, 219  and how this was applied in subsequent 
decisions. Finally, this chapter will examine the application of the manifest injustice exception 
to s 86C (stage-2 non-murder offences) in case law. 
3.2 Harrison 
The leading three-strikes case is R v Harrison; R v Turner. This involved appeals from the 
Crown on two second-strike murders which would have resulted in sentences of life without 
parole had the manifest injustice exception in s 86E not been satisfied.220 The facts of this case 
are as follows.  
The first offender, Mr Harrison, was convicted of murdering Alonsio Matalasi.221 Mr Harrison 
and an associate, Mr Pakai, were members of the Rogues Chapter of the Mongrel Mob. They 
entered the property of Mr EE, a member of the Petone Chapter, and stole various items of 
property, including a cellphone.222 Mr EE contacted them on the stolen phone, and demanded 
that they return with it. He arranged for them to be met by a number of armed gang 
associates.223 Mr Harrison and Mr Pakai returned. Mr Pakai was armed with a modified rifle.224 
Mr Harrison was struck by one of the Petone group, and Mr Pakai “responded by firing six 
shots in the direction of the group as they fled the scene.”225 Mr Matalasi was amongst the 
group, and was shot by Mr Pakai. He died soon after.226 Mr Harrison and Mr Pakai were both 
convicted, with the jury finding that Mr Pakai was acting on Mr Harrison's instructions or 
encouragement.227 
The second offender, Mr Turner, was convicted of murdering Maqbool Hussain. Mr Turner 
and Mr Hussain were both homeless. On 22 March 2014, Mr Turner severely beat Mr Hussain 
for approximately an hour and a half,228 subjecting him to “punches, kicks and stomps to the 
neck and head area”.229 Turner left dressed in a different top, returned shortly after to take 
 
218 A version of this chapter was published as Xu Wang “Understanding manifest injustice” [2020] NZLJ 259. 
219 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10. 
220 At [3]. 
221 At [13]. 
222 At [7]. 
223 At [8]. 
224 At [9]. 
225 At [10]. 
226 At [12]. 
227 At [14]. 
228 At [24]. 
229 At [25]. 
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Hussain's pants, then left again. 230  Mr Turner was arrested on 1 April 2014. In a police 
interview, he claimed to have been motivated by “just complete hatred, adrenalin and greed”.231  
3.3 Sections 86D, 86E and the Manifest Injustice Exception 
The manifest injustice exception is an exception that applies to sections 86D and 86E of the 
Sentencing Act. As discussed in Chapter 1 above, s 86D requires a court to sentence an offender 
who commits a third-strike other than murder to the maximum sentence of imprisonment for 
the offence, and to order that this sentence must be served without parole. The manifest 
injustice exception in s 86D allows a court to avoid making the non-parole order if such an 
order would be manifestly unjust. 
Section 86E requires a court to sentence an offender who commits a second or third strike 
murder to a sentence of life imprisonment, and to order that this sentence must be served 
without parole. The manifest injustice exception in s 86E allows a court to avoid imposing this 
order of life imprisonment without parole if such an order would be manifestly unjust. 
This exception has had a significant effect on the application of the three-strikes regime in case 
law, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3.4 Compatibility with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The preliminary issue raised in Harrison was whether the three-strikes regime was consistent 
with the NZBORA. The Court first began by considering the purpose of the three-strikes law. 
Referring to the Regulatory Impact Statement prepared by the Ministry of Justice, 232  it 
considered that the purpose of the three-strikes regime was to “reduce violent crime, and thus 
improve public safety, through deterrence and incapacitation.”233 It also referred to reports 
from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice, and the legislative history, and concluded 
that “Parliament's intention was to limit judicial discretion and any departure from the 
mandatory nature of the regime would be rare and only in “exceptional cases where life without 
parole would be unjustifiably harsh”.234 It was intended that the manifest injustice exception 
set a very high threshold235 and was intended to apply only to very extraordinary cases, such 
as “an offender with intellectual or mental impairment, offending on the cusp of murder and 
manslaughter or where an offender has provided significant assistance to police.”236 
 
230 At [24]. 
231 At [26]. 
232 Ministry of Justice, above n 117 <http://nzlii.org/nz/legis/bill/saprb2009277.pdf>. 
233 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [76]; citing “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Second Reading”, 
above n 19, at 10673–10675; “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – Third Reading”, above n 22, at 11236; See 
also New Zealand Police Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill: Departmental Report (12 March 2010) at [10]–[25]. 
234 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [73]; citing “Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill – First Reading”, 
above n 12, at 1421. 
235 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [74]; citing Ministry of Justice Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill: 
Initial Briefing (22 April 2009) at [47]. 
236 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [73]; citing Cabinet Business Committee “No parole for worst repeat 
violent offenders and worst murder cases” (5 December 2008) at [16]. 
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The Court then considered the NZBORA, and noted that the three-strikes regime may be 
inconsistent with s 9 NZBORA. It began its analysis by setting out the approach to be taken to 
interpreting legislation that may be inconsistent with the NZBORA:237 
Here the court must seek to resolve the tension that exists between Parliament’s 
right to determine a sentence for a particular offence and the constitutional right of 
citizens to be free from disproportionately severe punishment. Where the two 
cannot be reconciled, the Court must give effect to the legislation but may say that 
it has done so under s 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. 
The Supreme Court set out a test for breach of s 9 NZBORA in Taunoa v Attorney-General.238 
A summary of the decision in Taunoa can be found in Vaihu v Attorney-General:239 
The Judges of the Supreme Court expressed differing views on the test for 
determining whether conduct breaches s 9, and none of those views commanded 
majority support. Elias CJ and Blanchard J favoured the test from Canada – conduct 
which outrages standards of decency. However in the case of Blanchard J, this 
definition gave content only to “disproportionately severe” treatment. Elias CJ 
considered that no test could be drawn to determine whether conduct was inhuman. 
Blanchard J appeared to adopt a general criterion of outrageousness and 
unacceptability of conduct for determining whether there is a breach of s 9. Tipping 
and Henry JJ preferred an arguably stricter test – conduct which shocks the national 
conscience – again, only with respect to the definition of “disproportionately 
severe”. McGrath J preferred a criterion of overall harshness. What is clear from the 
judgments, however, is that the threshold for establishing a breach of s 9 is a high 
one. 
The Court considered that Parliament intended for the three-strikes regime to result in sentences 
that were higher, but not grossly disproportionate, to those previously imposed and that grossly 
disproportionate sentences would be contrary to s 9 NZBORA.240 It also considered that “a 
whole-of-life sentence is not a grossly disproportionate response to the very worst murders”.241 
The qualifying offences under the three-strikes regime are extremely broad,242  potentially 
encompassing “an infinite range of possible circumstances of offending”.243 Therefore, there 
was an elevated “risk of gross disproportionality”,244 and a potentially high risk that “s 86E 
will produce arbitrary or wholly disproportionate outcomes”.245 
 
237 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [78]; See also Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 
2 NZLR 9 at 16. 
238 Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70; Taunoa v Attorney-General [2008] 1 NZLR 429. 
239 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [82]; citing Vaihu v Attorney-General [2007] NZCA 574 at [36]. 
240 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [83]. 
241 At [84]. 
242 At [87]. 
243 At [88]. 
244 At [87]. 
245 At [88]. 
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The Court also accepted submissions from counsel for Mr Harrison on the subject of “death by 
incarceration”,246 and found that “on average, an offender sentenced under the three-strikes 
regime may face an effective sentence between 35 and 42 years in prison”.247 This far exceeds 
the longest non-parole period ever imposed, which was 30 years,248 and further demonstrated 
the “risk of gross disproportionality arising from the three-strikes regime.”249 
With the above findings in mind, the Court found that the manifest injustice exception “must 
be exercised by reference to the inherent risk of gross disproportionality arising from the 
application of s 86E”250 in order to avoid breach of s 9 NZBORA, and that the exercise of the 
discretion was to be an intensely factual inquiry, “informed by the full range of sentencing 
objectives and principles.”251 The Court noted that the language of manifest injustice was also 
found in ss102 and 104 of the Sentencing Act252 and that its approach to manifest injustice 
under the three-strikes regime differed from the approach under ss 102 and 104. It concluded, 
however, that only minimal guidance could be taken from ss 102 and 104253 because the three-
strikes regime encompassed a far wider range of offending,254 and could result in far more 
extreme outcomes.255 
In conclusion, the Court found that in order to interpret s 86E consistently with s 9 NZBORA, 
“the test for circumstances that are manifestly unjust must be of sufficient breadth to ensure 
that any sentence imposed under s 86E is not grossly disproportionate”.256 
3.5 R v Harrison: Manifest Injustice under s86E (Stage 2 or 3 murder) 
In considering whether manifest injustice could be found in a specific case, the Court of Appeal 
in Harrison set out a three-step process:257 
1. Begin by recognising “that the sentence for a stage-2 or stage-3 murder is presumed to 
be life imprisonment without parole”; and 
2. Determine the appropriate sentence under the ordinary sentencing regime (i.e. but for 
s 86E); and 
 
246 At [92]. 
247 At [93]. 
248 At [93]; R v Bell CA80/03, 7 August 2003. 
249 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [93]. 
250 At [94]. 
251 At [96]. 
252 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102 states that “[a]n offender who is convicted of murder must be sentenced to 
imprisonment for life unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a sentence of imprisonment 
for life would be manifestly unjust.”; Section 104 states that “[t]he court must make an order under section 103 
imposing a minimum period of imprisonment of at least 17 years in the following circumstances, unless it is 
satisfied that it would be manifestly unjust to do so”. 
253 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [101]. 
254 At [100]. 
255 At [98]. 
256 At [106]. 
257 At [109]–[110]. 
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3. Determine whether the ‘manifest injustice’ exception applies, where the manifest 
injustice standard is to be read as meaning ‘grossly disproportionate’ in the language 
of s 9 NZBORA. 
In the second stage of the inquiry, the Court referred to its ordinary sentencing analysis under 
ss 102 and 104 and described ‘the appropriate sentence’ as “the sentence that would otherwise 
be appropriate for this particular offending and offender”.258  
In the third stage of the inquiry the Court noted that this analysis is to take into account both 
the circumstances of the offence and the offender. 259  This is to be an intensely factual 
inquiry.260 This will include: 
• Personal mitigating factors under s 9(2) Sentencing Act; 
• The principles and purposes of sentencing as described in sections 7, 8 and 9 of the 
Sentencing Act (except where inconsistent with ss 86B to 86E);  
• The offender's ability to understand the three-strikes warnings; 
• The likelihood of re-offending; 
• The consequences for the offender of a non-parole order; 
• The stage of the index offence; 
• The nature of the index offence; 
• The nature of the offending in previous strike offences and the sentences imposed; 
• The sentence that would have been imposed but for s 86E; and 
• Relative sentencing in other three-strike cases. 
Some of these factors will be discussed further below. 
3.6 R v Campbell: Manifest Injustice Under s 86D (stage 3 offences other than 
murder) 
Harrison was decided under s 86E, which applies to stage-2 and -3 murder cases. The same 
test for manifest injustice was applied to s 86D (stage-3 non-murder) cases in R v Campbell261 
(stage-3 indecent assault). In Campbell, the offender was convicted of indecent assault as a 
stage-3 offence after he grabbed the buttock of a female prison officer while serving a sentence 
of imprisonment. The Court cited Harrison and considered that it could only make a finding 
of manifest injustice if a non-parole order would result in a “grossly disproportionate 
outcome”.262  The Court also noted that it was required to consider the factors set out in 
Harrison.263 
 
258 At [149]. 
259 At [104]. 
260 At [108]. 
261 R v Campbell, above n 8. 
262 At [16]. 
263 At [16]. 
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3.7 Davis v R: Clarification on the manifest injustice exception 
A section 86E sentence (stage-3 murder) was recently the subject of an appeal. In Davis v R264, 
The Court of Appeal considered and applied the Harrison test, and echoed the ruling in 
Harrison that the case for finding manifest injustice must be “clear and convincing”, but that 
such cases “need not be rare or exceptional”.265 The Court also added that “[a]ll relevant 
aggravating and mitigating factors under ss 7–9 of the Sentencing Act must be considered, 
including those identified in Harrison”.266 The Court commented that:267 
Because it does not allow for the circumstances of either instant or prior offending, 
the three-strikes regime is capable of producing what might otherwise be 
disproportionately severe sentences. 
For this reason, as was found in Harrison, there is ‘significant scope’ for a finding of manifest 
injustice in s 86E cases. The same test was applied to s 86E decisions in Campbell.268 However, 
manifest injustice is less likely to be found in s 86D cases as the consequences are far less 
extreme.269 
3.8 The Manifest Injustice Factors: Introduction 
In Harrison, the Court of Appeal commented that the presence of exceptional circumstances 
was not necessary for manifest injustice to be found:270 
Where we part company with the Solicitor-General's submissions is the proposition 
that the test for manifestly unjust is likely to be reached only in exceptional 
circumstances. If that approach were to be applied, we consider it would often give 
rise to grossly disproportionate sentences.  
This section will consider some of the factors that the Court of Appeal indicated that the inquiry 
into manifest injustice should take into account, and how these have been discussed in 
subsequent cases. It will also include some other factors considered by the courts. 
3.8.1 Factors: General Sentencing 
3.8.1.1 Section 8: Personal background of the offender 
Under s8 Sentencing Act, one principle of sentencing is that the court: 
must take into account the offender’s personal, family, whanau, community, and 
cultural background in imposing a sentence or other means of dealing with the 
offender with a partly or wholly rehabilitative purpose. 
 
264 Davis v R [2019] NZCA 40. 
265 At [30]. 
266 At [33]. 
267 At [46]. 
268 R v Campbell, above n 8, at [16]; fn 8. 
269 See e.g. R v Waitokia [2018] NZHC 2146 at [24]; R v Nuku [2018] NZHC 2510; R v Williams [2019] NZHC 
2630; R v Winitana [2019] NZHC 3229. 
270 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10, at [106]. 
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 A poor upbringing, sometimes described as Rotten Social Background (RSB),271  may be 
considered by a court. In R v Puna272 (stage-2 murder), the Court noted that Mr Puna had been 
exposed to violence and bullying as a child, leaving him with problems with fighting and anger, 
especially when provoked. It further noted that Mr Puna's upbringing had resulted in 
developmental delays and that a long sentence of imprisonment would negatively affect his 
life.273 
However, in many instances, the offender’s poor upbringing was not considered a factor 
pointing toward manifest injustice. In R v Tai274 (stage-2 murder), Mr Tai had been a victim of 
sustained physical abuse by his father from about the age of five. He was later placed in foster 
care, where he suffered further abuse.275 The Court noted that Mr Tai's “background and 
circumstances …  make him almost a paradigm of those who appear before this Court for 
serious crimes of violence”.276 However, despite noting Mr Tai's childhood abuse, the Court 
did not refer to it as being a factor pointing towards manifest injustice. 
Similarly, in R v Alexander277 (stage-2 murder), the Court did not find Mr Alexander’s poor 
upbringing to be a factor in its finding of manifest injustice, despite noting that Mr Alexander 
had been “exposed to violence, crime and substance abuse from a young age”.278 Rather, the 
Court found that his upbringing, together with his pattern of substance abuse, had contributed 
to his propensity for violence, and noted that he exhibited “all the risk factors associated with 
re-offending”.279 In this instance, it seems the Court found manifest injustice because it was 
primarily convinced by Mr Alexander's insight into his offending and his frank self-
awareness.280 In R v Wereta281 (stage-3 wounding with intent to cause GBH), the Court noted 
that Mr Wereta’s background was “depressingly familiar, indeed sad”,282 but similarly did not 
find that to be a factor pointing towards manifest injustice. In R v Winitana 283  (stage-3 
wounding with intent to injure), the Court considered similarly that Mr Winitana’s 
circumstances were “distressingly familiar”, partly explained his resort to gang life and 
violence, and warranted a 10 per cent discount to the ‘but for’ sentence. However, manifest 
injustice was not found due to the severity of the offending. 
 
271 Richard Delgado “Rotten Social Background: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe 
Environmental Deprivation” (1985) 3 Law & Ineq 9. 
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Thus, it seems that the Court will often discuss the offender’s RSB where it is relevant, but it 
is often not considered a factor pointing towards manifest injustice. Instead, RSB can point 
towards a propensity for violence and/or reoffending. 
3.8.1.2 Section 9 Mitigating Factor: Remorse 
Under s9 Sentencing Act, one mitigating factor in sentencing is that the court must take into 
account “any remorse shown by the offender”. 
The offender’s attitude towards the index offending (i.e. the offending for which they are being 
sentenced) is a factor in most three-strikes decisions. Many offenders express remorse for their 
offending both to the victims and to the Court. However, the Court will, as in the orthodox 
sentencing approach, assess the authenticity of the offender's remorse with regard to the 
available facts. The Court may decide that an expression of remorse is insufficient if not 
accompanied by tangible actions. For instance, in R v Pomee284 (stage-3 aggravated robbery 
and kidnapping), the Court noted that Mr Pomee had acknowledged his wrongdoing and said 
that he needed to “accept responsibility for [his] actions”.285 However, the Court considered 
that his “expressions of remorse and insight do not add materially to [his] pleas, because 
nothing tangible yet arises”.286 
The Court is likely to rely on psychiatric and pre-sentence reports to determine the authenticity 
of the offender's remorse. For instance, in R v Ratima287 (stage-3 robbery), although the Court 
accepted that Mr Ratima had been shaken and had started crying when he learned of the severity 
of his offence, it noted the conclusion in the psychiatric assessment that Mr Ratima's remorse 
appeared to be very limited in scope.288 Similarly, in R v Davis289 (stage-3 murder), the Court 
relied on the pre-sentence report and psychological assessment and found that Mr Davis had 
displayed no real or genuine remorse or empathy.290  
Conversely, the Court is more likely to accept an expression of remorse when this is supported 
by the offender's conduct both immediately following the offending, and in subsequent 
interviews. For instance, in Campbell, the Court accepted Mr Campbell's remorse and desire 
to engage in restorative justice as expressed during the pre-sentence interview.291 The Court 
considered that Mr Campbell's remorse was “genuine and that it is as much related to the effect 
of [his] behaviour on the victim, whom [he] liked, as it is on the consequences for [him]”.292 
Similarly, in R v Kingi293 (stage-2 murder), the Court noted that Mr Kingi had “expressed 
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remorse to each of the health assessors who interviewed [him]”294 and accepted this expression 
of remorse, saying that “[t]here is nothing to suggest that the remorse [he has] expressed is not 
genuine”.295 
The Court may also take into account other considerations. For instance, in Puna, the Court 
considered that Mr Puna had demonstrated genuine regret and remorse due to:296 
• his conduct in the police interview and swift acknowledgement of his actions; 
• his conduct at trial; 
• his display of shame and remorse, instead of bravado; and 
• his expression of remorse to his family. 
Staying on the topic of post-offending conduct, in Tai, Mr Tai seemed to regret his actions 
immediately after shooting the victim and had expressed remorse for his offending in a letter 
to the Court.297 However, the Court considered that he had not demonstrated genuine remorse, 
as this was offset by his subsequent actions — threatening one of the witnesses; attempting to 
find the gun in order to conceal it; and leaving and remaining on the run before knowing 
whether the victim survived.298 
Even if the Court finds that the offender has expressed genuine remorse, this may be discounted 
due to other factors. For instance, in R v Rutherford299 (stage-3 indecent act on a child) the 
Court accepted the finding in the pre-sentence report that Mr Rutherford felt genuine regret for 
his offending and demonstrated insight into the impact of his offending on the victim.300 
However, the report also noted that he had not been able to control his impulses despite 
previously completed treatment, and therefore the Court found that a discount for remorse was 
not available,301 and did not consider this to be a factor pointing towards manifest injustice.302 
Therefore we can see that the offender’s remorse can often point towards a finding of manifest 
injustice. However, the Courts are less likely to be satisfied by mere expressions of remorse 
that are not accompanied by conduct consistent with remorse. 
3.8.1.3 Section 9 Mitigating Factor: Early guilty plea 
Expressions of remorse aside, the Court may also consider the offender's guilty plea. An early 
guilty plea is given more weight than a late plea. Under s9 Sentencing Act, one mitigating 
factor in sentencing is “whether and when the offender pleaded guilty”. 
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An early guilty plea contributed to a finding of manifest injustice in Harrison, Campbell, Kingi, 
Davis and R v Waitokia303 (stage-3 wounding with intent to injure). In Harrison, the Court 
noted that “Mr Turner admitted his actions to police at the first opportunity and pleaded guilty 
at an early stage”,304 and considered that this, together with other factors, pointed towards a 
finding of manifest injustice.305 
The impact on sentencing of an early guilty plea may be lessened  if the Crown case is very 
strong.306 In Ratima, the Court considered that although Mr Ratima had entered a guilty plea, 
he had done so in the face of a very strong Crown case and that therefore a discount of only 15 
per cent to the ‘but for’ sentence would adequately reflect his guilty plea (instead of the 20-25% 
that might normally be expected).307 A similar 15 per cent discount was given for a guilty plea 
in the face of a strong Crown case in R v Nuku308 (stage-3 wounding with intent to injure). 
The lack of a guilty plea is not necessarily disqualifying. In Alexander, the Court noted that 
although Mr Alexander did not plead guilty, he was justified in proceeding to trial as there were 
available verdicts of manslaughter or murder.309 
Thus, an early guilty plea can contribute to a finding of manifest injustice. However, a guilty 
plea that was motivated by a strong Crown case may be discounted. In addition, a guilty plea 
will often result in a discount to the ‘but for’ sentence, which may widen the discrepancy 
between the ‘but for’ sentence and the consequences of a non-parole order, and thus contribute 
to a finding of manifest injustice (see also ‘3.8.2.3 Consequences of a non-parole order’ below). 
3.8.1.4 Section 9 Mitigating Factor: Diminished intellectual capacity or understanding 
Under s9 Sentencing Act, one mitigating factor in sentencing is “that the offender has, or had 
at the time the offence was committed, diminished intellectual capacity or understanding”. 
In Harrison, the Court of Appeal found that Mr Turner had a severe personality disorder and 
was being treated for schizophrenia. The Court further noted that mental health difficulties like 
those Mr Turner suffered from were “specifically considered as a justification for introducing 
the manifestly unjust exception into s 86E”.310 
In R v Fitzgerald 311  (stage-3 indecent assault), Mr Fitzgerald was described as having 
significant mental health issues and needing constant mental health care. 312  The Court 
considered that “[h]is mental health issues are linked to his impulsive offending of this type, 
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but not to an extent as to provide him with a defence”.313 Nonetheless, the Court noted Mr 
Fitzgerald's significant mental health issues as being a factor pointing towards a finding of 
manifest injustice.314 
Therefore, it appears that the offender’s diminished intellectual capacity or understanding will 
often lead to a finding of manifest injustice. 
3.8.1.5 Section 9 Mitigating Factor: Age 
Under s9 Sentencing Act, one mitigating factor in sentencing is “the age of the offender”. 
Aside from its implications on the consequences of a non-parole order (see also ‘3.8.2.3 
Consequences of a non-parole order’ below), age may also be considered as a separate 
mitigating factor. In Campbell, the Court considered that Mr Campbell was relatively young at 
the age of 25. This, together with his relatively meagre list of previous convictions, suggested 
that Mr Campbell had good prospects for rehabilitation, which led to a finding of manifest 
injustice.315 Similarly, in Ratima316 and Pomee,317 the Court considered that the offenders’ 
relative youth was in itself a factor pointing towards a finding of manifest injustice. This is 
consistent with the orthodox sentencing approach, as the age of the offender is listed as a 
mitigating factor in s 9(2)(a) Sentencing Act. In Puna, the Court noted that youth is relevant to 
sentencing because:318 
a) there are age related neurological differences between young people and adults. 
Young people are not as mature and do not respond in the same way that a more 
mature adult will; 
b) secondly, the effect … of imprisonment on young people, including the fact that 
long sentences can be crushing; and 
c) thirdly, young people have the potential and greater capacity for rehabilitation with 
appropriate direction. 
3.8.1.6 Other Factor: Prospects for rehabilitation 
In Harrison, the Court of Appeal held that the manifest injustice assessment would take into 
account ss 7, 8 and 9 of the Sentencing Act.319 Section 7(1)(h) Sentencing Act states that a 
court may consider the need to assist in an offender's rehabilitation and reintegration when 
sentencing an offender. However, the Court went on to say that as the three-strikes regime 
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prevails over inconsistent provisions,320 some principles, such as parity and rehabilitation, will 
be “inapplicable or of lesser relevance”.321 
Nevertheless the Courts have, in several decisions, cited an offender’s prospects for 
rehabilitation as a factor pointing towards a finding of manifest injustice. For instance, in 
Fitzgerald, Mr Fitzgerald expressed a desire to stop offending. The Court also noted Mr 
Fitzgerald's developing insight into his offending and considered that “[i]t is appropriate to 
provide encouragement and incentive to maintain this insight”,322 and that “an order that the 
standard one-third parole rule apply will achieve that”.323 
The Court in Campbell expressed a similar sentiment. The Court accepted that Mr Campbell 
was genuinely remorseful and willing to engage in rehabilitation.324 It went on to note that 
having no prospects for parole would not encourage Mr Campbell to engage in rehabilitative 
programmes while in prison325 and concluded that manifest injustice was established.326 This 
was cited in R v Sanders327 (stage-3 wounding with intent to cause Grevious Bodily Harm), 
where the Court similarly recognised that “having no prospect of parole may dissuade [Mr 
Sanders] from engaging in rehabilitative steps to address [his] behaviour”.328 
The Court will also rely on reports on the offender. In Alexander, the Court relied particularly 
on the s 27 Cultural Report and considered that there was potential for rehabilitation with 
significant professional help and the fostering of Mr Alexander's cultural identity.329 Similarly, 
in Tai, the Court noted that the psychiatric report found that Mr Tai was willing to participate 
in specialist rehabilitation programmes that would be available during his incarceration, and 
that there was potential for his eventual rehabilitation.330 Similarly, in Davis, the Court noted 
that Mr Davis was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder and Oppositional 
Defiant Disorder at a young age and was diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder as an adult. 
The Court considered that Mr Davis’ offending was influenced by alcohol and that this 
favoured “the imposition of a rehabilitative sentence”.331 
In Kingi, the psychiatric report found that Mr Kingi had a history of significant mental illness 
and had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder.332 Counsel for Mr Kingi submitted, and 
the Court accepted, that Mr Kingi's offending was correlated with his mental illness.333 The 
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Court considered that therefore the risk of re-offending could be reduced if his mental illness 
was addressed. 334  Similarly, in R v Herkt 335  (stage-2 murder), the Court considered the 
psychiatric report and found that Mr Herkt’s mental health issues did contribute to the index 
offending336 and that there was room for optimism for Mr Herkt’s rehabilitation if his mental 
health issues were treated.337 
Reports may also assist the Court by shedding light on the cause of the offending. In R v 
Eruera338 (stage-2 murder), the Court accepted the finding in the Cultural Report that Mr 
Eruera's offending could be explained by his exposure to gang culture, and a perceived need to 
protect his family.339 The Court considered that there was hope for rehabilitation with the 
appropriate counselling.340 In Herkt341 and Kingi,342 the Court, in light of the reports provided, 
considered that the offenders’ mental health issues, while falling short of providing them with 
a defence, did contribute to their offending and that therefore there was room for optimism for 
their rehabilitation if their mental health issues were treated.  
Successful engagement in rehabilitative programmes can be considered as a strong indicator of 
rehabilitative prospects. In Puna, the Court noted Mr Puna's successful engagement in a 
rehabilitative programme and his improvement in behaviour throughout.343 It was aided by the 
psychiatric report which considered that Mr Puna would benefit from intervention and could 
do well with input. 344  The Court found that Mr Puna showed good prospects for 
rehabilitation,345 and found that manifest injustice was established.346 This was also a factor in 
Herkt, as the Court noted that Mr Herkt had “enrolled in and successfully completed a number 
of helpful rehabilitation programmes”347 while in custody. 
On a related note, the Court may also consider the rehabilitative opportunities available to the 
offender in the past. In Ratima, the Court noted that Mr Ratima had not had an opportunity to 
engage in rehabilitation in any meaningful way, as he had sought but was declined admission 
to a methamphetamine rehabilitation programme upon his previous release from prison.348 The 
Court found that this was a factor pointing towards a finding of manifest injustice.349 
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In Sanders, the Court noted Mr Sanders' frustration at the lack of redemptive measures 
available to him in a maximum-security prison.350 However, this did not convince the Court to 
make a finding of manifest injustice — the Court's decision seemed to turn instead on the issue 
of parity, particularly with previous three-strikes cases.351 
The Court may also consider that a finding of manifest injustice may give the offender more 
incentive or support to reform, and thus keep the community safer. In Rutherford, the Court 
noted that imposing a 10-year MPI would “significantly delay the commencement of 
rehabilitation programmes, which may create adverse consequences for the community in the 
longer term.”352 In Wereta, the Court found that it was in the interests of public safety that Mr 
Wereta was motivated to reform, and that a shorter minimum period may give him that 
incentive.353 
The length of the MPI imposed may also factor into the Court's consideration of the offender's 
prospects for rehabilitation. In Tai, the Court considered that a sentence of life without parole 
would be manifestly unjust. A 17-year MPI had already been imposed, and due to the fact that 
incidents of violent offending decreases with age, there was hope that Mr Tai could be 
rehabilitated during this MPI term.354 
Finally, it is worth noting that an offender's expression of his desire to rehabilitate may not be 
sufficient. In Waitokia, the Court found that Mr Waitokia's stated desire to engage in 
rehabilitation was offset by his conduct while in custody, notably his recent involvement in a 
violent incident against a prison guard.355 
To summarise, although it was held in Harrison that rehabilitation may be a factor of lesser 
relevance, Courts in subsequent cases have nonetheless found that the offender’s potential for 
rehabilitation may point towards a finding of manifest injustice. This is especially so when 
there are clear indications of the offender’s potential for rehabilitation, such as successful 
engagement in rehabilitative programmes while in custody, or the offending being linked to 
mental health issues that can be addressed. 
3.8.1.7 Other Factor: Risk of reoffending 
In R v Heihei356 (stage-2 murder) the Court found that the spontaneous nature of the offending, 
together with Mr Heihei's criminal history, suggested that Mr Heihei was not “at risk in any 
way of acting in a similar way in the future.”357 
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3.8.2 Factors: The Offender 
3.8.2.1 Mental health 
The offender’s mental health issues may provide the Court with a more nuanced understanding 
of the reasons for the offending. In Herkt, the Court noted Mr Herkt’s extended history of 
mental health issues. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and had 
been prescribed a “long acting intra-muscular anti-psychotic medication Risperidone 
Consta”.358 Mr Herkt had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the offending, and 
the Court heard evidence that alcohol neutralises the effects of said medication, “unmasking … 
the underlying psychiatric symptoms and making [him] impulsive and prone to violence.”359 
This led the Court to find that Mr Herkt’s mental health issues, while falling short of providing 
him with a defence, did contribute to his offending, and that there was room for optimism for 
his rehabilitation if his mental health issues were addressed.360 
3.8.2.2 Offending in previous strike offences 
In Harrison, the Court held that the inquiry would take into account “the nature of the previous 
stage offences and the sentences imposed.”361 Applying the inquiry to Mr Harrison, the Court 
went on to note that considering his stage-1 conviction was for an indecent assault which was 
“at the lower end of that type of offending”,362 the fact that this could trigger a whole-of-life 
sentence was a wholly disproportionate response.363 
Manifest injustice may be available even if the stage-1 offending is not as minor as it was in 
Harrison. In R v Lothian364 (stage-2 murder), Mr Lothian was convicted of murder as a stage-
2 offence.365 His previous stage offence was wounding with intent to injure, resulting in a 
sentence of two years five months imprisonment.366 The Court considered that this was not 
among the more serious violent offences within the regime, and found that this was a factor 
pointing towards manifest injustice.367 
Thus, we can see that previous stage offences being relatively less serious can point towards a 
finding of manifest injustice. The Court may view the sentence imposed for the previous stage 
offences as an indication of their severity. For instance, in Tai, Mr Tai was convicted of murder 
as a stage-2 offence, with his previous stage offence being wounding with intent to injure.368 
He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for this stage-1 offence. The Court considered 
that this relatively low sentence reflected that it was “not the most serious offending of its 
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kind”,369 and found that this was a factor pointing towards a finding of manifest injustice in 
relation to the stage-2 offence.370 A similar analysis was undertaken in Ratima,371 Puna,372 
Davis373 and Kingi.374 
Beyond acting as an indication of the severity of the offences, sentences imposed for previous 
stage offences may also be a standalone factor. In Pomee, Mr Pomee was convicted of 
aggravated robbery as a stage-3 offence,375 with his previous stage offences being robbery376 
and aggravated robbery respectively.377 He faced a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment without 
parole for the index offending.378 The Court noted that he had received much shorter sentences 
in his earlier stage-1 and 2 offences and that this was one of three factors pointing towards a 
finding of manifest injustice.379 
There has also been a notion of proportionality in some decisions. In Fitzgerald, Mr Fitzgerald 
appeared for sentence on a charge of indecent assault380  as a stage-3 offence,381  with his 
previous stage offences both being indecent assaults.382 The Court considered that the previous 
offences were “relatively less serious”,383  and could be respectively described as “briefly 
grabbing the buttocks of a passing woman, and attempting to kiss a passing woman”.384 The 
Court went on to consider that the previous stage offences warranted sentences of 11 months 
imprisonment and four months' imprisonment respectively and that the index offence was less 
serious than the previous two.385 Therefore, the Court considered that “[a]n order that Mr 
Fitzpatrick [sic] serve the whole of a seven year sentence in relation to [the index offence] 
would be manifestly unjust”.386 
Differences between the circumstances of previous stage offences and the index offending may 
also lead to a finding of manifest injustice. In Heihei, Mr Heihei was convicted of murder as a 
stage-2 offence,387 with his previous stage offence being an indecent assault.388 The Court also 
found it appropriate to consider a conviction for indecent assault in 2004, before the three-
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strikes regime came into force.389 Mr Heihei was sentenced to three years imprisonment for the 
first offending,390 and four months' home detention for the second.391 The Court considered 
Heihei to be a “recidivist burglar who opportunistically offends against female victims when 
under the influence of alcohol”,392 and noted that nothing in his criminal history suggested that 
he would commit a murder, or that he would do so again.393 Overall, the Court considered that 
Heihei's criminal history was not “supportive of a whole of life sentence”.394 A similar analysis 
was undertaken in Campbell,395 R v Hone396 (stage-2 murder), and Eruera.397 
On the other hand, previous strike offences may also count against the offender. In Sanders, 
the Court considered that Mr Sanders' present offence was “an escalating continuation of [his] 
first- and second-strike conduct”.398 Similarly, in Ratima, Mr Ratima appeared for sentence on 
a charge of robbery,399 with his previous stage offences both being robberies.400 The Court 
considered that the index offending was very similar to that in his two previous stage offences 
and that the degree of violence used had “escalated over the course of the three offences”.401 
To summarise, it is a factor in the offender’s favour if their previous strike offences are 
relatively minor or are significantly different in nature to the index offending. Conversely, if 
previous strike offences show an escalating pattern of conduct, that may count against a finding 
of manifest injustice. 
3.8.2.3 Consequences of a non-parole order 
As discussed above, the approach set out by the Court of Appeal in Harrison is to first 
determine the appropriate sentence under the orthodox sentencing approach (i.e. the sentence 
but for the three-strikes regime), before comparing that with the consequences of a non-parole 
order. Manifest injustice will be found if the consequences of a non-parole order are “grossly 
disproportionate, given the circumstances of the offending and the offender”.402 
Thus, the discrepancy between the ‘but for’ sentence and the consequences of a non-parole 
order seems to be the ultimate deciding factor. In s 86E (stage-2 or 3 murder) cases, Courts 
will estimate the term of imprisonment likely to be served under a non-parole order based on 
the offender's age and the average life expectancy of his or her demographic group. For instance, 
in Harrison, the Court noted that “life expectancy for a male is 79.5 years, albeit this varies by 
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ethnicity: a Maori male’s life expectancy is 73 years while a “non-Māori” male’s is 80 
years”.403 
The Court then considered that Mr Harrison was aged 44 and was therefore likely to serve over 
30 years in prison under a non-parole order.404 Mr Turner, at 29 years of age, was likely to 
serve approximately 50 years.405 In both instances, the Court found that the difference between 
the sentences the offenders were likely to serve, and the ‘but for’ sentences, raised “issues of 
significant disproportionality”.406 
It appears that this factor will outweigh all other considerations. For instance, in Davis, Tai, 
and Lothian, the offenders presented relatively few of the factors discussed above. Nonetheless, 
the Court considered that life imprisonment without parole would be manifestly unjust. They 
could all expect to serve over 50 years in prison under a non-parole order407 and this was 
grossly disproportionate to the ‘but for’ sentence, which was found to be life imprisonment 
with a 14-year MPI in Davis and Tai, 408  and life imprisonment with a 20-year MPI in 
Lothian.409 
However, this factor is less determinative in s 86D (stage-3 non-murder) cases, as the 
consequences of a non-parole order are far less severe — the maximum sentence served 
without parole, rather than life imprisonment without parole. In Waitokia, the Court found 
that:410 
While the Court of Appeal noted that youth would be a relevant factor, that 
comment was made in the context of the consequences a whole-of-life sentence 
would have on an offender. While your age is still relevant to my assessment, it is 
less of a concern in the context of a seven-year sentence than for a life sentence. In 
my view, while taking your age into account, this is not a factor that impacts in any 
significant way on your sentence. 
This distinction is apparent in the fact that since the enactment of the regime in 2010, there 
have only been four cases in which manifest injustice has not been found — Waitokia, Nuku, 
R v Williams411 (stage-3 attempted murder) and Winitana. All were s 86D (stage-3 non-murder) 
cases. 
Thus, it seems that the consequences of a non-parole order will almost always be the 
determinative factor when the consequences are life imprisonment without parole. However, 
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this is less important when the consequences are merely the maximum sentence for the offence 
without parole, rather than life imprisonment. 
3.8.3 Factors: The Offence 
3.8.3.1 Stage of index offence 
In Harrison, it was held that the Court must take into account whether the index offence is a 
stage-2 or stage-3 murder, as this “may inform the nature and extent of the recidivism 
involved”.412 This has been applied in Hone,413 Tai414 and Alexander415. 
However, this is not a definitive factor. In Davis, Mr Davis was granted the manifest injustice 
exception despite the index offence being a stage-3 murder, because this was outweighed by 
other factors:416 
• the index offence was not one of the worst murders;  
• Mr Davis entered an early guilty plea;  
• his previous strike offences resulted in relatively low sentences;  
• he suffered from mental health difficulties;  
• the index offence occurred while he was intoxicated;  
• Mr Davis’ prospects for rehabilitation; and  
• the consequences of a whole-of-life sentence. 
3.8.3.2 Nature of the index offending 
In Harrison, the Court of Appeal held that Courts must take into account the circumstances of 
the offending.417 This is usually done at step 2 of the Harrison test (calculating the ‘but for’ 
sentence). However, where the index offending is particularly minor, this may be considered 
another factor pointing towards manifest injustice. For instance, in Fitzgerald, the Court 
considered that the relatively minor nature of the offence, which it described as being “at the 
bottom end of the range”,418 pointed towards a finding of manifest injustice.419 Similarly, in 
Campbell, the offending was described as “spontaneous and not malicious, and … at the lower 
end of the spectrum”.420 The Court went on to say that the nature of the offending pointed 
towards a finding of manifest injustice.421 In Rutherford, the Court considered that the index 
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offending was “at the lower end of the range for indecent assault”,422 and found that this pointed 
towards a finding of manifest injustice.423 
Even if the offending is not minor, the circumstances of the offending may still lead to a finding 
of manifest injustice. In Heihei, Mr Heihei stabbed the victim when an argument developed 
into a fight.424 The Court considered that the offending occurred spontaneously and that the 
circumstances of the offending did not suggest that Mr Heihei was “at risk in any way of acting 
in a similar way in the future”.425 Similar circumstances were present in Alexander, although 
the level of culpability was higher because Mr Alexander returned to confront the victim with 
a knife.426 Manifest injustice was found because the Court considered that the offending was 
at the “lower end of the culpability spectrum”.427 In Eruera, the Court considered that due to 
the presence of provocation leading to the offending, life imprisonment without parole was not 
necessary to protect the public428 and that “a father provoked to violence by an attempted rape 
of his daughter [does not] engage to the same extent, the object of s 86 in terms of deterrence 
and denunciation”.429 
There have also been cases where no such mitigating factors were present, but manifest 
injustice was still found because the offending was not the worst of its kind.430 In Davis, Mr 
Davis committed a “sustained and continuous assault” upon the victim, resulting in her 
death.431 The Court considered that “in comparison with other murder cases, [this] was not one 
of the worst murders”.432 In Kingi, Mr Kingi struck the victim in the head while robbing him. 
The victim later died. The Court considered that this was not the worst type of murder. There 
was no significant premeditation, and the violence was significant but not extreme.433 The 
evidence showed that Mr Kingi did not intend to kill the victim.434 
As in the previous section, there has also been a notion of proportionality in some decisions. 
For instance, in Tai, the Court drew comparisons to Davis where manifest injustice was found 
because the offending was “not one of the worst murders”,435 and considered that the facts in 
Davis were “appreciably worse”.436 In Herkt, manifest injustice was found because the Court 
considered that overall, the offending was “a good deal less serious” than that in Turner, 
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Harrison or Kingi437 where manifest injustice had been found. In Sanders, the Court found that 
manifest injustice had to be found because the nature of the offending was very similar to that 
in Nuku.438 However, because of how the offending was charged, Mr Nuku faced a sentence 
of,439 and had been sentenced to, seven years’ imprisonment without parole,440 whereas Mr 
Sanders faced a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment without parole.441 The Court found that 
the manifest injustice exception applied and imposed a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment 
with a seven-year MPI.442 
The nature of the index offending will often affect the ‘but for’ sentence arrived at in step 2 of 
the Harrison test. However, it may be taken into account as a separate factor, for example when 
the index offence is particularly minor, or when it suggests that the offender is unlikely to 
reoffend in a similar manner. 
3.8.3.3 Length of MPI imposed 
In Tai and Alexander, both s 86E decisions, the Courts have found that life imprisonment 
without parole would be manifestly unjust but emphasised that the sentence to be imposed 
instead would be life imprisonment and that the offender would only be released on parole if 
the Parole Board was satisfied that there was no risk to the public.443 In Tai, the Court noted:444 
The minimum period of imprisonment I intend to impose is within the context of 
what is a life sentence. At the expiration of that period, Mr Tai may apply for release 
on parole but that result is far from automatic. The Parole Board will only grant him 
parole if it is satisfied he does not pose a risk to the public. And, even if he is released, 
he is liable to be recalled to prison if he breaches his parole terms or reoffends. He 
is, therefore, subject to the sentence I impose today for the rest of his natural life. 
A lengthy MPI may also be in itself a factor pointing towards a finding of manifest injustice. 
This was the case in Hone, where the Court considered the fact that Mr Hone faced a lengthy 
20-year MPI to be a factor making it manifestly unjust to sentence him to life without parole.445 
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3.8.4 Factors: Other 
3.8.4.1 Victim’s views 
In Harrison, the father of Mr Harrison's victim “had granted forgiveness and did not seek 
imprisonment or a whole-of-life sentence”. 446  The Court held that this was a relevant 
consideration:447 
Given that one justification for the three-strikes legislation is that it ensures victims’ 
families do not have to worry about parole hearings or the offender’s release, it 
follows that the views of those affected may be a relevant consideration in the 
overall analysis. 
In Campbell, the victim wished for Mr Campbell to be allowed the opportunity for parole, and 
for him to be offered assistance.448 
The victim’s views are especially relevant when the victim is related to the offender. In Heihei, 
Mr Heihei was convicted of the murder of his brother. An argument arose between them, which 
escalated into a fight, during which Mr Heihei picked up a large knife and killed his brother. 
Mr Heihei and his brother’s parents expressed their support for Mr Heihei, as they “have lost 
one son and do not want to lose another completely”.449 The Court considered that “the views 
expressed by [his] victim are … not consistent with the imposition of a whole of life 
sentence”.450 
In both Herkt and Kingi, the victims expressed a desire for the offenders to serve significant 
terms of imprisonment but did not wish for them to be denied parole.451 This was taken into 
account by the Courts in both decisions. 
If the victim expresses a desire for the offender to be allowed the opportunity for parole, that 
will almost certainly be taken into account by the Courts. This is particularly so when the victim 
is related to the offender. 
3.9 Effect of the Three-strikes Regime on the Conventional Sentencing 
Approach in s 86C 
Under s 86C, an offender who is convicted of a second-strike offence other than murder is to 
be sentenced normally, but must serve that sentence without the possibility of parole. An issue 
that has arisen in the Courts is whether this sentencing should take into account the fact that 
the offender must serve the sentence without parole.452 
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3.9.1 Wereta and Muraahi: the initial approach 
The issue first arose in R v Wereta453 (stage-2 wounding with intent to cause GBH) and R v 
Muraahi. 454  In Wereta, it was held that imposing an uplift for the offender’s previous 
convictions would amount to double counting because his ineligibility for parole under s 86C 
came as a result of said previous convictions.455 In Muraahi, it was held that the Court could, 
having arrived at a final sentence, apply a further “enhanced totality deduction” to take into 
account the offender’s ineligibility for parole.456 
3.9.2 Palalagi v New Zealand Police: the approach reconsidered 
The Court in Palalagi v New Zealand Police disagreed with both decisions. Mr Palalagi had 
been sentenced to three years and nine months imprisonment for two charges of burglary and 
three charges of indecent assault as a stage-2 offence.457 Mr Palalagi appealed the sentence on 
the grounds that it was manifestly excessive.458 Counsel for Mr Palalagi submitted, among 
other things, that inadequate consideration was made for the principle of totality. It was 
submitted, citing the decision in Muraahi, that the Court “should have taken into account the 
consequences of the three-strikes regime in recognition of the principle of totality”.459 
The Crown submitted, and the Court agreed, that parole eligibility was not to be taken into 
account in determining sentencing length.460 Referring to Parliamentary history, the Court 
found that Parliament clearly intended to separate the sentencing exercise from the statutory 
consequences of the three-strikes legislation.461 Unlike ss 86D and 86E, there was no room for 
judicial discretion under s 86C.462 
3.9.3 Barnes v R: The Court of Appeal consideration 
The issue arose again in the Court of Appeal decision Barnes v R.463 Mr Barnes had been 
sentenced to two years seven months imprisonment464 for aggravated robbery465 as a stage-2 
offence.466 
Mr Barnes appealed on the grounds that his sentence should have been reduced because he was 
a stage-2 offender.467 Counsel for Mr Barnes submitted that s 86C Sentencing Act does not 
offer any guidance as to the length of imprisonment imposed, and that s 86C does not prevail 
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over any other provisions of the Act, including the purposes and principles of sentencing set 
out in ss 7, 8 and 9. In particular, s 8(h) provides that the Court must take into account:468 
… any particular circumstances of the offender that mean that a sentence or other 
means of dealing with the offender that would otherwise be appropriate would, in 
the particular instance, be disproportionately severe… 
Counsel for Mr Barnes submitted that his ineligibility for parole was a particular circumstance 
relating to him that meant that the sentence was disproportionately severe.469 The Court should 
instead have imposed a sentence of two years or lesser, as that would have allowed the Court 
to require Mr Barnes to participate in rehabilitation programmes for up to six months after the 
sentence expired.470 
The Court considered that Parliament intended that “[a] stage-2 offence will have the 
consequence that the sentence imposed, arrived at in the normal way, will be served without 
parole”,471 and that therefore, s 86C was to apply after the sentence had been “evaluated in the 
normal way and imposed.”472 
However, the Court went on to consider that the absence of an explicit manifest injustice 
exception did not preclude the Court from considering manifest injustice when sentencing 
stage-2 offenders.473 Section 86C engages the normal sentencing approach, which “necessarily 
involves the Court avoiding manifest injustice.” 474  The Court discussed the decision in 
Harrison, where it was held that Parliament did not intend for s 86E to result in grossly 
disproportionate sentences, and concluded that Parliament similarly did not intend for s 86C to 
result in “disproportionately severe or manifestly unjust” sentences. 475  Furthermore, 
Parliament intended for all other relevant principles of sentencing to apply, including 
rehabilitative purposes476 and the duty to impose the least restrictive outcome appropriate,477 
as well as other provisions that would increase a sentence.478 
The Court referred to a number of decisions where parole eligibility was deemed to be relevant 
to sentencing,479 and concluded that most sentencing under s 86C would take place without 
consideration of parole eligibility, but that a Court could take into account the offender’s 
rehabilitation if it considered that rehabilitation “might be better achieved by earlier eligibility 
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for parole than would otherwise be the case.”480 Where appropriate, a Court could, as counsel 
for Mr Barnes sought,481 impose “a sentence of imprisonment of two years or less, thereby 
enabling imposition of the standard and any relevant special conditions of release.”482 However, 
the Court emphasised that this approach could not be taken simply to avoid the effect of s 
86C,483 and that it was likely to apply only in exceptional cases.484 
3.10 Conclusion 
Three issues have emerged with the application of the three-strikes regime in the courts. The 
first is the consistency with the NZBORA. The Court of Appeal in Harrison concluded that 
that Parliament intended for the three-strikes regime to result in sentences that were higher, but 
not grossly disproportionate, to those previously imposed and that grossly disproportionate 
sentences would be contrary to s 9 NZBORA.485 It also considered that the qualifying offences 
under the three-strikes regime are extremely broad,486 potentially encompassing “an infinite 
range of possible circumstances of offending”.487 Therefore, there was an elevated “risk of 
gross disproportionality”,488 and a potentially high risk that “s 86E will produce arbitrary or 
wholly disproportionate outcomes”.489 
The second is the meaning of ‘manifest injustice’ as used in s86D and s86E, and how it is to 
be identified in cases. It was held in Harrison that in order to interpret s 86E consistently with 
s 9 NZBORA, manifest injustice must be found when the sentence under s 86E would be 
grossly disproportionate.490  
The Courts are for the most part following the test laid out in Harrison in determining whether 
manifest injustice exists. However, they have also introduced new factors pointing towards 
manifest injustice, thus making the test broader than was originally conceived in Harrison. The 
manifest injustice test is far broader under the three-strikes regime than it is for ss 102 – 104. 
As the Court of Appeal noted in Harrison, this is necessary because the broad scope of the 
three-strikes regime, combined with the possibility of a whole-of-life sentence, means there is 
a greater risk of disproportionality — and thus breach of s 9 NZBORA — under the three-
strikes regime.491 
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However, it is worth noting that while the Courts do generally apply the Harrison test, they do 
not always do so in the format set out in Harrison. That is, they will consider the factors 
discussed in Harrison, but may not always explicitly follow the steps in the Harrison approach. 
The third issue is whether manifest injustice is able to be taken into account in s86C, despite 
the lack of specific inclusion of this language in the section. In Barnes, it was held that Courts 
were also required to consider manifest injustice in s 86C decisions despite the absence of an 
explicit manifest injustice exception.492 However, the Court emphasised that this approach 
could not be taken simply to avoid the effect of s 86C,493 and that it was likely to apply only in 
exceptional cases.494 
The next section will consider the effect of the three-strikes regime on how defence lawyers 
prepare for criminal proceedings under the regime, and the impact on defendants as a result of 
being subject to the regime. 
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Chapter 4. The Three-Strikes Regime from the Perspective of 
Lawyers 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to gain insight into the effect of the three-strikes regime on preparation for criminal 
proceedings under the three-strikes regime, and the impact on defendants as a result of being 
subject to this, a survey of criminal lawyers was conducted. The survey was designed and 
analysed using online survey tool Qualtrics and the link to the survey was distributed with the 
assistance of local branches of the New Zealand Law Society.495 
4.2 Methodology 
Survey respondents were asked the following questions: 
1. As a lawyer, do you prepare differently for three-strike cases? 
2. How do you prepare differently for three-strike cases? 
3. Do you advise your clients differently for three-strike cases? 
4. How do you advise your clients differently for three-strike cases? 
5. How does the fact that they are on a second or third strike seem to affect your clients? 
6. Sections 86D (third strike non-murder) and 86E (second and third strike murder) 
contain a manifest injustice exception. What do you think the Court considers relevant 
in the manifest injustice assessment? 
7. Minister of Justice Andrew Little has signalled his intention to repeal the three-strikes 
regime. What are your thoughts? 
8. Do you agree with the following statement: New Zealand's three-strikes regime has 
helped reduce violent crime. 
9. Do you have anything else to add? 
4.3 Overview of results 
Twenty seven lawyers responded to the survey. However, not all respondents completed the 
survey, and the number of responses dropped off as the survey progressed, with 23 responses 
to the first question and 15 responses to the last question. A majority of respondents reported 
preparing differently for three-strike cases (13 out of 23 respondents or 56.5%) and advised 
their clients differently for three-strike cases (13 out of 19 respondents or 68.4%). Finally, a 
majority (8 out of 15 respondents or 53.3%) of respondents strongly disagreed that the three-
strikes regime has helped reduce violent crime. 
4.4 How do lawyers prepare differently for three-strike cases 
Thirteen out of 23 respondents considered that they did prepare differently for three-strike cases. 
Of the respondents who did prepare differently, two common themes emerged. First, most 
respondents noted that in a three-strike case, they would attempt to negotiate with the Crown 
 




to substitute the charge with a lesser (non-strike) charge. Secondly, respondents noted that if 
substitution of a non-strike charge was not possible, they would explore any mitigating factors 
available to the client. Respondents also noted that they would be more likely to take the matter 
to a defended hearing if substitution of a non-strike charge was not possible. One respondent 
considered that: 
There is a lot more riding on the outcome. One avenue that I explore is whether or 
not the charge could be reduced to a non-strike offence; for example, wounding with 
intent reduced to injuring with intent. The main area of difference is in the prospect 
of plea bargaining reducing the charge to a non-strike offence 
4.5 How do lawyers advise their clients differently for three-strike cases 
Thirteen out of 19 respondents considered that they did advise their clients differently for three-
strike cases.  Of the respondents who did advise their clients differently, most noted that they 
would explain the effect of the three-strikes regime, and the consequences of the strike offence 
on their client’s current sentence and on any future convictions. 
4.6 How does being on a second or third strike affect defendants 
Twelve respondents answered this question. Most respondents noted that being on a second or 
third strike was unlikely to deter their clients from reoffending in the future as clients were 
either unaware of the significance of the three-strikes regime, or did not consider the 
consequences of the regime. One respondent considered that:  
To be honest I don't think they care much. In relation to what they are currently 
charged with they already know what they have done. And in relation to the 
possibility of further strikes in the future that is hard to assess. Either their behaviour 
is going to improve or it isn't, having that hanging over them probably doesn't enter 
their minds when they are in situations of further serious violence. 
Similarly, another respondent stated that: 
Most offending is impulsive, much of it committed while under the influence of 
drugs, alcohol or both. Many clients are intellectually disabled. So the strike 
warning simply wears off and doesn't affect their behaviour or act as an effective 
deterrent. Obviously when they get charged, they are more likely to want to defend 
the charge, even if advised the defence has very slim prospects of success. 
Furthermore, many respondents found that clients were more demanding and belligerent than 
usual, and less likely to take responsibility for the offending because second and third strike 
offenders are required under the regime to serve their sentences without parole (with a manifest 
injustice exception for third strike offenders, as discussed above in Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
This removal of the possibility of parole also  removes any incentive to take responsibility for 
the offending, or to take steps towards reform.  
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4.7 What do lawyers think the Court considers relevant in the manifest 
injustice assessment 
As discussed above in Chapter 3, sections 86D and 86E Sentencing Act are both subject to a 
'manifest injustice' exception — that is, the Court may avoid making a non-parole order if it is 
satisfied that such an order would be manifestly unjust. 
Most respondents felt that the Court is very reluctant to impose a sentence of life without parole 
and would consider a wide range of mitigating factors. Respondents felt that the Court would 
consider the following factors relevant: 
• The difference between the sentence under the three-strikes regime and the sentence 
that would otherwise be imposed; 
• The circumstances of the first and second strikes; 
• Personal factors that may demonstrate some particular vulnerability in the defendant; 
• Youthful offending on a first strike; 
• Relatively low-level offending on a third strike; 
• Willingness and opportunity for an offender to engage in rehabilitative treatment. 
These results broadly echo the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which suggests 
that the respondents have a good understanding of the factors which will be taken into account. 
4.8 Lawyers’ opinions on proposed repeal of the three-strikes regime 
All 11 respondents who answered this question strongly supported the proposed repeal of the 
three-strikes regime. Three respondents considered that the three-strikes regime should be 
repealed because it does not achieve its stated goals of reducing violent reoffending. In 
particular, one of these respondents noted that: 
For someone on a second strike they often have extremely limited oversight after 
they are released. In my experience they are also less likely to receive treatment 
whilst in prison because they are not going to receive parole. 
This echoes the decision in R v Rutherford, where the Court found that:496 
it seems to me to be of central importance that focused attempts at rehabilitation 
occur sooner rather than later in Mr Rutherford’s case. Imposing a sentence of 10 
years without eligibility for parole will significantly delay the commencement of 
rehabilitation programmes, which may create adverse consequences for the 
community in the longer term. 
Three respondents considered that the three-strikes regime was motivated by political populism, 
and was a knee-jerk reaction to particularly bad crimes. One respondent in particular felt that 
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“[t]hree strikes was an unprincipled act of political populism which creates injustice and does 
little, if anything, to protect the public.” 
Two respondents considered that the regime restricted the autonomy of the judiciary, and 
undermined the role of judicial discretion. These respondents felt that the Courts, with their 
system of appellate courts and checks and balances, were best placed to calculate the 
appropriate sentence taking into account the particular circumstances of the offender and the 
offending, rather than an inflexible administrative process. 
Two respondents considered that the regime resulted in manipulation of charges by both Crown 
and Defence, and that this was a distortion to the justice system that was inherently wrong. One 
respondent noted that: 
[the regime] certainly results in a manipulation of charges by both Crown and 
Defence, often without proper reasoned basis, to achieve a result both sides can live 
with. For instance, I have represented two defendants on third strike offences where 
the max penalty is 14 years imprisonment. On the disclosed evidence, there has been 
an overwhelming Crown case against each defendant. But the Crown have been 
willing to reduce charges from 14 year charges to 7 year charges to reduce the 
impact of the three strike regime, which, but for the 3 strike regime, they would not 
have done. 
One respondent felt that the three-strikes regime should be repealed because it was likely in 
contravention of the United Nations prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment (Article 
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Another respondent felt that the 
regime should be repealed because it results in disproportionate outcomes. 
Finally, one respondent considered that the three-strikes regime should be repealed because it 
was theoretically flawed, and did not address the causes of crime: 
Three strikes is flawed in its concept. The idea that violent crime is the product of 
rational actors is inherently flawed. Most such crime is spontaneous, often driven 
by impulsive acts by drug or alcohol addled young men who lack good role 
modelling and who suffer from addictions. 
In summary, respondents felt that the three-strikes regime should be repealed because it did not 
reduce violent reoffending, was motivated by political populism, undermined the important 
role of judicial discretion, and resulted in manipulation of charges in the form of plea 
negotiation. The comments, both in this section and in section 4.4 above, about the prevalence 
of plea negotiation were particularly interesting because they provided insight that could not 
be found in case law. 
4.9 Lawyers’ opinions on the efficacy of the three-strikes regime 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the following statement: New Zealand's 
three-strikes regime has helped reduce violent crime. Of the 15 respondents who answered this 
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question, eight respondents strongly disagreed with the statement, five respondents disagreed, 
one respondent somewhat disagreed, and one respondent was neutral. 
4.10 Additional notable comments 
Respondents were asked whether they had any additional comments. Several respondents 
echoed previous comments about the political nature of the three-strikes regime. One 
respondent in particular considered that: 
This is neoliberalism at its worst and a political "solution" designed to catch votes. 
Nothing objective can be said about it except "it's the law". It is unenlightened at 
best and at worst just another oppressive law that maintains the (shameful) statistics 
of incarcerated Maori and Polynesian people. It would have been repealed but NZ 
First vetoed it to appease its conservative backbone.497 I'm looking forward to a 
Labour landslide so that Minister Little can consign this law to the dustbin of history. 
Respondents also echoed previous comments about the ineffectiveness of the regime, and the 
disproportionate outcomes that resulted. One respondent in particular noted that: 
I have been a criminal lawyer for 27 years. I regularly look over my clients' criminal 
history list to see how much time they would have spent in jail unjustly had they 
lived their whole lives under 3-strikes. It is sometimes decades longer than a trained 
and experienced Judge has sentenced them to on just principles. We are going to 
have to build a lot more prisons, and a more uncaring and callous attitude in our 
hearts, unless we repeal this legislation. 
Finally, one respondent considered that in addition to repealing the three-strikes provisions, 
there should also be re-consideration of those sentenced under the regime, and that an avenue 
for those sentenced under the regime to seek a resentencing would be appropriate. 
4.11 Conclusion 
The strength of this research is unfortunately limited due to the small number of respondents. 
However, the comments from the respondents were incredibly insightful and considered and 
are worth recording here. 
There were three trends in the responses that are worth highlighting. Firstly, lawyers generally 
do prepare differently for three-strike cases, and do advise clients differently if they are charged 
with a strike offence. Lawyers also seem to have a good understanding of how the courts 
approach three-strike cases. 
Secondly, defendants do not seem to be deterred by the regime, likely because most serious 
violent offences such as the ones captured by the regime are often impulsive, and often 
committed under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or both. In fact, defendants may be less likely 
 
497 See, for example, Laura Walters and Jo Moir “Government’s three strikes repeal killed by NZ First” (11 June 
2018) Stuff <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/104608068/governments-three-strikes-repeal-killed-by-
nz-first>; discussed further at chapter 6.1 below. 
71 
 
to engage in rehabilitative and reformative programs due to the removal of the possibility of 
parole. 
Finally, respondents overwhelmingly disagreed with the three-strikes regime, and supported a 
repeal of the regime. One respondent went further and suggested that if the regime were to be 
repealed, offenders sentenced under the regime should also be allowed to seek a resentencing. 
Several reasons were given for disagreeing with the regime. Firstly, respondents felt that the 
regime did not reduce violent reoffending because their clients who were subject to the regime 
were unlikely to be deterred from future offending. Secondly, respondents felt that the regime 
removed judicial discretion from the sentencing process, resulting in an administrative 
procedure that did not take into account the particular circumstances in each instance. Thirdly, 
respondents felt that the regime resulted in a distortion of the justice system in the form of 
increased plea negotiation. Respondents also considered that the regime resulted in 
disproportionate outcomes, and contributed to the overincarceration of Maori and Polynesian 
people. 
This chapter has suggested that the three-strikes regime is problematic, or even ineffectual, in 





Chapter 5. The Theoretical Justifications for a Three-Strikes Regime 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the practical operation of the three-strikes regime and found 
that it has issues in implementation. This chapter considers whether there is a theoretical basis 
for the regime. 
5.2 Application of punishment theory to three-strikes 
Of the four key theoretical grounds for punishment — retribution, deterrence, incapacitation 
and rehabilitation, three-strikes regimes are premised on deterrence and incapacitation, and 
reject retribution and rehabilitation. The primary justification for three-strikes regimes is 
incapacitation — a criminal who is incarcerated cannot offend against the general public. This 
is reflected in New Zealand’s implementation of the three-strikes regime — as discussed in the 
Chapter 2.3.2, proponents of the Bill considered that the primary objective of the Bill was to 
keep the community safe by incapacitating repeat violent offenders. 498  More specifically, 
three-strikes regimes are premised on the theory of specific incapacitation. Specific 
incapacitation is a subset of incapacitation theory which posits that if a small number of 
offenders are responsible for a disproportionate share of violent offences, and if it is possible 
to reliably select this group of offenders, society can achieve “maximum crime protection per 
prisoner”499 by targeting this group of offenders with enhanced sentencing measures.500 
The secondary justification for three-strikes regimes is deterrence.501 Three-strikes regimes 
rely both on specific deterrence and general deterrence. The theory of specific deterrence posits 
that “a repeat offender who would be subject to longer prisoner terms based on his prior 
convictions might be deterred from committing new offenses.”502 General deterrence theory 
extends this by positing that the longer sentences will not only deter the specific offender, but 
will also “serve as an example and deter other criminals from committing new offenses”.503 
Three-strikes regimes reject both rehabilitation and retribution theory. Rehabilitation theory 
posits that an offender's character can be improved such that he will not offend again. Three-
strikes regimes, however, assume that certain offenders are “beyond rehabilitation and have a 
high propensity for recidivism”,504 and therefore must be incarcerated either indefinitely or for 
very long periods of time for the protection of the public.505 
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Three-strikes regimes also reject retribution theory because retribution theory posits that 
offenders who commit crimes deserve to be punished for their crimes. Retribution theory 
requires that the offender be punished in proportion to his culpability for the charged crime. 
Three-strikes regimes, however, are explicitly intended to punish offenders disproportionately 
to their culpability for the charged crime. In New Zealand, proponents of the Bill have stated 
that the regime was intended to result in disproportionate sentences for repeat violent 
offenders.506 As a result of this disproportionate sentencing, offenders sentenced under three-
strikes regimes “receive more than their “just desserts” for the criminal act — more than what 
they would be morally culpable for if the present crime was considered in isolation”.507 
In summary, three-strikes regimes rely on incapacitation and deterrence, and reject 
rehabilitation and retribution. This chapter will now discuss, with reference to criminological 
and sociological research on incapacitation and deterrence, whether New Zealand's three-
strikes regime as enacted can achieve its stated aims of incapacitation and deterrence. 
5.3 Incapacitation 
This section will consider the application of incapacitation theory to the three-strikes regime, 
through a consideration of relevant studies, reports and academic arguments. 
5.3.1 Arguments that incapacitation theory provides justification for a three-strikes regime 
Proponents of three-strikes laws rely predominantly on incapacitation as the justification for 
the law because incapacitation achieves its goals by definition — an incarcerated offender 
cannot offend against the general population. Three-strikes laws promise to reduce serious 
violent offending by imposing disproportionately long sentences on offenders who are 
predicted to commit serious violent offences in the future. This is an application of Selective 
Incapacitation theory. For this to be effective, the regime has to be able to accurately predict 
the propensity of an offender to commit serious violent offences in the future. Therefore, a key 
factor in the success of selective incapacitation is the selection criteria used. Three-strikes 
regimes generally select targets by assuming that offenders who have committed two serious 
violent offences are more likely to commit other serious violent offences in the future. 
Proponents of three-strikes regimes point to studies like a 1995 study which estimated that 
California's three-strikes law would reduce serious felonies by between 22 and 34 percent due 
to the incapacitation effect,508 and the fact that violent crime in California dropped following 
the introduction of their three-strikes laws in 1994.509 
This notion is also supported by studies such as a 1987 study by Peterson which showed that 
career criminals accounted for only 25% of the sample (of 657 male prisoners), but had 
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“committed a large proportion of the total number of self-reported offenses.”510 This finding is 
consistent with the findings of a 1978 study by Williams,511 and a 1982 study by Shannon 
found that this held true for juvenile offenders.512 More recently, a 2000 study by Piquero 
concluded that “a small percentage of [the survey sample] was responsible for the majority of 
police contacts”, and that chronic offenders (those with five or more police contacts), were also 
serious offenders, and were more likely to be violent offenders.513  
5.3.2 Arguments that incapacitation theory does not provide justification for a three-strikes 
regime 
While it has been shown above that some studies do suggest an incapacitative benefit to a three-
strikes regime, other studies reach a different conclusion. One study by Van Dine, Conrad and 
Dinitz suggests that selective incapacitation is not effective because “it is clearly impossible to 
define the chronic offender in such a way that a practical basis for crime reduction can be 
structured”, 514  and that even under the most extreme option, which applied a five year 
mandatory minimum sentence following a single conviction for a violent felony, only 3.7% of 
the 2892 violent offences would have been prevented.515 Piquero and Blumstein's literature 
review of studies into selective incapacitation found that no research has been able to find a 
group of offenders with a consistently high rate of offending.516 
Furthermore, to the extent that selective incapacitation may sometimes be effective, other 
studies suggest that previous offences are not an accurate selection criteria. These studies 
suggest that “most violent crime is committed by individuals who lack the indicia of 
recidivism”,517 and that future violent behaviour cannot be predicted based on an offender's 
criminal record.518 Studies on selective incapacitation suggest that:519 
Prior criminal contact with the criminal justice system is an important predictor of 
future contact. This was found to be true in all the studies. However, prior 
convictions do not seem to be very good predictors by themselves. This is caused, 
in part, by the interaction of age with criminality. By the time a person is old enough 
to have several prior convictions, he is old enough to have reduced his propensity 
toward crime.   
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Furthermore, the same report concluded that “property crimes seem to be better predictors of 
future criminality than violent crimes with no property motivation”.520 This observation has 
been supported by other studies — a 2007 study by Bhati examining sentencing practices in 13 
US states found that “[a]cross all 13 states, the average number of crimes against persons 
averted annually was 1.93 … [whereas] [t]he average property related crimes averted annually 
across these states was 8.47.”521 This study further found that for property offences, “for most 
individuals, a 1% increases in prison term will yield a less than a percent increase in the number 
of crimes averted”522 and that therefore, for property offences, “reducing the incarceration 
terms of a large number of inmates may result in little or no reductions in the number of crimes 
averted by incapacitation.”523  
A New Zealand-based study by Brown examined amendments to New Zealand's Criminal 
Justice Act 1985 which created a distinction between 'ordinary' offenders and 'serious' 
offenders.524 The following offences were classified as “serious violent offences”:525  
• section 128 (sexual violation); 
• section 171 (manslaughter); 
• section 173 (attempt to murder); 
• section 188(1) (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm); 
• section 188(2) (wounding with intent to injure); 
• section 189(1) (injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm); 
• section 189(2) (injuring with intent to injure); 
• section 198A (using a firearm against law enforcement officer, etc); 
• section 198B (commission of crime with firearm); 
• section 234 (robbery); 
• section 235 (aggravated robbery). 
Although the study is somewhat dated, it is nonetheless relevant because the 1985 Act, like the 
current New Zealand three-strikes regime, attempted to predict the future dangerousness of an 
offender using a present offence (or set of offences). This was based on the assumption that 
there was “a higher than average reoffending rate among those individuals whose present 
offence lay within a specific group of violent offences”.526 The study found that predicting 
future dangerousness in this manner was problematic for two reasons. First, the New Zealand 
data confirmed previous studies 527  showing that offenders engage in a range of illegal 
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behaviour. Brown noted that “[l]ess than half of all offenders receiving a further conviction 
during the follow-up period were reconvicted for offences within even the same broad offence 
category (e.g., violent, sexual, property) as that for which they were imprisoned.”528 Secondly, 
a three-strikes regime “fails to take into account the principle of regression — the observation 
that extreme events are by definition infrequent and thus likely to be followed by less extreme 
(or in the present case, less serious) events.”529 Overall, this attempt to predict serious violent 
offending is inadequate because:530 
directing strategies for incapacitation or control at current violent offenders alone 
will, perhaps substantially, under identify the at-risk group. Conversely, this 
approach will also incorrectly identify a substantial number of offenders (false 
positives) whose offending is largely 'ordinary'.   
The study went on to conclude that “offence-based classification systems are difficult to sustain 
on either logical or empirical grounds.”531 
This conclusion is supported by another New Zealand-based study by Brown, which found that 
the vast majority of serious offences committed by the sample group were committed by 
offenders who were imprisoned for a non-serious offence.532 
Another study by Blokland and Niewbeerta found that a policy of selective incarceration in the 
Netherlands led to a small projected decrease in the number of violent offences.533 It further 
found that ”[s]electively incapacitating presumed frequent offenders on the basis of the number 
of offenses they have committed in the … preceding 5 years … leads to a substantial decline 
in crime“,534 but that this was offset by the significant increase in the prison population — up 
to 45 times the baseline population. For this to be justified, “the average conviction prevented 
by the selective incapacitation of frequent offenders would have to generate four to eight times 
as much in benefits than it would cost detaining an offender for 1 year.”535 In reality, “the 
benefits from preventing an average conviction are only approximately twice as high as the 
costs of 1 year of prison.”536 Blokland went on to conclude that “risk estimation merely on the 
basis of criminal past generates high wastage of prison capacity.”537 Furthermore, the study 
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noted that if incarceration has an effect on an offender's likelihood of future offending, this 
may cancel out any positive effects of selective incarceration.538 
Finally, studies have found that the average career length for offenders is 9.2 years for violent 
offences, and 13.6 years for property offences.539 In comparison, a third-strike conviction under 
New Zealand's three-strikes regime will result in imprisonment without parole (unless manifest 
injustice is found) for between seven years to life, depending on the offence. This suggests that 
for its stated goal of reducing serious violent offending, New Zealand's three-strikes regime is 
likely imprisoning offenders for too long.   
5.3.3 Ethical implications of a three-strikes regime 
Another aspect of the incapacitation argument is the ethical question. This was examined in 
great detail in the Floud Report. Floud considered that preventive detention of dangerous 
offenders could be justified by the principle of just redistribution of risk. Under this conception, 
preventive detention is justly imposed if it justly redistributes risk between potential victims 
and potential aggressors.540 The risk is therefore justly redistributed if:541 
i. the risk presented by the offender must be one of grave harm; 
ii. the offender is at fault; 
iii. there is no less restrictive way of dealing with the offender consistent with 
maintaining the necessary degree of public protection; and 
iv. the offender has caused or risked grave harm, and has committed at least one offence 
of a similar kind on a separate occasion from the instant offence. 
The Floud Report went on to examine the practical feasibility of identifying dangerous 
offenders, and noted that:542 
The nature of predictive judgments, the limited scope for precision and confidence 
in such judgments, the widely varying characteristics of the relatively few offenders 
likely to meet the qualifying conditions we propose for a protective sentence, call 
for the exercise of a broad discretion rather than the application of statutory tests. 
Floud further noted that predictive judgments have “on average no more than an even chance, 
at best, of being right”.543 However, the Report went on to argue that certain offences were so 
harmful that even a low risk of reoffending was unacceptable, and that preventive detention 
could be justified if sufficient procedural safeguards were put in place.544 It is worth noting that 
this is an argument in favour of a preventive detention regime with broad judicial discretion, 
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such as the regime in ss103-104 Sentencing Act. It does not, however, justify our three-strikes 
regime, which is a strict statutory test. In fact, Floud warns against an application of such tests 
because the limited precision of predictive judgments calls for “the exercise of a broad 
discretion rather than the application of statutory tests.”545 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
In summary, incapacitation will by definition reduce reoffending because an incarcerated 
offender cannot offend against the general public. However, it would not be just or practicable 
to incapacitate every offender by incarcerating them for extensive periods of time. Therefore, 
the goal of the incapacitation principle is to accurately predict offenders who are likely to 
commit serious violent offences in the future, so as to specifically incapacitate them. Some 
research has shown that a small percentage of career offenders are responsible for the majority 
of the offending. This indicates that selectively incapacitating these career offenders would 
effectively reduce offending. However, other research has shown that an offender’s criminal 
history may not be an accurate predictor of his propensity to reoffend. This is particularly true 
when attempting to predict violent offending. Furthermore, other research suggests that 
offence-based classification systems like that implemented by New Zealand’s three-strikes 
regime fail to accurately predict future reoffending. New Zealand’s three-strikes regime is also 
likely to result in periods of imprisonment that are longer than the average career length of an 
offender, which suggests that the regime is likely imprisoning these offenders for too long. 
Finally, a strict statutory test like that implemented by the New Zealand regime may also be 
ethically unjustifiable, as it removes the judicial exercise of discretion. 
5.4 Deterrence 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section will consider the application of deterrence theory to a three-strikes regime. 
5.4.2 The theory of deterrence 
Deterrence theory posits that punitive consequences for offending will deter future offending 
either by the particular offender being sentenced (Specific Deterrence), or by the general public 
(General Deterrence). This is premised on the notion that offenders act as ”homo 
economicus“ — the economic person with perfect knowledge making unfailingly rational 
choices.546 Under this assumption, offenders undergo a rational cost-benefit analysis before 
committing an offence, and as such, would be deterred from offending by their fear of punitive 
consequences.547 The hypothetical rational offender would undertake the following analysis, 
where C is the certainty of being punished for the offending, S is the severity of the punishment, 
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In other words, if the value of R is less than the value of the equation on the left, it will not be 
in the rational offender’s best interests to commit the offence. 
5.4.3 Studies on the effectiveness of deterrence 
Research to test deterrence theory has been difficult to accomplish because deterrence refers to 
nonevents (an offender's failure to commit an offence), and is therefore not directly observable. 
“[F]ailure to act is meaningful information about deterrence only if we clearly expect that the 
action should have occurred but did not”.549 Furthermore, where an offender does offend, this 
is nonetheless not a helpful observation because “[t]o infer a failure of deterrence, we must 
know that they were aware of and considered the punitive consequences of their acts before 
deciding to act anyway … otherwise, it is not a failure of deterrence but rather a thoughtless 
behaviour oblivious to its possible outcomes”.550  
The research that has been carried out on the effectiveness of deterrence has produced mixed 
results. Anecdotal studies based on interviews of repeat offenders found that “most of the 
offenders studied did not really think about the likely legal consequences of their actions”, and 
“had unrealistic perceptions about the likelihood of being caught and irrational expectations 
about what would happen to them if they did get caught”551. This result may be explained by 
the fact that “certainty of punishment mostly deters those with a high predisposition (or low 
“risk-sensitivity”) from offending because those with a low predisposition (“high risk- 
sensitivity”) are not likely to engage in crime at all”.552 This is supported by other research 
which shows that people vary in deterrability (their responsiveness to sanction threats), and 
that a certain segment of people are “incorrigible offenders”, who are “impervious to dissuasion” 
— “[i]ncreases in the perceived certainty and/or severity of sanction threats mean little to them 
because of their unresponsiveness to threatened punishment.”553 In addition, other research 
shows that many offenders who were incarcerated for the first time reached the conclusion that 
incarceration could be endured relatively easily, and therefore was no great threat.554 Some 
offenders did desist from crime for a short time after their first incarceration, and attributed this 
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to knowledge of the legal punishment, and extralegal factors in their lives.555 Offenders who 
did not desist either engaged in more planning before committing a crime, or “simply chose 
not to think about the legal consequences of their actions.” 556  Other researchers have 
commented that for some individuals, being arrested and incarcerated was viewed as a way of 
life, and therefore had little or no deterrent effect.557  
An increased police presence in an area has been shown to deter some amount of crime, as 
offenders rationally readjust their perception of risk, but research suggests that offenders may 
simply commit crimes elsewhere until “the heat is off”,558 or change the manner in which they 
offend to reduce the risk.559 One study concluded that:560  
The implementation of harsher penalties may be adequate to deter those populations 
who either do not commit crime or do so infrequently, but it appears to be dubious 
when applied to frequent offenders. They view themselves as immune from criminal 
sanction, and hence are undeterred. They tend to believe that they simply will not 
be apprehended for their criminal actions; if they are caught, they will be imprisoned 
for a very short amount of time. Those who actually consider the possibilities of 
brief imprisonment view prison as a nonthreatening environment. 
Studies correlating imprisonment rates and sentencing policy across states in the United States 
found results consistent with deterrence. However, this methodology produces inconclusive 
results because it does not directly assess the effects of deterrence.561 Studies that tracked crime 
levels before and after a change in punishment or enforcement policy similarly produced mixed 
results, with some studies showing a “definite deterence-like effect”, and others showing an 
opposite effect.562 In relation to the effect of California's three-strikes law, proponents argued 
that the three-strikes law accounted for a sharp decline in crime in California, and that indeed 
this decline significantly exceeded the that in the rest of the United States. 563  However, 
opponents of the law argue that New York (which did not have a three-strikes law during that 
time) showed the sharpest decline in crime in the same time period, not California. 564 
Furthermore, more recent studies found that “within California, counties that aggressively 
enforce the law “had no greater declines in crime than did counties that used it far more 
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sparingly.””565 Thus, any decline in crime during that time period may be more correctly 
attributed to other criminological factors such as a decrease in alcohol consumption and 
unemployment,566 rather than to the adoption of the three-strikes regime. This is supported by 
another study which found that “prior to “three strikes,” crime rates were declining already and, 
after “three strikes” they continued to decline at about the same rate, suggesting that whatever 
effect “three strikes” had, it was small at best.”567 
To the extent that deterrence may be effective, research indicates that it is affected more by the 
certainty (certainty that offending will result in punishment) and celerity (swift punishment 
following the offending) of the punishment, and less by the severity of the punishment.568 The 
criminal justice system is not suited to delivering effective deterrents because it fails to deliver 
certainty and celerity — sentences are generally uncertain, and are only imposed long after the 
commission of the offence. On the other hand, “the pleasures of crime are immediate and so 
carry greater weight than the delayed costs of crime in the would-be offender's calculus.”569  
Furthermore, other research indicates that to the extent that deterrence may be effective, it is 
more effective at preventing property offences, and less effective at preventing violent offences. 
This is because in instrumental crimes such as property offences, offenders may be more likely 
to weigh benefits and costs consciously, whereas in violent offences, offenders are less likely 
to make a rational decision to offend based on a cost-benefit analysis.570 “[T]he failure of the 
rational choice model may be the basis of many of the most serious crimes — from murder 
based upon anger, to terrifying thrill killings.”571 
5.4.4 Conclusion 
In summary, deterrence affects different people differently due to different levels of risk-
sensitivity. In addition, deterrence is particularly ill-suited to reducing re-offending by chronic 
offenders for two reasons. Firstly, people with high levels of risk-sensitivity are unlikely to 
offend in the first place. Repeat offenders on the other hand either do not believe that they will 
be apprehended, or believe that if they are caught, they will be imprisoned for a very short 
amount of time.572 Policies that increase deterrence may cause repeat offenders to adjust their 
behaviour, but this will likely be done by changing the manner or location of their offending in 
order to reduce the risk.573 Secondly, many offenders discover when they are first incarcerated 
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that incarceration can be endured relatively easily, and is therefore no great threat.574 This is 
compounded by the fact that for some people, arrest and incarceration is viewed simply as a 
way of life.  
5.5 The impact of the manifest injustice exception 
The above discussion has considered what could be described as a ‘pure’ three-strikes regime- 
one that contains no exceptions. New Zealand has implemented a slightly modified regime. In 
short, offenders who commit three “serious violent offences” are subject to long terms of 
imprisonment without parole. A manifest injustice exception was introduced as a safeguard, 
allowing courts to avoid imposing a non-parole order if such an order would be manifestly 
unjust. As discussed in chapter 3 above, this exception has been applied in almost every case. 
This has had the effect of further watering down the incapacitative and deterrent effects of NZ's 
three-strikes regime. The existence and frequent application of the manifest injustice exception 
further reduces certainty of punishment. As discussed above,575 certainty is a key factor in 
deterrence, and any reduction in certainty will drastically reduce the deterrent effect of the 
three-strikes regime. The application of the manifest injustice exception also means that fewer 
potential reoffenders are imprisoned, which by definition reduces the incapacitative effect of 
the regime. The potential effectiveness of a three-strikes regime as discussed in studies above 
must therefore be qualified, and will likely be reduced, in a New Zealand context, due to the 
manifest injustice exception. 
5.6 Conclusion 
To summarise, New Zealand's three-strikes regime seeks to reduce reoffending by means of 
incapacitation and deterrence. Although incapacitation by definition prevents an offender from 
reoffending against the general public, the three-strikes regime is a strict statutory test based 
on offence categories, and as such is poor predictor of future offending. Furthermore, the three-
strikes regime will often result in sentences of incarceration that exceed the career length of 
the offender — that is, the regime will incarcerate offenders even when they no longer pose a 
risk to society.  
The second mechanism by which the three-strikes regime seeks to reduce reoffending is 
deterrence. However, this is unlikely to be effective. Deterrence is particularly ill-suited to 
reducing re-offending by chronic offenders because people with high levels of risk-sensitivity 
are unlikely to offend in the first place. Repeat offenders on the other hand either do not believe 
that they will be apprehended, or believe that if they are caught, they will be imprisoned for a 
very short amount of time. Repeat offenders may also become institutionalised, and find that 
incarceration is either easily endured, or in fact preferable to life outside prison. Finally, the 
manifest injustice exception in the three-strikes regime further reduces the certainty of 
punishment, which further reduces the deterrent effect of the three-strikes regime.  
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This discussion of a three-strikes regime from a theoretical perspective therefore raises doubt 
as to its overall likelihood of effectiveness in New Zealand. This is a conclusion that appears 
to be supported by the discussion in the previous chapter of the practical operation of the three-




Chapter 6. The future of the three-strikes regime in New Zealand 
6.1 Indications of plans to repeal 
In May 2018, the Hon Andrew Little, who was at the time the Minister of Justice, announced 
plans to repeal the three-strikes regime576 because it “had not reduced crime rates and failed to 
act as an effective deterrent”, and had not made a difference in the eight years since its 
enactment.577 However, this attempt at repeal was unsuccessful as Mr Little was forced to 
withdraw his proposal due to a lack of political support from their coalition partners in the New 
Zealand First Party.578  
Although Mr Little signalled his intention to re-introduce the issue of repealing the three-strikes 
regime as part of the bulk of the criminal justice reforms taking place in 2019, this did not 
ultimately happen. 
In October 2020, following the 2020 New Zealand General Election, the Labour Party once 
again vowed to repeal the three-strikes regime, with caretaker Minister of Justice Andrew 
Little579 saying that:580 
Labour has committed to repeal the three strikes law which is leading to absurd 
results and instead focus on building a criminal justice system that ensures less 
crime, less offending and fewer victims of crime who are better supported.581 
This attempt at repeal may be more successful than the 2018 attempt as the Labour Party’s 
commanding win in the 2020 General Election allowed it to govern without a coalition 
partner.582 Thus far, as of February 2021, the new Minister of Justice, Kris Faafoi, has not 
commented publicly on this. 
6.2 Should it be repealed? 
6.2.1 Arguments for repeal 
The analysis of three-strikes case law carried out in the chapter 3 above shows that the Courts 
have indicated a lack of comfort with the three-strikes regime, as is demonstrated through the 
frequent application of the manifest injustice exception. As examples, in R v Harrison, 583 the 
Court found that the broad scope of the regime resulted in an elevated “risk of gross 
disproportionality”,584  and a potentially high risk of “arbitrary or wholly disproportionate 
 
576 O’Brien, above n 3. 
577 Northcott, above n 4. 
578 Little, above n 5. 
579 Following the 2020 New Zealand General Election, the current Minister of Justice is the Honourable Kris 
Faafoi: “Ministers | Beehive.govt.nz”, above n 6. 
580 Gay, above n 7. 
581 Minister Little may have been referring to decisions such as R v Campbell, above n 8; and R v Fitzgerald, 
above n 8 both of which resulted in sentences of 7 years imprisonment for relatively minor offending. 
582 New Zealand Electoral Commission, above n 9. 
583 R v Harrison; R v Turner, above n 10. 
584 At [87]. 
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outcomes”, 585  and in R v Campbell, where Mr Campbell was sentenced to 7 years’ 
imprisonment for grabbing the buttocks of a Corrections Officer, the Court stated that:586 
It may seem very surprising that this consequence could be required by law for an 
offence of this kind, but that is the law and I have no option but to enforce it. 
The regime is similarly criticised by lawyers. As discussed above in chapter 3, prosecution 
lawyers will often agree with the defence counsel that the manifest injustice exception should 
be applied.587 This is further illustrated by the findings in chapter 4 above, where several 
defence lawyers responded to the author’s survey by commenting that when acting for a client 
on their second or third strike, they would often seek to plea bargain to reduce the charge to a 
non-strike offence. Some defence lawyers also noted that their clients either did not understand 
the impact of the regime, or would not be deterred from future offending by the regime because 
most of the offending captured by the regime is impulsive and carried out under the influence 
of drugs, alcohol or both. Crown lawyers may also be more willing to reduce charges to a non-
strike offence when the defendant is on his second on third strike. As one survey respondent 
noted: 
[the regime] certainly results in a manipulation of charges by both Crown and 
Defence, often without proper reasoned basis, to achieve a result both sides can live 
with. For instance, I have represented two defendants on third strike offences where 
the max penalty is 14 years imprisonment. On the disclosed evidence, there has been 
an overwhelming Crown case against each defendant. But the Crown have been 
willing to reduce charges from 14 year charges to 7 year charges to reduce the 
impact of the three strike regime, which, but for the 3 strike regime, they would not 
have done. 
The three-strikes regime is also theoretically unsound. As discussed in the chapter 5 above, a 
strict statutory test such as the one imposed in New Zealand’s three-strikes regime is a poor 
predictor of future offending and often results in sentences of incarceration that exceed the 
career length of the offender, and therefore is an inefficient way to reduce reoffending by 
incapacitation. Furthermore, the three-strikes regime is also unlikely to reduce reoffending by 
deterrence because deterrence is particularly ill-suited to reducing re-offending by chronic 
offenders. 
Furthermore, the three-strikes regime will incur significant additional costs. A Regulatory 
Impact Statement by the New Zealand Police estimated that the regime would cause an increase 
in prison population, and therefore an increase in capital and operating costs as additional 
prison beds would be required. The Regulatory Impact Statement went on to say that 50 years 
after implementation, the regime would result in 700 additional prison beds being required, 
 
585 At [88]. 
586 R v Campbell, above n 8, at [13]. 
587 See e.g. R v Campbell, above n 8; R v Fitzgerald, above n 8; R v Alexander, above n 277. 
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incurring an additional $280 million in one-time capital costs and $63.8 million per year in 
ongoing operating costs.588 
The effect of this increase in prison population is exacerbated by the fact that many of New 
Zealand’s prisons are overcrowded and unfit for purpose. For instance, an inspection of the 
Auckland South Corrections Facility by Chief Ombudsman Peter Boshier found that prisoners 
were frequently locked in their cells for extended amounts of time as a way of managing staff 
shortages or rostering issues.589 Similarly, an inspection of the Waikeria Prison by the Chief 
Ombudsman found that prisoners in the High Security Complex (HSC) were “double-bunked 
in cells originally designed for one, and living conditions were poor”, and that the “HSC 
environment is not fit for purpose and is impacting adversely on the treatment of 
[prisoners]”. 590  Another inspection of the Paremoremo prison in Auckland by the Chief 
Ombudsman found that “staff shortages were having a significant impact on many aspects of 
custodial operation”,591 and that this negatively affected the prisoners “ability to attend medical, 
case management and reintegration appointments”,592 and could compromise prisoner and staff 
safety.593Finally, New Zealand’s three-strikes regime does not appear to have achieved its 
stated goal of reducing violent offending. An Evidence Brief by the Ministry of Justice 
concluded that the evidence on the effectiveness of our three-strikes regime was inconclusive, 
and that there was conflicting evidence that the regime could reduce crime. 594  Similarly, 
research by the Ministry of Justice published in August 2018 found that there had been a 5 per 
cent increase in three-strikes convictions since the introduction of the regime in 2010, and that 
there was “no clear indication that the three strikes legislation is reducing serious offending 
behaviour.”595 
6.2.2 Arguments against repeal 
Proponents of the regime may argue that the regime should not be repealed because it has not 
been given enough time to determine its efficacy. A Regulatory Impact Statement by the New 
Zealand Police found that the three-strikes regime would begin to increase the prison 
population 5 years after implementation, with the effect increasing linearly from five to 50 
 
588 New Zealand Police Regulatory Impact Statement: Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (16 December 2009) at 
7. 
589 Peter Boshier Ombudsman’s Report on an announced inspection of Auckland South Corrections Facility under 
the Crimes of Torture Act 1989 (February 2019) at 8. 
590 Peter Boshier Ombudsman’s Final report on an unannounced inspection of Waikeria Prison under the Crimes 
of Torture Act 1989 (August 2020) at 2. 
591 Peter Boshier Ombudsman’s Final report on an unannounced inspection of Auckland Prison under the Crimes 
of Torture Act 1989 (December 2020) at 2. 
592 At 2. 
593 At 2. 
594 Tadhg Daly and Matthew McClennan Three Strikes Law: Evidence Brief (Ministry of Justice, Evidence Brief 
2018). 
595 Ministry of Justice Factsheet: Three Strikes Offending (Ministry of Justice, Evidence Brief, August 2018). 
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years after implementation.596 Due to the incapacitative effect of incarceration, this would be 
expected to reduce serious violent offending by a proportionate amount.  
From a victim’s perspective, it should be noted that the regime also serves to protect victims 
from re-victimisation as it spares victims and their families from having to repeatedly attend 
parole hearings. It is worth noting however that this outcome could also be achieved through a 
reform of the parole system, rather than through sentencing legislation. 
The regime may also reflect public opinion. When the regime was first introduced in the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009, public submissions in support of the regime far 
outnumbered submissions opposing the regime. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 
of this thesis. On a similar note, some proponents of the regime may also argue that aside from 
its effect on serious violent offending, the regime was intended to increase public confidence 
in the Criminal Justice System. 
6.3 What does repeal look like? 
Given that the Labour Government has given a clear indication of its intention to repeal the 
three-strikes law, it is worthwhile considering how a repeal should be implemented. While 
those convicted of serious violent or sexual offending would no longer accrue strikes following 
the repeal of the regime, there may be an issue in relation to those who have already been 
sentenced under the regime. Could they be eligible to seek resentencing, as suggested by some 
lawyers in the practical chapter? 597  This would be particularly relevant for second strike 
offenders who are by definition ineligible for parole and third strike offenders who are serving 
the maximum sentence. 
Any resentencing requires consideration of retrospectivity. There is a general presumption that 
legislation should not be construed to have retrospective effect.598 However, Parliament can 
provide for retrospective effect if it wishes to do so.599 There are two groups of defendants who 
stand to benefit from a repeal of the three-strikes regime. Firstly, defendants who have been 
convicted of a strike offence, but who are sentenced after a repeal of the regime, would likely 
be subject to the non-strike penalty. This is because Section 6(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002 
states that: 
An offender has the right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty 
has been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty. 
However, this same section would be of no assistance to the second group of defendants — 
those who have already been sentenced under the regime. For this second (likely larger) group 
 
596 New Zealand Police, above n 588, at 7; See table at Table A. 
597 See discussion in chapter 4 above. 
598 Interpretation Act 1999, s 7; Crimes Act 1961, s 10A; Sentencing Act 2002, s 6. 
599 Interpretation Act, s 8. 
88 
 
of defendants, any relief would likely have to come in the form of a specific provision in the 
repeal allowing defendants sentenced under the regime to seek resentencing. 
The prohibition against retroactive application in s 26 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZBORA) and s 10 of the Crimes Act applies only to liability for offences, so a 
retroactive repeal of a sentencing law allowing defendants who have been sentenced under the 
regime to seek resentencing would arguably not be contrary to the NZBORA.  
As New Zealand’s three-strikes regime was inspired by a similar regime in California, it may 
be appropriate to look to California’s reform of their three-strikes regime as a guide for any NZ 
reform. Under California’s three-strikes regime as it was originally enacted, an offender who 
had two previous convictions for qualifying offences had to be sentenced to life imprisonment 
for their third conviction, even if this third conviction was a non-violent offence. This led to 
unjust outcomes in which defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment for relatively minor 
non-violent offending. In 2012, this regime was reformed to impose less severe sentences for 
non-violent and non-serious third strike offenders.600  Under this reform, non-violent third 
strike offenders would be sentenced to double the ordinary term of imprisonment, rather than 
to life imprisonment. The amendment also applied retroactively, allowing for defendants who 
were sentenced to life-imprisonment for a non-violent offence under the old regime to seek to 
be resentenced. More recently, in December 2020, Los Angeles County District Attorney 
George Gascón announced that prosecutors in the district of Los Angeles would no longer seek 
to apply “prior-strike enhancements” in sentencing, and would no longer seek sentences of life 
without parole. Furthermore, any defendants sentenced on the amended provisions within 120 
days of the announcement would be eligible for resentencing.601 
It is interesting to note that resentencing in a New Zealand context, resentencing might not be 
as complicated or as time consuming as in California. Because of the test laid out in Harrison, 
Courts have generally set out a “but for” sentence for every second and third strike murder and 
third strike non-murder defendant as part of the manifest injustice decision. This is the sentence 
that would have been imposed in the absence of the three-strikes regime. If our three-strikes 
regime was repealed with retroactive effect, sentences affected by three-strikes provisions 
could simply be rolled back to their “but-for” sentences. This would also mean that defendants 
for whom the sentence under the regime was found to be manifestly unjust would not be eligible 
for resentencing, as they would already have been sentenced to the but-for sentence. Similarly, 
second strike defendants (who under the regime were required to serve their sentence without 
parole) could simply have the restriction on parole eligibility removed. This may prevent some 
of the administrative issues seen in some counties in California following the reform in 2012, 
such as a large backlog of cases pending resentencing.602 
 
600 California Proposition 36, Changes in the “Three Strikes” Law (2012). 
601 George Gascón Sentencing Enhancements/Allegations (2020) Special Directive 20-08. 
602 Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project and NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Progress Report: 
Three Strikes Reform (Proposition 36) (2013). 
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To date, there have been 402 second strike603 and 19 third strike defendants sentenced under 
the three-strikes regime since its enactment. However, of the 402 second-strike defendants, 12 
defendants were sentenced for murder as a second-strike offence. In all 12 of these cases, 
defendants were not ordered to serve the sentence of life imprisonment without parole due to 
the manifest injustice exception that applies to the sentencing of second and third strike 
murders under the regime. In addition, due to the manifest injustice exception that applies to 
third strike sentencing, 12 of the 19 third-strike defendants were not ordered to serve their full 
sentence of imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Another two of those third-strike 
defendants were sentenced for murder as their third-strike offence, and in both cases, the 
defendants were similarly not ordered to serve the sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole.604 Therefore, without accounting for defendants who have already completed their 
sentence under the regime and been released, there may potentially be 390 second-strike 
defendants and five third-strike defendants who are eligible for resentencing following a repeal 
of New Zealand’s three-strike regime. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The Labour government attempted to repeal the three-strikes regime in May 2018, but was 
unsuccessful due to lack of political support from its coalition partners, the New Zealand First 
Party. Following a commanding win in the 2020 General Elections, the Labour government is 
now able to govern without a coalition partner, and has once again indicated that it intends to 
repeal the three-strikes regime.  
The analysis carried out in the Case Law, Theory, and Practical chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis 
indicates that the three-strikes regime is disliked by judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers. 
The regime is also theoretically unsound, and the limited quantitative evidence available thus 
far suggests that as predicted by the theory, it does not appear to have effectively reduced 
violent offending. Although proponents of the regime may claim that the regime achieves other 
goals such as protecting victims from repeated parole hearings and improving public 
confidence in the Criminal Justice System, these goals can and should be achieved by other, 
more targeted means such as a reform of the parole system, rather than by the unwieldy lever 
of increased sentencing. The regime should be repealed, and in addition, defendants who would 
be affected by the repeal (see discussion above) should have an opportunity to seek 
resentencing. To quote Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascón, “[t]he pursuit 
of justice is timeless, therefore this policy will correct historic wrongs”.605 It therefore follows 
that defendants who have been subject to unjust outcomes as a result of this regime should be 
able to seek redress in the form of a resentencing. 
  
 
603 Ministry of Justice “Three strikes” offences (Ministry of Justice, June 2020). 
604 A more detailed breakdown of these cases is available on Table B. 
605 Gascón, above n 601. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
Similarly to the Californian three-strikes regime, New Zealand’s three-strikes regime was 
enacted amid public outcry about crime and the perceived leniency of the criminal justice 
system. Proponents of the regime claimed that it would increase public safety by reducing 
serious and violent offending, through the means of incapacitation and deterrence. Proponents 
also claimed that the New Zealand regime was better designed than the Californian regime, 
and therefore would not result in the unjust outcomes seen under the Californian regime. 
However, these promises do not appear to have been fulfilled.  
This thesis began in chapter 2 by setting out the background and history of New Zealand’s 
three-strikes law, by examining the evolution of the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill as it 
moved through the legislative process. It then examined the arguments made for and against 
the Bill in Parliamentary debates, and then analysed public sentiment about the Bill by 
examining the submissions made on the Bill by members of the public. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis went on to analyse the application of the regime as found in case law. 
It first examined the consistency of the three-strikes regime with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. Next, it discussed the application of the manifest injustice exception in the 
leading case of R v Harrison; R v Turner, and how this was applied in subsequent decisions. 
Finally, this chapter examined the application of the manifest injustice exception to s 86C 
(stage-2 non-murder offences) in case law. 
Expanding from the analysis in chapter 3, chapter 4 of this thesis discussed the impact of the 
regime on criminal lawyers, and defendants who are subject to the regime. This involved a 
survey of criminal lawyers in New Zealand, and provided further insight into the practical 
application of the three-strikes regime and its effect on criminal defendants. 
Next, chapter 5 of this thesis analysed the theoretical basis of the three-strikes regime. It began 
by establishing the theoretical grounds for punishment under which New Zealand’s three-
strikes regime is justified. It then considered the validity of these grounds, and whether New 
Zealand’s implementation and application of the three-strikes regime fits within these grounds. 
Finally, chapter 6 of this thesis discussed the potential repeal of New Zealand’s three-strikes 
regime. It first analysed the arguments for and against repealing the regime, before going on to 
consider how a potential repeal may be implemented, and the practical implications of such a 
repeal. 
7.2 Significance 
This thesis contributes to the debate by performing an in-depth analysis of the design and 
development of the New Zealand law, and its application in case law. In the course of this 
analysis, this thesis has found that the New Zealand regime has resulted in several potentially 
unjust outcomes, and that as a result, judges are often uncomfortable with the effects of the 
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regime, and have frequently sought to avoid applying the regime to its full extent by means of 
liberal application of the manifest injustice exception.  
Furthermore, this thesis also sheds light on the practical effects of the regime on pre-trial 
negotiations and preparations by defence lawyers, and the practical effects of the regime on 
defendants. In the course of this research, this thesis has found that defence lawyers (and 
possibly also prosecution lawyers) are often similarly uncomfortable with the effects of the 
regime due to the removal of judicial discretion and the resulting potential to result in unjust 
outcomes, and as a result were often more willing to engage in plea negotiation. This thesis has 
also found in its analysis of the case law that prosecution lawyers have in many cases conceded 
that application of the full extent of the regime would result in unjust outcomes. The regime 
has also resulted in defendants being less likely to plead guilty to strike offences, and being 
less willing to engage in rehabilitative programs due to the removal of the possibility of parole. 
This thesis has also found that the New Zealand regime is theoretically unsound. The regime 
fails as an incapacitative measure because it operates as a strict statutory test based on offence 
categories, and such tests are a poor predictor of future offending. Furthermore, the regime will 
result in offenders being imprisoned even when they no longer pose a risk to society. The 
regime also fails as a deterrent measure because deterrence is particularly ill-suited to reducing 
re-offending by chronic offenders because people with high levels of risk-sensitivity are 
unlikely to offend in the first place. Repeat offenders on the other hand are less likely to respond 
to deterrence because they either do not believe that they will be apprehended, or believe that 
if they are caught, they will be imprisoned for a very short amount of time. This is reflected in 
the experience of defence lawyers who commented that defendants do not seem to be deterred 
by the regime, likely because most serious violent offences such as the ones captured by the 
regime are often impulsive, and often committed under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or both. 
In fact, defence lawyers have noted that defendants who fall under the regime may be less 
likely to engage in rehabilitative and reformative programs due to the removal of the possibility 
of parole. 
Finally, this thesis argues that New Zealand’s three-strikes regime should be repealed because 
of the flaws discussed above. Furthermore, drawing from the repeal of California’s three-
strikes regime, this thesis argues that such a repeal should extend to allowing for defendants 
sentenced under the regime to seek a resentencing, and briefly discusses what a resentencing 
process might look like in the context of the New Zealand regime. 
7.3 Future directions for research 
One future direction for research is connected to the limitation of the present thesis. As 
acknowledged in the introduction, there has been little empirical data on the efficacy of New 
Zealand’s three-strikes regime, and so more empirical research on this front would contribute 
greatly to the literature. This might involve semi-structured interviews with both defence and 
prosecution lawyers, in order to follow up on some of the comments made in the online survey. 
92 
 
However, this research would need to isolate the influence of a large variety of other variables, 
such as changes in socioeconomic conditions and other policies introduced during the same 
time period. 
Another future direction for research is the practical implications of a repeal of the New 
Zealand regime. For example, this thesis has argued that any repeal should also extend to 
allowing for defendants sentenced under the regime to seek a resentencing. However, one 
question that has not been addressed is whether it would be possible, or even desirable, for the 
Courts to create a right of resentencing through case law if resentencing is not provided for by 
the legislation of the repeal. Further research in this area will depend on if, and how, repeal is 
considered by the new Minister of Justice. 
7.4 Final words 
I hope that this thesis has set out the case for repealing New Zealand’s three-strikes sentencing 
regime. The regime removes the exercise of judicial discretion from the sentencing process, 
and in doing so turns sentencing into a mechanical box-ticking exercise, rather than an 
application of the law to individual circumstances. It is theoretically unsound, has not achieved 
its stated goals, and has resulted in potentially unjust outcomes. To quote a lawyer who 
responded to the survey in chapter 4.10 of this thesis, “[w]e are going to have to build a lot 





Appendix A: List of Strike Offences in Bar-1 Bill 
1. Section 128B Crimes Act (sexual violation) (max 20 years imprisonment) 
2. Section 129 Crimes Act (attempted sexual violation and assault with intent to commit 
sexual violation) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
3. Section 129A(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with consent induced by threat) (max 
14 years imprisonment) 
4. Section 130 Crimes Act (incest) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
5. Section 131(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with dependent family member under 
18 years) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
6. Section 131(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with dependent family 
member under 18 years) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
7. Section 132(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with child) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
8. Section 132(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with child) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
9. Section 132(3) Crimes Act (indecent act on child) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
10. Section 134(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with young person) (max 10 years 
imprisonment) 
11. Section 134(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with young person) (max 10 
years imprisonment) 
12. Section 134(3) Crimes Act (indecent act on young person) (max 7 years 
imprisonment) 
13. Section 135 Crimes Act (indecent assault) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
14. Section 138(1) Crimes Act (exploitative sexual connection with person with 
significant impairment) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
15. Section 138(2) Crimes Act (attempted exploitative sexual connection with person 
with significant impairment) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
16. Section 142A Crimes Act (compelling indecent act with animal) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
17. Section 172 Crimes Act (murder) (max life imprisonment) 
18. Section 173 Crimes Act (attempted murder) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
19. Section 177 Crimes Act (manslaughter) (max life imprisonment) 
20. Section 188(1) Crimes Act (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
21. Section 188(2) Crimes Act (wounding with intent to injure) (max 7 years 
imprisonment) 
22. Section 189(1) Crimes Act (injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) (max 
10 years imprisonment) 
23. Section 191(1) Crimes Act (aggravated wounding) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
94 
 
24. Section 191(2) Crimes Act (aggravated injury) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
25. Section 198(1) Crimes Act (discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
26. Section 198(2) Crimes Act (discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent to 
injure) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
27. Section 198A(1) Crimes Act (using firearm against law enforcement officer, etc) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
28. Section 198A(2) Crimes Act (using firearm with intent to resist arrest or detention) 
(max 10 years imprisonment) 
29. Section 198B Crimes Act (commission of crime with firearm) (max 10 years 
imprisonment) 
30. Section 199 Crimes Act (acid throwing) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
31. Section 208 Crimes Act (abduction for purposes of marriage or sexual connection) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
32. Section 209 Crimes Act (kidnapping) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
33. Section 232(1) Crimes Act (aggravated burglary) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
34. Section 234 Crimes Act (robbery) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
35. Section 235 Crimes Act (aggravated robbery) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
36. Section 236(1) Crimes Act (causing grievous bodily harm with intent to rob or assault 
with intent to rob in specified circumstances) (max 14 years imprisonment) 




Appendix B: List of Strike Offences in Bar-2 Bill 
1. Section 128B Crimes Act (sexual violation) (max 20 years imprisonment) 
2. Section 129 Crimes Act (attempted sexual violation and assault with intent to commit 
sexual violation) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
3. Section 129A(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with consent induced by threat) (max 
14 years imprisonment) 
4. Section 131(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with dependent family member under 
18 years) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
5. Section 131(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with dependent family 
member under 18 years) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
6. Section 132(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with child) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
7. Section 132(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with child) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
8. Section 132(3) Crimes Act (indecent act on child) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
9. Section 134(1) Crimes Act (sexual connection with young person) (max 10 years 
imprisonment) 
10. Section 134(2) Crimes Act (attempted sexual connection with young person) (max 10 
years imprisonment) 
11. Section 134(3) Crimes Act (indecent act on young person) (max 7 years 
imprisonment) 
12. Section 135 Crimes Act (indecent assault) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
13. Section 138(1) Crimes Act (exploitative sexual connection with person with 
significant impairment) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
14. Section 138(2) Crimes Act (attempted exploitative sexual connection with person 
with significant impairment) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
15. Section 142A Crimes Act (compelling indecent act with animal) (max 14 years 
imprisonment) 
16. Section 144A Crimes Act (sexual conduct with children and young people outside 
New Zealand) (max 7–14 years imprisonment) 
17. Section 172 Crimes Act (murder) (max life imprisonment) 
18. Section 173 Crimes Act (attempted murder) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
19. Section 174 Crimes Act (counselling or attempting to procure murder) (max 10 years 
imprisonment) 
20. Section 175 Crimes Act (conspiracy to murder) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
21. Section 177 Crimes Act (manslaughter) (max life imprisonment) 
22. Section 188(1) Crimes Act (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
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23. Section 188(2) Crimes Act (wounding with intent to injure) (max 7 years 
imprisonment) 
24. Section 189(1) Crimes Act (injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) (max 
10 years imprisonment) 
25. Section 191(1) Crimes Act (aggravated wounding) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
26. Section 191(2) Crimes Act (aggravated injury) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
27. Section 198(1) Crimes Act (discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
28. Section 198(2) Crimes Act (discharging firearm or doing dangerous act with intent to 
injure) (max 7 years imprisonment) 
29. Section 198A(1) Crimes Act (using firearm against law enforcement officer, etc) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
30. Section 198A(2) Crimes Act (using firearm with intent to resist arrest or detention) 
(max 10 years imprisonment) 
31. Section 198B Crimes Act (commission of crime with firearm) (max 10 years 
imprisonment) 
32. Section 200(1) Crimes Act (poisoning with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
33. Section 201 Crimes Act (infecting with disease) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
34. Section 208 Crimes Act (abduction for purposes of marriage or sexual connection) 
(max 14 years imprisonment) 
35. Section 209 Crimes Act (kidnapping) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
36. Section 232(1) Crimes Act (aggravated burglary) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
37. Section 234 Crimes Act (robbery) (max 10 years imprisonment) 
38. Section 235 Crimes Act (aggravated robbery) (max 14 years imprisonment) 
39. Section 236(1) Crimes Act (causing grievous bodily harm with intent to rob or assault 
with intent to rob in specified circumstances) (max 14 years imprisonment) 




Appendix C: Issues raised in submissions against the Bill 
1. Contravenes natural justice 
2. Does not support mandatory life without parole 
3. Increased legal aid costs because strike offences will require senior practitioners 
4. Will cause chaos in penal system 
5. Stronger emphasis on restorative justice 
6. Punitive culture unhealthy for society 
7. Will compound society's lack of concern for elderly 
8. Section 86D raises double jeopardy issue 
9. Will put judges in difficult position 
10. Recommend putting in place Ombudsman's 2007 recommendations 
11. Incarceration shouldn't be a cure-all 
12. Sensible Sentencing Trust does not understand crime and its causes 
13. Bi-cultural, value-based model in schools 
14. More recognition and resources for NGOs involved in early intervention, Restorative 
Justice, etc. 
15. Effect on youth — longer in prison without rehab 
16. Recent increase in statistics is due to increased reporting of domestic violence 
17. NZ Law is based on inclusion and redemption 
18. Breaches separation of powers 
19. Will put increased demands on forensic mental health services that cannot be met 
20. Evidence shows modest reduction in crime rates accompanying significant increases 
in sentencing 
21. Danger of Police ratcheting up charges to meet strike threshold 
22. Incapacitation to reduce crime is unrealistic due to cost 
23. Alternative: parole eligibility at a later point 
24. Manifest injustice is a high threshold 
25. Explanatory Note is missing key information 
26. If offenders are detained for long periods, there must be a commitment to 
rehabilitation 
27. Regime is inconsistent with parole framework 
28. Lists of offences in legislation are problematic due to inconsistencies 
29. Does not support retroactive effect 
30. Does not support inclusion of more offences 
31. May decrease confidence in Criminal Justice System among Maori 
32. Prisoners should be treated with dignity and respect 
33. Prisons will have to be improved to meet UN standards 
34. Contrary to Te Ao Maori principles 
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Appendix D: Issues raised in submissions in favour of the 
Bill 
1. Concerns about immigrants; 
2. It was society's right to punish offenders; 
3. the regime would allow judges to apply sentences that better reflect the seriousness of 
the crime and impose harsher sentences; 
4. The regime would reduce reoffending by incapacitating offenders; 
5. Concern about the younger age at which offending begins; 
6. Major crime was being fuelled by imported media; 
7. The criminal process was unnecessarily convoluted, with too many appeals; 
8. Criminals were not deterred by prison sentences, and should therefore be excluded 
from the community; 
9. The financial costs of the regime should not be a consideration; 
10. The regime would stop the cycle where prison time was seen as a badge of honour; 
11. Other areas of government need to address the over-representation of Maori and 
Pasifika peoples in prison; 
12. NZ has a low imprisonment rate; 
13. Crime is underreported in Police statistics; 
14. The regime would affect 0.3% of the current prison population; 
15. There was evidence that “getting tough on crime” worked; 
16. The BORA fails law-abiding people; 
17. Life sentences are a good idea; 
18. Habitual offenders commit a majority of offences; 
19. The regime would eliminate sentencing disparities; 
20. The crime rate fell in USA after implementation of their three-strikes regimes; 
21. Current rehabilitation programmes do not work; 
22. Youth need to be educated; 
23. There was international research showing that three-strike systems do not criminalise 
ethnic minorities; 
24. There was no comparison between the regime proposed in the Bill, and the USA 
system (fortunately not from the same person who supported the regime because the 
USA system works); 
25. The regime would not result in cruel and unusual penalties; 
26. Preventive detention was not a satisfactory alternative because victims would still be 
re-victimised at parole hearings; 
27. The regime should not focus on reform; 
28. There was inadequate police presence in rural communities. 
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Appendix E: Amendments suggested by one submitter 
1. More than three strikes 
2. Send young offenders into the Army 
3. Ignorance of the list of strike offences should not be a defence 
4. Compulsory rehab programs  
5. More consideration for rehab programs 
6. More support systems for victims 
7. All criminals should be sterilised  
8. Eugenics should be considered 
9. Gang members should not be eligible for parole 
10. NZ version should avoid problems of US version 
11. Life sentences for drug offences 
12. Where appropriate, three-strike system should be applied to first time offenders 
13. Believes home invasion and theft are organised crime 
14. Combine with accessible addiction treatment 
15. Offenders sentenced to 25 years released once they reach 55 years of age and 15 years 
have been served 
16. New, separate prison wings for drink/drugged drivers 
17. Failure to notify victims should invalidate parole hearings 
18. Sentences doubled if positive drug test 
19. Parole violations should be actioned immediately 
20. Prisoners should be assessed on education levels 
21. Ban gangs 
22. Remove troubled children from their environment 
23. Wants imprisonment for child pornography 
24. Offenders who offend against children should have any future children taken from 
them 
25. No compensation for prisoners 
26. Increased anti-drug efforts 
27. Focus resources on helping offenders on first appearance 
28. Life sentences for violent offenders 
29. Significant sentences for convicted directors and CEOs 
30. Harsher sentences for home invasion 
31. Investigate offenders re Maori land ownership 
32. Public safety should be paramount in all legislation 
33. More prison funding 
34. No appeals for repeat offenders 




36. Wants Maori leaders to condemn crime 
37. Reintroduce corporal punishment in schools 
38. Legal aid for victims 
39. Judges held responsible for repeat offenders 
40. 17-year minimum sentence for all murders 
41. 25-year minimum sentence for certain murders 
42. Legal aid only for first time offenders 
43. Licence cancellation/suspension for car thieves/car chases 
44. No defence lawyers allowed — self rep only 
45. 3 strike system for all offenders 
46. Wants more emphasis on first serious crime 
47. Police should spend less time on motorists 
48. Harsher sentences for deterrence 
49. Build more prisons 
50. Better education from birth 
51. 25-year MPI for serious offences 
52. Young offenders should be closely looked at 
53. Allow victim's family to be merciful 
54. It's racist, sexist and ageist to notice disproportionate impact on Maori  
55. Look at Canadian system 
56. Cases being brought to court quicker 
57. Get rid of drugs 
58. ROC/ROI results should be available to the courts 
59. No legal aid for violent offenders 
60. Concessions for early guilty plea 
61. Any offence resulting in permanent disability or loss of life should always result in 
prison 
62. Chemical castration for serial rapists 
63. More police presence 
64. Violent offending resulting in permanent disability should attract 2 strikes 
65. Separate facilities for young offenders 
66. Educate prisoners 
67. Morale/humanity education in prisons 
68. Prisoners should not be allowed to father children 
69. No sentences less than 75% of the max 
70. Raise drinking age to 20 
71. More speed cameras 
72. Whipping criminals instead of imprisonment 
73. Bail and parole should not be abolished for violent criminals 
74. Community Safety Act to protect public 
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75. Also address causes of crime 
76. Jury to give strike warnings instead of judges 
77. More punitive sentences 
78. BORA concerns can be dealt with by adding a presumption that third strike offenders 
pose a significant risk 
79. Confiscation of profits from drug dealing 
80. Random visits by police 
81. Police should have more powers 
82. Fewer qualifying offences 
83. Only prosecute more serious crimes 
84. No automatic LWOP for second strike murder 
85. Increase max sentences 
86. Life sentences for life  
87. Mandatory imprisonment for strike 2 
88. Proceedings in indictable jurisdiction 








Table B: Spreadsheet of Section 86D and 86E Cases 
s86D (Stage 3 offences other than murder)
Case Name Offender Name Court Location Judge Counsel Date Decided Strike Sentence under s86D First Strike Offence First Strike Sentence Date of First Strike Offending Date of Conviction for First Strike Offence Estimated End of Sentence for First Strike Offence Second Strike Offence Second Strike Sentence Date of Second Strike Offending Date of Conviction for Second Strike Offence Estimated End of Sentence for Second Strike Offence Third Strike Offence Third Strike Sentence Date of Third Strike Offending Sentence but for s86D (Harrison  step 2) Fourth Strike Offence Fourth Strike Sentence Date of Fourth Strike Offending Fourth Strike Sentence but for s86D (Harrison  step 2) Personal circumstances Manifest injustice found Crown agrees with manifest injustice 
R v Campbell [2016] NZHC 2817 Raven Casey Campbell High Court Hamilton Kit Toogood Thomas Sutcliffe 24/11/2016 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Robbery (10 years) 14 months intensive supervision, 4 months community detention September 2012 March 2013 May 2014 release; 4 months community detention Aggravated robbery (14 years) 3 years 4 months imprisonment August 2013 7 April 2014 Indecent assault (7 years) 7 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 17 May 2016 12 months imprisonment Relatively young, no previous sexual offending, genuine remorse. Victim hopes for defendant to have the opportunity for paroleYes Yes
R v Ratima [2017] NZHC 252 Kingi Ratima High Court Hamilton Gordon A-M Beveridge 23/02/2017 3 10 years imprisoment without parole Robbery (10 years) 1 year imprisonment 14 May 2014 4 August 2014 August 2015 Robbery (10 years) 1 year 4 months imprisonment without parole 25 November 2014 10 June 2015 April 2016 (dates don't match up? Backdate for time served?)Robbery (10 years) 10 years imprisonment with 5 year MPI 15 May 2016 (3 weeks after release) 3 years 11 months; parole after 1 year 3 months Relatively young, mental health difficulties (bipolar affective disorder with psychotic symptoms), has had no chance to engage in rehabilitation in a meaningful wayYes No
R v Fitzgerald [2018] NZHC 1015 Daniel Clinton Fitzgerald High Court Wellington Simon France Kevin Preston & A C R M Jeffares 10/05/2018 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Indecent assault (7 years) 11 months imprisonment 1 October 2012 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=TEVEST0020121201e8c10000a&cat=a&ep=ASI))convicted 26 October 2012 and remanded in custody ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default. spx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=TEVEST0020121026e8aq0000f&cat=a&ep=ASI)); Sentenced on 1 December 2012 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=TEVEST0020121201e8c10000a&cat=a&ep=ASI))2013 Indecent assault (7 years) 4 months imprisonment 2015 Indecent assault (7 ye rs) 7 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 3 December 2016 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=DOMPOS0020180510ee5b0000c&cat=a&ep=ASI)) (R v Fitzgerald [2018] NZHC 465)*Truncated consideration bec use Crown concurred Has significant mental health issues (schizophrenia), and needs constant mental health careYes Yes
R v Waitokia [2018] NZHC 2146 Hayze Neihana Waitokia High Court Whanganui David Collins Roger B Crowley 21/08/2018 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 5 months home detention Sentenced in 2012 2012 Sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection (20 years) 3 years imprisonment Sentenced in 2014 Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 7 years imprisonment without parole 4 January 2018 2 years 3 months imprisonment Genuine regret, desire to undertake rehabilitative measures. However, high risk of reoffendingNo N
R v Nuku [2018] NZHC 2510 Stead Nuku High Court Auckland Matthew Downs AS Bloem 26/09/2018 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) 5 years 9 months imprisonment 14 July 2015 22 December 2015 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020151221ebcm009st&cat=a&ep=ASI))2021 Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) 3 years 10 months imprisonment (cumulative) 19 October 2016 Sentenced 3 November 2017 2024 Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) Preventive detention; 7 year MPI 5 years 1 month imprisonment Dysfunctional childhood, Guilty plea (however very strong Crown case)No No
R v Pomee [2018] NZHC 2891 George Christopher Pomee High Court Auckland Matthew Downs LB Cordwell 09/11/2018 3 14 years imprisonment without parole Robbery (10 years) 1 year 11 months imprisonment 11 & 14 November 2013 2016 Aggravated robbery (14 years) 1 year 4 months imprisonment 23 April 2015 Aggravated robbery & Kidnapping (14 years) 14 years imprisonment; 5.5 year MPI 3 & 9 August 2017 6 years 3 months imprisonment; 50% MPI Age, desire to rehabilitate, guilty plea Yes No
R v Sanders [2019] NZHC 164 Bailey Desmond Sanders High Court Auckland Pheroze Jagose G A Harvey and K-A Stoikoff 15/02/2019 3 14 years imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 2 years 8 months imprisonment 2014 Injuring with intent to cause grevious bodily harm (10 years) 5 years imprisonment (cumulative) 2016 (while in prison) 2024, parole in 2021 Wounding with intent to cause grevious bodily harm (14 years)14 years imprisonment; 7 year MPI 21 July 2018 7 years imprisonment; 50% MPI Dysfunctional childhood, lack of redemptive measures availableYes No
R v Rutherford [2019] NZHC 1628 Grahame John Rutherford High Court Wellington Francis Cooke L A Scott 12/07/2019 3 10 years imprisoment without parole Indecent act on a child under 12 (10 years) 2 years community detention 2015 2017 Indecent assault on a female under 12 (10 years) 8 months imprisonment 2016 Indecent act on child (10 years) 10 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 7 February 2019 14 months' imprisonment Guilty plea, no previous opportunity to undertake a treatment programme, however, high risk of reoffending, no discount for rehab potential or remorseYes No
R v Williams [2019] NZHC 2832 Stephen Williams High Court Wellington Peter Churchman B Crowley 1/11/2019 3 14 years imprisonment without parole Attempted murder (14 years) 5 years 8 months imprisonment 8 August 2014 Sentenced 26 November 2014 serving life imprisonment; eligible for parole 2019 Attempted murder (14 years) Preventive detention; 10 year MPI 11 December 2016 sentenced 14 March 2017 serving life imprisonment and preventive detention; eligible for parole 2027Attempted murder (14 years) Preventive detention; 14 year MPI 30 July 2019 9-10.5 years imprisonment; 66% MPI Guilty plea, but no remorse; high risk of violent reoffending; some willingness to engage with supportNo No
R v Wereta [2019] NZHC 2734 Damian Karl Wereta High Court Auckland Matthew Downs Ron M Mansfield 25/10/2019 3 14 years imprisonment without parole Aggravated robbery (14 years); Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to injure10 years 6 months imprisonment Sentenced 1 February 2013 2023 Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) 7 years 9 months 15 September 2013 Sentenced 17 September 2015 2021 Wounding with intent to cause grevious bodily harm (14 years)Preventive detention; 8 year MPI 12 November 2017 10 years imprisonment; 66% MPI Guilty plea, but no remorse; extensive history of violence; high risk of violent reoffending; PTSD and ASPD; some willingness to engage in rehabilitaitonYes No
R v Winitana [2019] NZHC 3229 Leo Winitana High Court Wellington Francis Cooke M J Phelps 9/12/2019 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Aggravated robbery (14 years) 3 years imprisonment 2011 2014 Aggravated robbery (14 years) 6 years 2016 Sentenced May 2016 2021 Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 7 years imprisonment without parole 4 July 2018 4 years 3 months imprisonment; 66% MPI Guilty plea; Dysfunctional childhood; drug and alcohol use from a young age; little education; some attemptes to rehabilitate; risk of reoffendingNo No
R v Mitai-Ngatai [2020] NZHC 410 Tauhu David Mitai-Ngatai High Court Tauranga Pheroze Jagose B J Hesketh 5/12/2020 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Indecent assault (7 years) 13.5 months imprisonment without parole 2017 2018 Indecent assault (7 years) 7 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 8 March 2019 14 to 24 months imprisonment Offending driven by substance abuse; Willing to address alcohol use and problematic behaviour; High risk of reoffendingYes No
R v Edmonds [2020] NZHC 557 Peter Edmonds High Court Christchurch Cameron Mander DJH Stringer 18/03/2020 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 9 months home detention 9 November 2014 Robbery (10 years) 9 months imprisonment 10 June 2016 Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 7 years imprisonment; 3 years 6 months MPI 25 November 2018 5 years 2 months imprisonment High risk of reoffending, denies wrongdoing, uninterested in rehabilitationYes No
R v Nuku [2020] NZHC 506 Stead Nuku High Court Auckland Sarah Katz E Priest & P Wilks 13/03/2020 4 14 years imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) 5 years 9 months imprisonment 14 July 2015 22 December 2015 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020151221ebcm009st&cat=a&ep=ASI))2021 Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) 3 years 10 months imprisonment (cumulative) 19 October 2016 Sentenced 3 November 2017 2024 Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) Preventive detention; 7 year MPI 31 October 2017 & 23 November 2017 5 years 1 month imprisonment Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (14 years) Preventive detention imposed, 14 year MPI 8-Apr-19 10.5 years, 2/3 MPI Guilty plea; Dysfunctional childhood; systemic deprivation; Second third strike offence; no remorse; incapable of empathy; no efforts towards rehabNo No
R v Love [2020] NZHC 1215 Jamie Natata Love High Court Christchurch Cameron Mander S J Hembrow 3/06/2020 3 10 years imprisoment without parole Robbery (10 years) 2 years 4 months imprisonment February 2013 2015 Robbery (10 years) Compulsory treatment order 7 February 2019 22 July 2019 Robbery (10 years) 10 years imprisonment; 3 years 4 months MPI 15 August 2020 18 months imprisonment High risk of reoffending; bipolar disorder, controlled by medication but exercabated by substance abuse; insight into offendingYes Yes
R v Sheers [2020] NZHC 1596 Conrad John Sheers High Court Auckland Mark Woolford Maria Pecotic 7/07/2020 3 14 years imprisonment without parole Aggravated robbery (14 years) 2015 11 September 2015 Aggravated robbery (14 years) 2015 15 July 2016 Aggravated robbery (14 years) 14 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 15 March 2019 2.5 to 3 year ADHD; FASD; functions at a level below his age Yes No
R v Allen [2020] NZHC 1796 Wiremu Tamahana Allen High Court Wellington Clark C J Nicholls 23/07/2020 3 7 years imprisonment without parole Wouding with reckless disregard (7 years) 7 years imprisonment; normal parole rules apply 15 June 2019 2 years 1 month Guilty plea; Abusive and dysfunctional childhood; substance addiction and abuse; mental health issues; high risk of reoffendingYes No
s86E (When murder is a stage-2 or stage-3 offence)
Case Name Offender Name Court Location Judge Counsel Date Decided Strike Sentence under s86E First Strike Offence First Strike Sentence Date of First Strike Offending Date of Conviction for First Strike Offence Estimated End of Sentence for First Strike Offence Second Strike Offence Second Strike Sentence Date of Second Strike Offending Date of Conviction for Second Strike Offence Estimated End of Sentence for Second Strike Offence Third Strike Offence Third Strike Sentence Date of Third Strike Offending Sentence but for s86E (Harrison  step 2) Personal circumstances Manifest injustice found Crown agrees with manifest injustice 
R v Kingi [2016] NZHC 139 Turei Rawiri Kingi High Court Hamilton Edwin Wylie Thomas Sutcliffe 11/02/2016 2 Life imprisonment without parole Robbery (10 years) (relatively minor) 11 April 2014 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 13 year MPI 10 August 2015 1 September 2015 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable pre-Harrison Relative youth, first strike relatively minor, present offending not the worst type of murder, mental health issues  (diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, poor compliance with prescribed medication, offending coincides with onset of mental illness), guilty plea, remorse, prospects of rehabilitation, views of the victimsY s No
R v Herkt [2016] NZHC 284 Ben Bosch Herkt High Court Auckland Simon Moore Peter Kaye 26/02/2016 2 Life imprisonment without parole Robbery (10 years) 3 years 6 months imprisonment 04/01/2012; 10/01/2012 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020120111e81b003h1&cat=a&ep=ASI))27 July 2012; sentenc d in 2012 July 2015 Murder (Life; MPI according to s1 /104) Life imprisonment with 12 year MPI 17 November 2014 05/11/2015 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020151105ebb50005m&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicabl Not Applicable pre-Harrison Remorse, age (39), circumstances of offending less serious, no violence in first strike offence, mental health issues (alcohol has the effect of neutralising his prescribed anti-psychotic medication), some room for optimism w.r.t. rehabilitation, victims do not hold a grudgeYes No
R v Eruera [2016] NZHC 532 Hiakita Hori Eruera High Court Rotorua Christian Whata E R Fairbrother QC & M M Dorset 23/03/2016 2 Life imprisonment without parole Injuring with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (10 years) 4 years imprisonment 2010 2014 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI 29 November 2014 (still subject to parole conditions)11/12/2015 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=APNBPT0020151215ebcb0000d&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI (s104) Provocation — circumstances do not engage the need for deterrence and denunciation, capacity to rehabilitateYes No
R v Harrison [2016] 3 NZLR 602 Shane Pierre Harrison Court of Appeal Ellen France P, Randerson, Harrison, Stevens and Miller JJ Christopher WJ Stevenson & SJ Gill 10/08/2016 2 Life imprisonment without parole Indecent assault (7 years) 1 year 4 months imprisonment 2011 2012 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 13 year MPI 22 August 2013 25/09/2014 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=DOMPOS0020140924ea9p00006&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applic ble Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 13 year MPI Relative youth, mental health, guilty plea, attempts to live a more pro-social lifeYes No
R v Turner [2016] 3 NZLR 602 Justin Vance Turner Court of Appeal Ellen France P, Randerson, Harrison, Stevens and Miller JJ Nick P Chisnall & L Freyer 10/08/2016 2 Life imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 3 years 4 months imprisonment 2010 15 January 2014 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI 22 March 2014 (2 months after release) 08/10/2014 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020141007eaa8006pp&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applic ble Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI (s104) Guilty plea, mental health (not on prescribed anti-psychotic medication at time of offending), physical and sexual abuse as a child, head injuries leading to suspected frontal lobe damageYes No
R v Heihei [2017] NZHC 2243 Jason Jake Heihei High Court Whangarei Graham Lang Kelly Ellis 15/09/2017 2 Life imprisonment without parole Indecent assault (7 years) 4 months home detention sentenced on 24 June 2014 March 2015 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 10 year MPI 22 July 2016 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 10 year MPI Age, guilty plea, views of the victims, nothing in his criminal history to suggest he will likely murder again.Yes Yes
R v Puna [2018] NZHC 79 Johnnie Puna High Court Napier Helen Cull Eric J Forster (Elvidge & Partners) 8/02/2018 2 Life imprisonment without parole Aggravated robbery (14 years) 9 months community supervision; 6 months community detention 2016 2017 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 14 year MPI 5 February 2017 24 November 2017 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=DOMPOS0020171124edbp0000b&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicabl Not Applicable Not A plica le Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 14 year MPI Mother's pre-natal use of alcohol and drugs, engaged well in rehabilitative efforts, remorse, some degree of insight into his difficulties. High risk of re-offending.Yes Yes
R v Davis [2018] NZHC 1162 Dylyn Mitchell Davis High Court Hamilton Paul Davidson Thomas Sutcliffe & PJA Buckle 22/05/2018 3 Life imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 1 year 6 months imprisonment (R v Davis DC Hamilton CRI-2014-019-804, 2 July 2014)2 July 2014 2016 Aggravated robbery (14 years) 2 years 4.5 months imprisonment March 2015 (R v Davis [2015] NZDC 15681) 12 August 2017 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=WAIKTI0020180327ee3s00002&cat=a&ep=ASI))Mu de  (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 20 year MPI (s1 4) 4 February 2018 (5 months after release) Life imprisonment with 14 year MPI ADHD at a young age, suicide attempt in 2014. Many prior convictions, high risk of re-offending, no signs of depression or psychotic symptomatology, no genuine remorse or empathy.Yes No
R v Alexander [2018] NZHC 1584 Jayden Shane Alexander High Court Timaru Nicholas Davidson James R Rapley & Paul Bradford 29/06/2018 2 Life imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 1 year 11 months 17 August 2015 April 2016 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 11 year MPI 13 September 2016 (5 months after release) 3 March 2018 Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 11 year MPI Expression of extreme remorse and distress. Significant criminal history, institutionalised — unable to function in the community, strong predilection towards violence, high risk of offendingYes Yes
R v Tai [2018] NZHC 1602 Turiarangi Tai High Court Auckland Matthew Muir Peter J Kaye & R Keam 29/06/2018 2 Life imprisonment without parole Wounding with intent to injure (7 years) 9 months imprisonment January 2016? 10 May 2016 Feb 2017 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI 4 April 2017 28 March 2018 ((https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/353581/guilty-verdict-in-chozyn-koroheke-murder-trial))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 17 year MPI (s104) Youth, victim of sustained physical abuse by his father from age 5, frequent user of alcohol and drugs, length criminal history. Psychiatric symptoms consistent with antisocial personality disorder. Willingness to participate in rehabilitation programmesYes No
R v Hone [2018] NZHC 2605 Martin Hone High Court Rotorua Geoffrey Venning W Lawson (Bill Lawson) (Lance Lawson, Rotorua)05/10/2018 2 Life imprisonment without parole Unlawful sexual connection (20 years) Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 20 year MPI 7 August 2017 (on prison release and subject to parole conditions)5 October 2018 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=APNTDP0020181005eea60001f&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applica le Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable not stated Relative youth, PTSD diagnosis, second stage murder rather than third, circumstances of first stage offence quite different to the present offending, guilty plea, length MPI imposedYes Yes
R v Lothian [2019] NZHC 2938 David James Lothian High Court Napier Robert Dobson R B Philip 11/11/2019 2 Life imprisonment without parole Wounding with reckless disregard (7 years) 2 years 5 months imprisonment 2013 2015 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 20 year MPI 29 September 2018 24 September 2018 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=RNZNEW0020190923ef9o0008e&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Appli bl Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Life imprisonment with 20 year MPI (s104) Guilty plea, remorse, age (27), first strike offending relatively less serious, some grounds for encouragement re: rehabilitation, but insufficient to justify any reductionYes No
R v Ngatai [2020] NZHC 2106 Tyson Ellis Ngatai High Court Whanganui Christine Grice P M Keegan & J Waugh 14/08/2020 2 Life imprisonment without parole Aggravated robbery (14 years) 5 years 5 months imprisonment (served 4 years) Apr-19 Murder (Life; MPI according to s103/104) Life imprisonment with 15 year MPI 20 September 2019 29 June 2020 ((https://global-factiva-com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&NS=16&AID=9UNI002200&an=THDAIL0020200629eg6u00003&cat=a&ep=ASI))Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable not stated Guilty plea; dysfunctional childhood; remorse Yes Yes
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